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2 Schedule 1—Main counter-terrorism amendments 
Recommendation 1 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 
to remove the ability of ‘members’ or ‘part-time senior members’ of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be eligible issuing officers for a 
delayed notification search warrant. 
Recommendation 2 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 
to reduce the extension of a notification period for a delayed notification 
search warrant without requiring Ministerial authorisation from 18 to 12 
months. 
Recommendation 3 
The Committee recommends that additional exemptions be included in 
the offence provisions relating to disclosure of information on delayed 
notification search warrants in proposed section 3ZZHA of the Counter 
Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 to 
explicitly enable: 
 disclosure of information in the course of obtaining legal advice, 
 disclosure of information by any person in the course of 
inspections by the Commonwealth Ombudsman, or as part of a 
complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman or other pro-active 
disclosure made to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, and 
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 communication of information by Commonwealth Ombudsman 
staff to the Commonwealth Ombudsman or other staff within the 
Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in the course of their duties. 
Recommendation 4 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Counter Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 to confirm that the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions must take into account 
the public interest, including the public interest in publication, before 
initiating a prosecution for the disclosure of information relating to a 
delayed notification search warrant. 
Recommendation 5 
Whilst there were differing views within the Committee, the Committee 
recommends that the Attorney-General further clarify the meaning of the 
terms ‘encourage’, ‘advocacy’ and ‘promotion’ by amendment to either 
the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 
2014 or its Explanatory Memorandum in light of the evidence provided 
during the Committee’s inquiry. 
Recommendation 6 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 to clarify the meaning of 
‘promotion’ in relation to statements of support for the objectives or 
activities of a terrorist organisation as defined by the Criminal Code. 
Recommendation 7 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General review all current 
listings of terrorist organisations under the Criminal Code to determine 
whether additional names or aliases should be added to any listings. 
Recommendation 8 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General notify the 
Committee of any proposed Regulation to alter the listing of a terrorist 
organisation by adding or removing a name or alias. The Committee also 
recommends that it have the power to determine if it wishes to review 
any proposed changes to listings. 
Recommendation 9 
The Committee recommends that the Government consider requiring 
that a control order can only be based on a foreign conviction where the 
conduct giving rise to the conviction would constitute a terrorism related 
offence in Australia. 
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Recommendation 10 
The Committee notes that the Attorney-General’s Department and the 
Australian Federal Police have flagged the possibility of further 
enhancements to the control order regime given ongoing examination of 
the application process and purposes for which a control order can be 
sought. 
Should further changes be proposed, the Committee recommends that 
these amendments are referred to this Committee with appropriate time 
for inquiry and review. 
Recommendation 11 
The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended: 
 to ensure that a preventative detention order is only able to refer 
to a description in circumstances where the person’s true name is not 
known and not able to be determined based on reasonable inquiries. 
 to enable a preventative detention order to refer to an alias (as well 
as, or instead of a description) instead of a name where the person’s 
name is not known and not able to be determined based on reasonable 
inquiries. 
The Committee also recommends that the Bill be amended so that where 
a description is included in the preventative detention order, it has 
sufficient detail so as to identify beyond reasonable doubt the person to 
whom it applies. 
Recommendation 12 
The Committee recommends the existing preventative detention order 
regime be amended to specify that where the Ombudsman is required to 
be notified of certain events by the Australian FederalPolice, this 
notification is required to take place as soon as is reasonably practicable. 
Recommendation 13 
The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended so that the 
following powers sunset 24 months after the date of the next Federal 
election: 
 control order regime in Division 104 of the Criminal Code Act 
1995 
 preventative detention order regime in Division 105 
 the stop, search and seizure powers relating to terrorism offences 
in Division IIIA of the Crimes Act 1914 
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 questioning and questioning and detention warrant regime in the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to require the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security to complete a review of each of the powers listed above 18 
months after the next Federal election. 
The Committee recommends that the Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor Act 2010 be amended to require the INSLM to finalise 
a review of the operation of each of these powers 12 months after the next 
Federal election. 
Recommendation 14 
The Committee recommends that the functions of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security be extended to encompass the 
counter-terrorism activities of the Australian Federal Police, including, 
but not limited to, anything involving classified material. 
Recommendation 15 
The Committee recommends that the definition of ‘subverting society’ in 
proposed section 117.1 of the Criminal Code be replaced with a cross-
reference to the conduct contained in the definition of ‘terrorist act’ in 
section 100.1 of the Criminal Code. 
Recommendation 16 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General consider 
amending the definition of ‘engaging in a hostile activity’ in proposed 
section 117.1 of the Criminal Code to constrain it to conduct that would 
be considered to be a ‘serious offence’ if undertaken within Australia. 
The definition of ‘serious offence’ for the purposes of this section should 
be made in consideration of other comparable areas of Australian 
criminal law. 
Recommendation 17 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General remove from, or 
more specifically define, acts prejudicial to the ‘international relations’ of 
Australia in the definition of ‘prescribed organisation’ contained in clause 
117.1(2) for the proposed foreign incursions and recruitment offences. 
Recommendation 18 
The Committee recommends that proposed subsection 119.3(2)(b), which 
explicitly enables the Minister to declare an entire country for the 
purposes of prohibiting persons from entering, or remaining, in that 
country, be removed from the Counter Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014. 
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Recommendation 19 
The Committee recommends that the Counter Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended to insert a clause 
that enables the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security to conduct a review of the declaration of each area made under 
proposed section 119.3, within the disallowance period for each 
declaration. The clause should be modelled on the existing subdivision 
102.1A of the Criminal Code in relation to the listing of terrorist 
organisations. 
Recommendation 20 
If legislated, the Committee recommends that subclause 119.2(6), relating 
to the proposed offence for entering, or remaining in, a declared area, 
sunset two years after the next Federal election. 
Recommendation 21 
If legislated, the Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 
2001 be amended to require the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security to complete a public inquiry into the ‘declared 
area’ provisions in clauses 119.2 and 119.3 of the Counter-Terrorism 
Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014, including the list of 
‘legitimate purposes’, 18 months after the next Federal election. 
The Committee further recommends that the Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor Act 2010 be amended to require the Independent 
National Security Legislation Monitor to review and report on the 
operation of the ‘declared area’ provisions 12 months after the next 
Federal election. 
Recommendation 22 
The Committee recommends that proposed section 27D of the Foreign 
Evidence Act 1994, which currently applies only to public officials and 
persons connected to public officials, be broadened to apply in 
circumstances where any person has directly obtained material as a result 
of torture or duress. 
Recommendation 23 
The Committee recommends that the Government broaden the definition 
of ‘duress’ in proposed Part 3A of the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 to include 
other threats that a reasonable person might respond to, including threats 
against a person’s assets, personal associates or other third parties. 
Recommendation 24 
The Committee recommends that proposed Part 3A of the Foreign 
Evidence Act 1994 be amended, based on section 165 of the Evidence Act 
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1995, to require courts to provide appropriate direction to juries, where 
necessary, about the potential unreliability of foreign evidence admitted 
under Part 3A. 
Recommendation 25 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Explanatory Memorandum to make it clear that the definition of 
‘politically motivated violence’ must be read with reference to the 
opening words in the definition of ‘security’ in section 4 of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. 
Recommendation 26 
The Committee recommends that proposed subsection 22A(2) of the 
Australian Passports Act 2005 and proposed section 15A of the Foreign 
Passports (Law Enforcement and Security) Act 2005 be amended so that the 
Director-General of ASIO or a Deputy Director-General must suspect on 
reasonable grounds the factors necessary to apply for the suspension of 
travel documents. 
Recommendation 27 
The Committee recommends the ability of the Foreign Affairs Minister to 
delegate the power to suspend a travel document be limited to the 
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
Recommendation 28 
The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014  be amended to require the 
Attorney-General or Minister for Justice to conduct: 
 a review of the decision to issue a certificate under paragraph 
38(2)(a) of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 or 
proposed subsection 48A(4) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 within 
12 months of issuing that certificate; and 
 ongoing reviews every 12 months for the time period the 
certificate remains active. 
3 Schedules 2 to 7 
Recommendation 29 
The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended to require the 
Attorney-General to make a decision to issue a security notice ‘on 
reasonable grounds’, having regard to: 
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 whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is, 
or will be, directly involved in activities which are prejudicial to 
security (with consideration given to ASIO’s security assessment); and 
 the likely effect of the cancellation of welfare payments on any 
dependents and what alternative arrangements might apply. 
Recommendation 30 
The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended to require the 
Attorney-General to conduct: 
 an initial review of the decision to issue a security notice within 12 
months of making that decision; and 
 ongoing reviews every 12 months after for the time period the 
security notice remains active. 
Recommendation 31 
Unless the Attorney-General is able to provide to the Parliament further 
explanation on the necessity of the proposed definition of ‘serious 
Commonwealth offence’ for the purposes of the Customs Act 1901 and 
how it would enable a greater role for Customs in dealing with national 
security threats or terrorist activity, the Committee recommends that the 
definition be removed from the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014. 
Recommendation 32 
The Committee recommends that the allowable period of detention by a 
Customs officer without notification to a family member or other person 
be extended from 45 minutes to two hours, rather than four hours as 
proposed in the Bill. 
The Committee notes that this does not deny a Customs officer’s power 
to refuse contact beyond this period on grounds of national security, 
security of a foreign country, safeguarding law enforcement processes or 
to protect the life and safety of another person. 
Recommendation 33 
The Committee recommends that information on the frequency of the use 
of Customs detention powers is included in the Department’s annual 
report. Further where a Customs officer exercises the power to refuse 
contact with a family member or other person on the grounds of national 
security, security of a foreign country, safeguarding law enforcement 
processes or to protect the life and safety of another person, then notice of 
this should be provided to the Ombudsman within seven days. 
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Recommendation 34 
The Committee recommends that the Privacy Commissioner undertake a 
Privacy Assessment of the data collected and stored by the Department 
of Immigration and Border Protections and Customs, and report to the 
Attorney-General by 30 June 2015, with specific regard to the collection, 
storage, sharing and use of that data by the government agencies within 
the remit of the Commissioner’s jurisdiction. 
Recommendation 35 
The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended to remove the 
ability to prescribe the collection of additional categories of biometric 
information within the Migration Regulations. 
Should this information be required by relevant agencies to ensure 
Australia’s border security, further legislative amendments should be 
proposed by the Government and referred to this Committee with 
appropriate time for inquiry and report. 
Recommendation 36 
The Committee recommends the Government consult with the Privacy 
Commissioner and conduct a privacy impact statement prior to 
proposing any future legislative amendments which would authorise the 
collection of additional biometric data such as fingerprints and iris scans. 
Recommendation 37 
The Committee commends its recommendations to the Parliament and 
recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be passed. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
The Bill and its referral 
1.1 On 24 September 2014, the Attorney-General, Senator the Hon George 
Brandis, QC, introduced the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (the Bill) into the Senate. In his second reading 
speech, the Attorney-General stated that the Bill is intended to ‘enhance 
the capability of Australia’s law enforcement, intelligence and border 
protection agencies to protect Australian communities from the threat 
posed by returning foreign fighters and those individuals within Australia 
supporting foreign conflicts.’1 
1.2 The Attorney-General added that: 
Around 160 Australians have become involved with extremist 
groups in Syria and Iraq by travelling to the region, attempting to 
travel or supporting groups operating here from Australia. While 
this is not the first time Australians have been involved in overseas 
conflicts, the scale and scope of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and 
the number of Australians presently involved, is unparalleled and 
demands specific and targeted measures to mitigate this threat.2 
1.3 On the same day, the Attorney-General wrote to the Committee to refer 
the provisions of the Bill for inquiry and to request it to report by 
17 October 2014.  He further requested that the Committee should, as far 
as possible, conduct its inquiry in public. 
 
1  Senator the Hon George Brandis QC, Attorney-General, Senate Hansard, 24 September 2014, 
p. 65. 
2  Senator the Hon George Brandis QC, Attorney-General, Senate Hansard, 24 September 2014, 
p. 65. 
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1.4 In the letter, the Attorney-General informed the Committee that the Bill 
would constitute the Government’s second tranche of legislation in 
response to the current national security threat. The first tranche was the 
National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014. 
Inquiry objectives and scope 
1.5 In conducting its inquiry, the Committee acknowledged that the Bill 
responds to a request from the Australian Federal Police, the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation and the Attorney-General’s Department 
for enhanced powers to deal with the heightened security threat. The 
Committee took evidence to this effect in both public and private hearings. 
The Committee was inclined to support this request subject to appropriate 
safeguards. 
1.6 As part of its inquiry, the Committee examined: 
 whether the Bill incorporates adequate safeguards and accountability 
mechanisms to ensure the proper application of the laws into the 
future; and 
 whether the Bill is drafted in a way to avoid any foreseeable 
unintended consequences. 
1.7 The Committee notes that at the time of this inquiry, a further proposal for 
amendments to national security legislation was being discussed by the 
Government. This included foreshadowed legislation relating to 
mandatory retention of telecommunications data, which is not within the 
scope of the Committee’s inquiry and is not discussed in this report.  
1.8 The Committee also notes that there has been discussion about its 
previous inquiry into the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 
(No. 1) 2014, which passed the Parliament on 1 October 2014. 
Conduct of the inquiry 
1.9 The inquiry was referred to the Committee by the Attorney-General on 
24 September 2014. The Chair of the Committee, Mr Dan Tehan MP, 
announced the inquiry by media release on 25 September 2014 and invited 
submissions from interested members of the public.  Submissions were 
requested by 3 October 2014. 
1.10 The Committee received 46 submissions, 10 supplementary submissions 
and two exhibits from sources including government agencies, legal, 
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community and civil liberties groups and members of the public. A list of 
submissions and exhibits received by the Committee is at Appendix A. 
1.11 The Committee held three public hearings, one private hearing and one 
private briefing in Canberra on 2 October, 3 October and 8 October 2014. A 
list of hearings and the witnesses who appeared before the Committee is 
included at Appendix B. 
1.12 Both the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman appeared before the Committee and gave 
evidence that they have sufficient authority to oversight the new powers 
in the Bill. These agencies are likely to require more resources to fulfil their 
expanded role. As recommended in the Committee’s previous report, the 
position of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor should 
also be urgently filled. 
1.13 Copies of submissions received and transcripts of public hearings can be 
accessed on the Committee website at www.aph.gov.au/pjcis. Links to the 
Bill and the Explanatory Memorandum are also available on the 
Committee website. 
Timeframe for the inquiry 
1.14 Nearly every submission to the inquiry commented on the short 
timeframes. The intensive nature of the inquiry and the short timeframes 
placed significant demands on the Committee. While the Committee 
recognises and understands that this resulted from exceptional 
circumstances, it would have been preferable if more time had been 
available for the inquiry.   
1.15 The Committee notes that a number of the measures in the Bill are derived 
from recommendations in earlier reviews or have formed part of 
community consultations conducted by the Attorney-General’s 
Department. The Bill also proposes a number of necessary and urgent 
measures to respond to threats to Australia’s national security and this has 
necessitated an expedited process. 
1.16 This report, while making a number of recommendations to amend the 
Bill, is designed to inform the next stage of debate which will take place in 
the Senate and House of Representatives. In some instances the 
Committee has recommended amendments to the Bill. In other instances 
the Committee has determined that measures in the Bill require more 
detailed explanation and has requested that the Attorney-General provide 
additional information to assist debate of the Bill. 
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1.17 The provisions of the Bill were intensely debated and there were a variety 
of views expressed within the Committee. The Committee expects the Bill 
will be subject to continuing debate in the Parliament and the community. 
1.18 It is the Committee’s firm view that for the third tranche of proposed 
legislation, a longer timeframe will be required to deal with the 
complexity of the legislation and allow sufficient time for public 
consultation.  
Report structure 
1.19 This report consists of three chapters: 
 This chapter sets out the context, scope and conduct of the inquiry, 
 Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the main issues raised in evidence 
regarding Schedule 1 of the Bill, and the Committee’s comments and 
recommendations regarding those issues, and 
 Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the main issues raised in evidence 
concerning Schedules 2 to 7 of the Bill, and the Committee’s comments 
and recommendations regarding those issues. 
 
 
 2 
Schedule 1—Main counter-terrorism 
amendments 
Introduction 
2.1 This chapter addresses Schedule 1 of the Bill, which contains the main 
counter-terrorism amendments.  
2.2 A number of issues concerning this schedule were raised with the 
Committee. Some were of a more minor nature and in these cases the 
Committee has made no comment. In other cases where there was a lack 
of clarity about particular provisions, the Committee has sought further 
information on these provisions.  
2.3 The chapter focusses on the issues that were of most concern to the 
Committee, informed by the evidence received from inquiry participants. 
These issues were: 
 amending the definition of ‘terrorism offence’ in the Crimes Act 1914 
 extension of the power to arrest without a warrant and introduction of 
delayed notification search warrants 
 introduction of a new offence of advocating terrorism into the Criminal 
Code 
 amending the process and criteria for listing terrorist organisations 
 changes to the control order regime  
 changes to the preventative detention order regime 
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 extending the operation of the 
 control order regime 
 preventative detention order regime 
 stop, search and seizure powers relating to terrorism offences 
 questioning and detention warrants regime in the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
 amending the definition of serious offence in the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 
 amending the definition of security in the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 
 changes to questioning and detention powers in Part III of the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
 amending the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing 
Act 2006 to include the Attorney-General’s Department as a ‘designated 
agency’ 
 changes to the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 to provide greater discretion in 
admission of foreign material in terrorism-related proceedings 
 repeal of the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 and its 
replacement with a new part 5.5 in the Criminal Code, and 
 amendments to the Australian Passports Act 2005. 
Amendments to the Crimes Act 1914 – definition of 
terrorism offence 
2.4 Schedule 1 of the Bill includes a proposed amendment to the definition of 
‘terrorism offence’ within section 3 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Crimes Act). 
The proposed amendments will mean that offences against Subdivision B 
of Division 80 (treason, urging violence and advocating terrorism 
offences) and proposed Part 5.5 (foreign incursion offence) of the Criminal 
Code and parts of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 will be 
terrorism offences for the purposes of the Crimes Act. 
2.5 The amendments are considered to be particularly important in the 
context of the Crimes Act, as there are a range of special police powers in 
that Act which rely on the definition of ‘terrorism offence’: 
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 Division 3A of Part 1A which provides powers in relation to 
terrorist acts and terrorism offences 
 Section 15AA which relates to bail not being granted in certain 
cases 
 Section 19AG which relates to non-parole periods for sentences 
for certain offences 
 New section 3WA in Part 1AA which inserts a new power of 
arrest without a warrant for a terrorism offence or offence of 
advocating terrorism 
 New Part 1AAA which inserts the delayed notification search 
warrant scheme, and  
 Part 1C which provides powers to detain a person for the 
purpose of investigating a terrorism offence.1 
2.6 The Explanatory Memorandum states that the amendment will implement 
Recommendation VI/6 of the Independent National Security Legislation 
Monitor (INSLM)’s Fourth Annual Report: 
In this recommendation the INSLM reiterates his position stated in 
his third annual report that ‘there is no reason in principle or 
policy to distinguish [United Nations] Charter Act terrorism 
financing offences which implement Australia’s international 
counter-terrorism obligations under 1373 and relate to potentially 
very serious terrorism financing activity, from terrorism offences 
under the Criminal Code.’ Further to this, he notes that the 
Foreign Incursions Act criminalises politically motivated violence, 
including conduct that would fit within the meaning of ‘terrorist 
act’ under the Criminal Code and criminalises engaging in hostile 
activity with an organization which is a proscribed terrorist 
organization under the Criminal Code.  For this reason there is 
similarly [no] reason in principle or policy to distinguish between 
the offences under the Foreign Incursions Act, which cover 
potentially very serious terrorist activity, from terrorism offences 
under the Criminal Code.2 
2.7 The reference to the Foreign Incursions Act offences will be covered by 
referring to proposed Division 119 of the Code.   
2.8 The Explanatory Memorandum also notes that the amended definition 
will be used for the purposes of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.3 
 
1  Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 [CTLA(FF) Bill], 
Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 90-91. 
2  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 91. 
3  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 91. 
8  
 
2.9 The Islamic Council of Victoria noted that the existing definition of 
‘terrorism’ already creates confusion within the Muslim community, as 
many in that community see groups engaged in conflicts throughout the 
world as legitimate forms of armed struggle: 
The broad definition of ‘terrorism’ and the way in which it is 
sometimes selectively applied to such groups is problematic in and 
of itself … 
Broadening this definition to include ‘foreign incursions’ and 
‘treason’ when Australia already has laws which deal with these 
further muddies the water on the issue of what can be considered 
terrorism and what should be considered legitimate resistance to 
oppression.4 
Committee comment 
2.10 While some concern was expressed about the range of offences that would 
be deemed to be terrorism offences, the Committee did not receive any 
substantive submissions or comments on specific offences which should 
not be included in the definition.   
2.11 Further, while acknowledging that there is an ongoing debate about the 
definition of ‘terrorism’ in Australian legislation, the Committee did not 
receive evidence to suggest the amendment should not proceed.   
2.12 On the evidence presented to it, the Committee supports the 
Government’s efforts to ensure consistency across legislation and to 
implement the INSLM’s recommendation. 
2.13 While there was agreement to update the definition, there were a variety 
of views on the specific implications that arise. 
Extension of stop, search and seizure powers 
2.14 The Bill proposes to extend the operation of the ‘stop, search and seizure 
powers’ in Division IIIA of the Crimes Act relating to terrorism offences 
for a further 10 years to 15 December 2025.   
2.15 The Explanatory Memorandum outlines that: 
 
4  Islamic Council of Victoria, Submission 42, p. 2. 
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In light of the enduring threat of terrorism, these powers will be 
maintained for an extended period of ten years to give law 
enforcement agencies the appropriate tools they need to deal with 
this threat.5 
2.16 While some submitters expressed concern about these powers,6 the focus 
of submissions was on the length of the proposed extension. This will be 
dealt with separately below.   
Power of arrest without a warrant 
2.17 The Bill inserts new section 3WA into the Crimes Act which will give 
constables the power to arrest, without a warrant, a person who the 
constable suspects on reasonable grounds has committed or is committing 
a terrorism offence or an offence against section 80.2C. Additionally, the 
constable must also reasonably suspect that issuing a summons against 
the person would not achieve one or more of the purposes specified in 
proposed subparagraphs 3WA (1)(i)–(vi).  
2.18 The section changes, in relation to terrorism offences, the existing power to 
arrest without a warrant in section 3W of the Crimes Act, which requires a 
constable to believe on reasonable grounds the same matters outlined 
above. 
2.19 According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the threshold for suspicion 
is 
lower than that of ‘believing’ on reasonable grounds … [h]owever, 
there would need to be some factual basis for the suspicion and 
there would need to be more than idle wondering. An arrest 
threshold based on suspicion is not a new concept in Australian 
law and is used in a number of Australian jurisdictions.7 
2.20 The intent of the new section is to 
give police the option to intervene and disrupt terrorist activities 
and the advocating of terrorism at an earlier point than would be 
possible where the threshold is reasonable grounds to believe.8 
 
5  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 93. 
6  For example, the Australian Human Rights Commission noted that these powers ‘involve 
restrictions on the freedom of movement and the right to privacy’ (Submission 7, p. 8). 
7  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 93. 
8  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 93. 
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2.21 The Explanatory Memorandum states that a different arrest threshold for 
terrorism offences is required 
due to the extraordinary risk posed to the Australian public by 
terrorism and the time critical nature that a response to such 
offences is needed.9 
2.22 Submitters questioned whether there was a demonstrable need for the 
new power, and its creation of a distinction between terrorism offences 
and other offences for the purposes of arrest. The Castan Centre for 
Human Rights Law stated in their submission that there is a lack of public 
evidence that the current arrest provision in 3W of the Crimes Act is an 
impediment to successful police action through arrests or disruption.10 
2.23 Both the Castan Centre and the Law Council of Australia noted that in his 
Fourth Annual Report, the INSLM considered a suggestion from the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) that the arrest threshold for terrorism 
offence should be lowered from ‘believe’ to ‘suspect’. The INSLM stated 
that 
it may be that the semantic distinction between ‘suspect’ and 
‘believe’ has escaped substantive attention. 
Be that as it may, the INSLM regards the [Australian Federal 
Police]’s suggestions as well founded, sensible and of some 
practical utility. This does not mean that the INSLM supports a 
special rule for terrorism offences in relation to arrest: that 
would be hard to justify.11 
2.24 Two additional points were raised in submissions. Australian Lawyers for 
Human Rights stated that the ability to arrest an individual without a 
warrant, based on reasonable suspicion, would appear to be a breach of 
Article 9(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR):12 
If persons can be arrested only on suspicion, then they cannot 
promptly be informed of proposed charges against them – which 
by definition would appear to be unformed when there is only a 
basis of ‘suspicion’. Nor can they be informed of the ‘reason’ for 
their arrest in the sense of being told what grounds have given 
 
9  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 94. 
10  Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission 17, p. 3. 
11  Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), Fourth Annual Report, p. 64. 
12  ‘Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest 
and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him’. 
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rise to a belief that particular charges should be brought against 
them – because that belief has not been formed.13 
2.25 Amnesty International Australia also noted that arrest on the grounds of 
‘reasonable suspicion’ is an inadequate standard of proof for arrest under 
international fair trials law.14 
2.26 Contrary to this position, the Explanatory Memorandum states that: 
An arrest threshold based on suspicion is not a new concept in 
Australian law and is used in a number of Australian jurisdictions. 
The arrest threshold in the United Kingdom is ‘reasonable 
grounds for suspecting’, a position which is consistent with the 
European Convention on Human Rights.15 
2.27 Dr David Connery stated that the ability to arrest without a warrant for 
advocating terrorism would require police officers to make 
a snap political and social judgment [that] the cause being 
advocated was indeed about terrorism. It is possible to imagine 
volatile situations where such statements may be made, and the 
action of trying to arrest a person for this might inflame the 
situation.16 
2.28 Dr Connery suggested that a better approach would be to require the 
officer to seek a warrant in such circumstances. 
2.29 In his submission, Dr Greg Carne raised questions about whether further 
safeguards would be required if the new provision is passed as it stands: 
It may be that the introduction of a lower standard of reasonable 
suspicion demands the introduction of compensatory further 
safeguards in the custodial and review processes in the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) after arrest for terrorism offences without warrant.17 
2.30 This position was echoed by the President of the Australian Human Rights 
Commission, who considered that many provisions in the Bill were 
lowering thresholds in relation to accessing powers: 
[M]any of these amendments, as you will be aware, significantly 
lower the thresholds of existing law and the words 'may' and 
'might' and 'suspicion' are used rather than words that require 
 
13  Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission 15, p. 5. 
14  Amnesty International Australia, Submission 22, p. 5. 
15  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 21. 
16  Dr David Connery, Submission 26, p. 3. 
17  Associate Professor Greg Carne, Submission 27, p. 11. 
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reasonableness and higher levels of 'shall' and so on. So they are 
drafting differences but quite profound in lowering these 
thresholds to levels that we think raise concerns. In broad terms 
we would like to see a greater use of the concept of reasonableness 
of belief and we would like to see proper procedural safeguards as 
a practical matter. Many human rights are protected through 
proper safeguards rather than necessarily substantive provisions.18 
2.31 The AFP noted that in the exercise of all its powers there is a significant 
degree of oversight of its operations and management: 
At the moment, obviously, we appear before parliamentary 
inquiries such as this, we have Senate estimates, we appear before 
the [Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement] as well, 
we have the Ombudsman, we have [the Australian Commission 
for Law Enforcement Integrity] and ultimately we are responsible 
to the courts and to the community for our actions.19 
Committee comment 
2.32 The Committee notes the AFP requested the lowering of the threshold for 
this specific power.  
2.33 The Committee notes that if a law enforcement officer suspects an 
individual of committing a terrorism related offence, the officer must first 
consider proceeding by way of summons, consistent with the existing 
arrest without warrant power in the Crimes Act.20 The constable may only 
arrest without a warrant if they reasonably suspect that a summons would 
not achieve one or more of the specified purposes, which include ensuring 
the appearance of the person before a court, preventing repetition or 
continuation of an offence or preserving the safety of the person.21 
2.34 The Committee particularly notes that lowering the arrest threshold 
within the Crimes Act for terrorism purposes in no way impacts on the 
use of other police powers, such as control orders or preventative 
detention orders. Such powers have their own thresholds, which must be 
met and which are discussed in other sections of this report.  
 
18  Professor Gillian Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 5. 
19  Assistant Commissioner Neil Gaughan, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 24. 
20  Section 3W of the Crimes Act. 
21  Proposed paragraph 3WA (1) (b) of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
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2.35 Australia is facing an increased threat from terrorism. The Committee 
considers the police should be appropriately equipped to disrupt 
terrorism activity at the earliest possible stage to ensure community safety.  
2.36 The Committee notes that other Australian jurisdictions (Queensland, 
Western Australia, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory) 
have powers for arrest without warrant for terrorism offences based on 
reasonable suspicion.22 In his Fourth Annual Report, the INSLM found 
that the existence of suspicion based arrest in other jurisdictions 
suffice[s] to dispel concern that liberalizing the test for arrest 
would disturb appropriate social balances.23 
2.37 The Committee also notes that the arrest threshold in the United Kingdom 
for a suspected terrorist is one of ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’,24 which 
is consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights.25 
2.38 The Committee notes the safeguards in the Crimes Act and the oversight 
mechanisms which apply to the AFP. This accountability would be 
enhanced by the Committee’s proposed oversight of the AFP’s counter-
terrorism operations, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
2.39 The Committee notes the comments in relation to ensuring proper 
procedural safeguards are included in the Bill. Throughout this report the 
Committee details where changes to existing powers have been made or 
new powers created, and the justifications provided for such changes or 
additions. The Committee also gives consideration to ensuring that there 
are appropriate safeguards in each instance. 
Delayed Notification Search Warrants 
2.40 The Bill proposes to introduce a delayed notification search warrant 
scheme into the Crimes Act. 
2.41 A delayed notification search warrant would allow an AFP member or 
special member to search a property without immediate notification to the 
occupier if they: 
 
22  Section 365, Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld); section 128, Criminal Investigation 
Act 2006 (WA); section 75, Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA); section 212, Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). 
23  INSLM, Annual Report, 28 March 2014, p. 64. 
24  Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK). 
25  Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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 suspect, on reasonable grounds, that one or more eligible offences have 
been, are being, are about to be or are likely to be committed 
 suspect, on reasonable grounds, that entry and search of the premises 
will substantially assist in the prevention or investigation of one or 
more of those offences, and 
 believe, on reasonable grounds, that it is necessary for the entry and 
search of the premises to be conducted without the knowledge of the 
occupier of the premises or any other person present at the premises.26 
2.42 An ‘eligible offence’ is a terrorism offence that is punishable by 
imprisonment for seven years or longer.27   
2.43 Notification to the occupier is delayed, initially for a period of not more 
than 6 months,28 which can be extended in certain circumstances.29 
2.44 Before applying for a warrant, the AFP Commissioner must have first 
authorised the member to do so, and only if the Commissioner is satisfied 
that the conditions for issuing the warrant are met.30 
2.45 The member may then apply to eligible issuing officers, which are certain 
judges and members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).31  
2.46 Under existing search warrant provisions in the Crimes Act, notification of 
the search warrant is required to be provided to the occupier of the search 
property at the time of execution of the warrant.32 The occupier may then 
also observe the search as it occurs.33 
2.47 According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the scheme will differ from 
the existing search warrant provisions so as to enable 
AFP officers to covertly enter and search premises for the 
purposes of preventing or investigating Commonwealth terrorism 
offences, without the knowledge of the occupier of the premises.34 
2.48 The ability to conduct a covert search is considered important because it 
will 
 
26  Proposed section 3ZZBA of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
27  Proposed section 3ZZAA of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
28  Proposed section 3ZZBE of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
29  Proposed section 3ZZDC of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
30  Proposed section 3ZZBB of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
31  Proposed section 3ZZAD of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
32  Section 3H of the Crimes Act. 
33  Section 3P of the Crimes Act. 
34  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 95. 
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ensure that the investigation remains confidential. This is 
considered critical to the success of certain investigations by the 
AFP, particularly when carrying out investigations of multiple 
suspects over an extended period… 
Operational experience has shown that the individuals and groups 
who commit such offences are highly resilient to other 
investigative methods and pose significant threats to the 
Australian community.35 
2.49 A range of concerns with the proposed scheme were raised in 
submissions. These concerns focussed on: 
 departures from established human rights and privacy principles 
 the ability of AAT members to issue warrants 
 introduction of a Commonwealth Public Interest Monitor 
 conditions which must be satisfied before a warrant is granted 
 the time frame in which notification of the search is delayed 
 adequacy of the compensation scheme 
 potential impact on Legal Professional Privilege (LPP) 
 the safety of occupiers and executing officers 
 disclosure offences, and 
 use of information seized during a search. 
2.50 Key issues arising from the evidence are discussed below.  
Precedents 
2.51 Submitters raised significant concerns that the introduction of a delayed 
notification warrant scheme would represent a substantial departure from 
established privacy and police investigatory principles.36 The Muslim 
Legal Network (NSW), for example, did not consider that sufficient 
evidence had been presented to justify the new powers: 
 
35  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 23, 95. 
36  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 16; Law Council of Australia, 
Submission 12, p. 33; Members of the Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee, Submission 29, 
p.2. 
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The proposed amendments fail to show why there is such a clear 
need to expand the already extensive range of powers available to 
the AFP and other law enforcement agencies.37 
2.52 The Law Council of Australia stated that the existing warrant scheme 
ensures 
that a person whose premises are searched is aware of the basis 
and the authority for the search, and is in a position to challenge or 
make a complaint about the issue of the warrant and/or its 
method of execution.38  
2.53 Immediate notification to an occupier was considered to be fundamental 
to reducing the risk of abuse of the power by officials.39 However, 
submitters also recognised the importance of the safeguards that will 
accompany the proposed new regime.40   
2.54 The Explanatory Memorandum notes that a delayed notification warrant 
scheme would be in keeping with other Commonwealth covert 
investigative powers. Additionally: 
Several Australian states and territories have either delayed 
notification or covert search warrant regimes for investigating 
terrorism offences including New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory.  
Covert or delayed notification search warrants are also available in 
both Canada and New Zealand.41 
2.55 The AFP submission also noted that covert style search warrants are 
available to police in the USA and the UK.42 
2.56 The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to state that: 
A delayed notification search warrant will only be used in limited 
operational situations and will be subject to a number of 
safeguards to balance the legitimate interests of the 
Commonwealth in preventing terrorism with the need to protect 
human rights.43 
 
37  Muslim Legal Network (NSW), Submission 43, p. 24. 
38  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 33. 
39  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 16; Muslim Legal Network 
(NSW), Submission 43, p. 26. 
40  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 17. 
41  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 95. 
42  Australian Federal Police, Submission 36, p. 4. 
43  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 95. 
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2.57 The AFP supported introduction of the warrant scheme as it would allow 
it to identify and collect information about 
other suspects involved in terrorist activity, the proposed location 
of and methodology for any planned attack, and the means of 
communication among suspects. In addition, the proposed DNSW 
regime would give the AFP the opportunity to identify and 
decipher any encryption techniques a suspect may be using to 
protect electronic communications. The ability to examine and 
potentially overcome these techniques without the knowledge of 
the suspect would facilitate the ongoing lawful monitoring of 
communications while preserving evidential material.44 
Issuing criteria and issuing officers 
2.58 The criteria that must be satisfied before the warrant can be granted are at 
proposed section 3ZZBD (2)(a)–(c).  Some submitters argued that criteria 
(2)(b), which requires the issuing officer to ‘have regard to’ the existence of 
alternative means of obtaining the evidence or information sought was not 
stringent enough. The councils for civil liberties across Australia argued 
there should be 
a pre-condition to the issuing of the warrant that the Applicant 
demonstrates that it is not possible to obtain the evidence in 
another way and in particular it is not possible to execute a 
warrant in the ordinary fashion.45 
2.59 Similarly, the Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee favoured a 
necessity test for why a normal search warrant would not be sufficient. 46   
2.60 The Law Council of Australia considered that issuing officers should have 
to consider possible impacts on LPP before issuing a warrant. 47 
2.61 The Explanatory Memorandum states that the ‘two-step’ authorisation 
process and the proposed issuing criteria which both the AFP 
Commissioner and issuing authority need to be satisfied of will ensure 
that 
a delayed notification search warrant is not authorised where it is 
not appropriate to do so, for example, where there would be a 
disproportionate impact on the occupier’s privacy or there is a 
 
44  Australian Federal Police, Submission 36, p. 4. 
45  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 17. 
46  Members of the Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee, Submission 29, p. 2. 
47  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 33. 
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more appropriate means of obtaining the evidence or information 
sought.48 
2.62 Some submitters questioned the power of an AAT member to issue a 
warrant. For example, the Australian Privacy Foundation expressed 
strong concern that action can be authorised by a member of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (ie someone who is not a judge 
and indeed may not have a law degree) rather than by a judge or 
magistrate.49 
2.63 The Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee suggested that only AAT 
members who were former judges should be able to become an issuing 
officer, due to a greater perceived degree of independence.50 
2.64 The Attorney-General’s Department noted that enabling AAT members to 
be issuing officers would be consistent with other Commonwealth covert 
power schemes, and that there were strong operational reasons for 
following this precedent: 
Including nominated AAT members as eligible issuing officers 
greatly enhances accessibility to the pool of individuals authorised 
to issue delayed notification search warrants.  Limiting the group 
to judges of the Federal Court and the Supreme Courts of states 
and territories could be problematic in urgent operational settings, 
or where operations are being conducted in remote areas.  AAT 
members have consistently proven to be available out-of-hours to 
deal with the operational needs of the AFP.   
AAT members will have the power to issue delayed notification 
search warrants in relation to premises located anywhere in the 
country, whereas state and territory judges will be limited to 
premises located within their jurisdiction.  This is particularly 
relevant in the context of terrorism investigations, where the 
offending activity is likely to be cross-border in nature.  The AFP 
can reduce the administrative burden on the courts by 
approaching the same AAT member for warrants in multiple 
states or territories rather than having to go to separate judges in 
those jurisdictions.  This also serves to improve transparency of 
the investigation as the same AAT member will have oversight of 
 
48  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 25. 
49  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 20, p. 2.  See also Councils for civil liberties across 
Australia, Submission 25, p.16; and Members of the Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee, 
Submission 29, p. 3. 
50  Members of the Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee, Submission 29, p. 3. 
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the extent of delayed notification search warrants and any related 
warrants being sought.51 
Period of notification delay 
2.65 The proposed scheme will allow notice of a search conducted under a 
delayed notification search warrant to be delayed for six months.52 In 
certain circumstances, this period can be extended for up to 18 months 
and, in exceptional circumstances, beyond.53 
2.66 The period of delay was considered too long by some contributors and the 
test for any subsequent extensions not strict enough. The councils for civil 
liberties across Australia noted that comparable powers in the United 
States and Canada have notification periods of seven (or 48) days and 90 
days respectively.54 The Law Council of Australia suggested that the 
timeframe needs to be proportionate given that such a warrant is 
intended to investigate a relevant offence, and is not a general 
intelligence gathering exercise.55 
2.67 The initial six month delay period may be extended if the issuing officer is 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for continuing to delay giving 
notice to the occupier.56 The councils for civil liberties across Australia 
considered that the test for extending the initial delay period was not 
sufficiently rigorous, and should be strictly limited to those relating to the 
investigation of an actual offence.57 
2.68 The Law Council of Australia also recommended that when a person is 
charged with an offence, and the evidence to be used against them 
includes evidence gained through a delayed notification search warrant, 
the material should be provided to them immediately upon charge. The 
Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee agreed, specifically noting that 
while the Bill provides that the person be notified as ‘soon as practicable’ 
after being charged: 
[the] phrase is robbed of content when that is defined as the earlier 
of the end of the delay period (ie 6 months or as extended) and the 
 
51  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, pp. 16–17. 
52  Proposed section 3ZZBE (1)(i) of the CTLA(FF) Bill.  
53  Proposed section 3ZZDC (6) of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
54  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 17. 
55  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 34. 
56  Proposed section 3ZZDC (5) and (6) of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
57  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p.17. 
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time when the prosecution brief of evidence is presented: cl 
3ZZDC(3) – this may be many, many months later.58 
Disclosure offences 
2.69 Submitters raised concerns about the offence provisions under proposed 
section 3ZZHA, particularly that a well-intentioned person, such as a 
journalist, who disclosed information about a delayed notification search 
warrant which that person considered to be in the public interest, may 
face prosecution. For example, the Joint Media Organisations raised 
concerns that the offence 
would see journalists jailed for undertaking and discharging 
their legitimate role in our modern democratic society – 
reporting in the public interest.59 
2.70 The Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance was of the same opinion, 
noting that the ‘time-lag’ between the issuing of a warrant and the 
provision of notification has the potential to impede journalists seeking to 
report a legitimate news story in the public interest.60 
2.71 The Joint Media Organisations suggest that the provision be removed or, 
alternatively, a public interest exception be created.61  Senator David 
Leyonhjelm agreed with this approach, arguing that 
we are not here talking about a major security operation. It is 
merely the issuance of a warrant. The provision seems calculated to 
remove the AFP from any and all journalistic scrutiny, and is in 
any case excessively broad.62 
2.72 Mr Bret Walker SC, the former INSLM, while noting his in-principle 
support for secrecy provisions attached to such powers, identified some 
issues with the provision and similarly to 
section 35P of the [Australian Security Intelligence Organisation] 
Act, in a cognate bill section 3ZZHA has, I suspect, some further 
work to be done, I hope without unpleasant experiences actuating 
 
58  Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee, Submission 29, p.3. 
59  Joint Media Organisation, Submission 23, p.7. 
60  Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Submission 44, p.6. 
61  Joint Media Organisation, Submission 23, p. 7. See also Australian Lawyers Alliance, Submission 
13, p. 5. 
62  Senator David Leyonhjelm, Submission 45, p. 3. 
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it, before an appropriate allowance of so-called whistleblowing in 
the case of illegality is provided for.63 
2.73 The Explanatory Memorandum states that the provision is similar to an 
existing provision in Part 1AB of the Crimes Act relating to controlled 
operations, and that: 
The intention of this offence provision is to maintain 
confidentiality of the information as long as operational 
sensitivities require.  The exceptions at 3ZZHA(2) ensure that no 
offence is committed if information is disclosed by officers in the 
performance of their duties.64 
2.74 No issues have been raised to date in relation to the Crimes Act 
provisions.65 In its previous inquiry into the National Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014, the Committee received evidence that a 
disclosure offence such as section 3ZZHA would operate with a 
‘recklessness’ threshold, and that 
the prosecution would be required to prove that a person who 
communicated information on [a delayed notification search 
warrant] was ‘reckless as to the possibility that the information 
related to [a delayed notification search warrant]’. This was a 
result of the application of the Criminal Code’s ‘fault element of 
recklessness’, which  
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of two matters: 
firstly, that the person was aware of a substantial risk that 
the information related specifically to [a delayed 
notification search warrant] and, secondly, that the person 
nonetheless and unjustifiably in the circumstances took 
that risk of communicating the information.66 
Other matters 
2.75 Three further points of particular note were raised with the Committee in 
relation to delayed notifications search warrants: powers available in the 
execution of the warrants, the use of information gained through the 
warrants and their potential use for other crime types. 
 
63  Mr Bret Walker SC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 38. 
64  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 116. 
65  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Inquiry into the National Security 
Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014, September 2014, p. 57. 
66  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Inquiry into the National Security 
Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014, September 2014, p. 56. 
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2.76 Some submitters, such as the Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee, 
Senator David Leyonhjelm and the Muslim Legal Network (NSW), raised 
concerns about the powers available to executing officers, in particular the 
ability to impersonate others and gaining access to the search premises 
through adjoining property. These powers were considered to be an 
unwarranted expansion of the power to investigate offences.67 The 
Explanatory Memorandum states that these powers are necessary to 
ensure that the covert nature of the warrant is maintained,68 and can only 
be authorised if such measures are reasonably necessary.69 
2.77 In his submission, Dr David Connery noted concerns around the range of 
agencies that would have access to delayed notification search warrants.70 
While the Bill makes it clear that only members or special members of the 
AFP may apply and execute a delayed notification search warrant,71 
section 3ZZEA of the Bill includes an expansive list or purposes for which 
things seized under a warrant may be used and shared.   
2.78 The Australian Crime Commission provided evidence that there is a 
growing nexus between organised crime and terrorism: 
The confluence between serious and organised crime and 
terrorism today is at a stage where it is becoming difficult to 
identify between the two.72 
Committee comment 
2.79 The Committee received a wide range of evidence about the proposed 
introduction of delayed notification search warrants. The following 
comments are limited to the main issues identified above. 
2.80 In general, on the evidence presented, the Committee accepts that there is 
a need for delayed notification search warrants for the investigation of 
serious terrorism offences by the AFP, and notes that their proposed 
introduction follows a recommendation by the INSLM. The Committee 
has considered, however, whether amendments are required to the 
scheme to address privacy and other concerns. 
 
67  Muslim Legal Network (NSW), Submission 43, p. 27. 
68  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 23. 
69  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 26. 
70  Dr David Connery, Submission 26, p. 2. 
71  Proposed section 3ZZAA of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
72  Mr Paul Jevtovic, Executive Director, Operations, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 
2014, p. 23. 
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Precedents 
2.81 While the Committee notes that delayed notification search warrants do 
represent a significant departure from the normal search warrant scheme 
provided for in the Crimes Act, it also notes that many other Australian 
police forces have access to similar, if not more intrusive, powers. Given 
the threat posed by terrorism and foreign fighters, the Committee 
considers it is appropriate that the AFP have access to these powers for 
serious terrorism offences. 
2.82 These powers were supported by the INSLM in his Fourth Annual Report, 
where he stated that he saw 
no reason why the AFP should not be able to access a delayed 
notification search warrant scheme for the investigation of 
terrorism offences. Such a scheme would increase the capability 
of the AFP to investigate and prosecute terrorism offences and 
would improve the effectiveness of Australia’s counter-terrorism 
laws.73 
2.83 The Committee notes the safeguards attached to delayed notification 
search warrants, which include: 
 a ‘two-step’ authorisation process 
 regular reporting to the Ombudsman and the Minister on use of the 
warrants, and 
 the high threshold for the issuing of a warrant 
in conjunction with the existing reporting and oversight mechanisms in 
place for the AFP,74 will provide safeguards and accountability. While this 
Committee does not currently have oversight of the AFP, a change to this 
effect is recommended later in this chapter. 
Issuing criteria and issuing officers 
2.84 The Committee accepts that the proposed issuing criteria will allow 
issuing officers to take into account concerns of privacy and the 
availability of other investigative techniques before deciding that the 
warrant is appropriate. 
2.85 Requiring an issuing officer to be exhaustively satisfied that no other 
investigative methods are available may have a detrimental effect on the 
 
73  INSLM, Annual Report, 28 March 2014, p. 62. 
74  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, pp. 15–16. 
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operational effectiveness of the warrant scheme. Similarly, requiring 
eligible officers to show that a delayed notification search warrant was the 
only available method may result in less effective, more time-consuming 
and more dangerous methods having to be evidenced in every 
application. It may even require such methods to be tried before making 
the application.75  
2.86 The Committee acknowledges the operational benefits of allowing AAT 
members to issue warrants. The Committee also recognises that delayed 
notification search warrants are an intrusive power and that those 
authorised to be issuing officers should be suitably qualified.  The 
Committee therefore recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Bill to remove the ability of ‘members’ or ‘part-time senior members’ of 
the AAT to be eligible issuing officers. 
 
Recommendation 1 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 
to remove the ability of ‘members’ or ‘part-time senior members’ of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be eligible issuing officers for a 
delayed notification search warrant. 
 
Period of notification delay 
2.87 The Committee accepts that a six-month notification delay (possibly 
extended to 18 months or beyond) could be considered an overly long 
interval for a person to be made aware of a search of their house or 
business. However, this view must be balanced with the operational need 
for police to be able to maintain the covert nature of an investigation for 
fear of ‘tipping off’ those subject to investigation. 
2.88 The Committee notes that a similar delayed notification search warrant 
scheme, with an initial six month delay period, was proposed in the 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (National Investigative Powers and 
Witness Protection) Bill 2006, which was the subject of inquiry by the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. The Senate 
Committee’s report did not recommend any changes to the notification 
period in this Bill.   
 
75  Mr Walker SC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, Wednesday 8 October 2014, p. 44. 
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2.89 The Committee believes that the initial six month period strikes a 
sufficient balance between operational utility and an individual’s right to 
know of a search of their property. The ability to extend this period is 
dependent on satisfying an independent third party, including in some 
instances the Minister, which provides sufficient protection against 
potential misuse of the power.  
2.90 The Committee does, however, consider that an 18-month period before 
Ministerial authorisation is required is too long. This is an important 
oversight requirement and the Committee considers that a 12-month 
period would be more appropriate. This will ensure that each delayed 
notification search warrant that involves a long-term investigation will be 
subject to an appropriate degree of scrutiny. The Committee notes that this 
does not affect the ultimate delay period that is found to be required for 
maintaining operational confidentiality.  
 
Recommendation 2 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 
to reduce the extension of a notification period for a delayed notification 
search warrant without requiring Ministerial authorisation from 18 to 12 
months.   
 
2.91 Where a person is charged based on evidence gained during a delayed 
notification search warrant, the Committee does not agree that the 
evidence should be provided to the charged person ‘immediately’. If this 
were the case, it may result in situations where a person is charged with 
an offence and given parts of the brief of evidence against him or her, 
without any further context of the charges or other evidence against them. 
It would also result in notification of police operational behaviour and 
methodology before the police may be willing to reveal such information. 
Further, it would create issues if the person’s charges were dropped before 
the start of criminal proceedings. 
Disclosure offences 
2.92 Concerns about disclosure offences were also raised in relation to the 
creation of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)’s 
Special Intelligence Operations (SIO) in the National Security Legislation 
26  
 
Amendment Bill (No.1) 2014. The Committee reiterates the comments 
made in its report into the SIO provisions: 
The Committee paid close attention to concerns raised by inquiry 
participants about the potential impact of the proposed offences 
on press freedom. The Committee considers that in order to ensure 
the success of highly sensitive operations and to protect the 
identity of individuals involved, it is essential that information on 
these operations not be disclosed. 
However, the Committee also considers that it is important for this 
need for secrecy not to penalise legitimate public reporting. The 
Committee notes that, under the Criminal Code Act 1995, the fault 
element of ‘recklessness’ would apply to any prosecution of 
offences under proposed section 35P. This would mean that to be 
successful, the prosecution would be required by legislation to 
prove that a disclosure was ‘reckless’. The structure of the offence 
provisions, as well as the requirement for the Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions to take the public interest into 
account before initiating a prosecution, provides an appropriate 
level of protection for press freedoms while balancing national 
security. However the Committee sees value in making these 
safeguards explicit in the Bill or the Explanatory Memorandum.  
…the Committee does not consider it appropriate to provide an 
explicit exemption for journalists from the proposed offence 
provisions. Part of the reason for this is that the term ‘journalism’ 
is increasingly difficult to define as digital technologies have made 
the publication of material easier. The Committee considers that it 
would be all too easy for an individual, calling themselves a 
‘journalist’, to publish material on a social media page or website 
that had serious consequences for a sensitive intelligence 
operation. It is important for the individual who made such a 
disclosure to be subject to the same laws as any other individual.76 
2.93 The Committee also notes that the offences are designed to mirror existing 
provisions relating to the controlled operations scheme in the Crimes 
Act.77 The Committee notes that there is no public interest test in either the 
controlled operations or the SIO provisions.   
 
76  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Inquiry into the National Security 
Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014, September 2014, pp. 61–62. 
77  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 116. 
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2.94 As noted previously, the operations of the AFP are already subject to 
significant safeguards and oversight, with potential for an expansion of 
this oversight to this Committee (as discussed later in this chapter). The 
Committee is satisfied that these safeguards and accountability provisions 
provide appropriate protections.  
2.95 Several Committee members were concerned that the Bill may prevent 
legitimate reporting of important matters in the public interest when it 
comes to delayed notification search warrants.  While it is noted that the 
Bill does not intend to criminalise reporting of matters that are in the 
public interest, some members believed this could be further clarified. 
Members reiterated the importance of protection of public interest 
publication. 
2.96 The Committee notes that the current Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions ‘Prosecution Policy’ already refers to a ‘public interest’ test.78 
The Committee therefore recommends that the Attorney-General’s 
Department explain this public interest requirement in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to make it clear that the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions must take the public interest into account before initiating a 
prosecution. 
2.97 Reflecting evidence received, especially from the former INSLM, the 
Committee is concerned to ensure that there is adequate protection for 
those who identify any potential illegality regarding the use of delayed 
notification search warrants. To ensure that individuals may seek legal 
advice on this illegality, without being liable for prosecution under the 
disclosure offences, the Committee recommends the introduction of an 
explicit exemption from the offences for disclosure of information in the 
course of obtaining legal advice.  
2.98 As for the protection of whistleblowers, the Committee also supports 
explicit exemptions for the disclosure of information to the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman. To avoid any doubt about the applicability 
of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013, the Committee considers it should 
be made explicit in the Bill that this exemption applies to all persons 
making a complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, including public 
officials. 
 
 
78  Available at <http://www.cdpp.gov.au/publications/prosecution-policy-of-the-
commonwealth/>. 
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Recommendation 3 
 The Committee recommends that additional exemptions be included in 
the offence provisions relating to disclosure of information on delayed 
notification search warrants in proposed section 3ZZHA of the Counter 
Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 to 
explicitly enable: 
 disclosure of information in the course of obtaining legal 
advice, 
 disclosure of information by any person in the course of 
inspections by the Commonwealth Ombudsman, or as part of a 
complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman or other pro-
active disclosure made to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, 
and 
 communication of information by Commonwealth 
Ombudsman staff to the Commonwealth Ombudsman or other 
staff within the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in 
the course of their duties. 
 
Recommendation 4 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Counter Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 to confirm that the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions must take into account 
the public interest, including the public interest in publication, before 
initiating a prosecution for the disclosure of information relating to a 
delayed notification search warrant. 
Other matters 
2.99 While the powers available to executing officers of delayed notification 
search warrants will differ markedly from the powers available under the 
normal Crimes Act search warrant provisions, the Committee accepts that 
these powers are required to maintain the covert nature of such searches. 
The Committee also notes that in Australian jurisdictions that already 
have covert search warrants, such powers are available.79 
 
79  Section 27 of the Terrorism (Extraordinary Powers) Act 2005 (WA) and section 27O of the 
Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW). 
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2.100 The Committee is also satisfied that the list of purposes for which things 
seized under a delayed notification search warrant can be shared and used 
is appropriate. While not an exhaustive list, the Committee recognises that 
items seized under a delayed notification search warrant may be relevant 
for other offences or other agencies and that existing sharing and handling 
safeguards continue to be important and appropriate.  
2.101 The Committee acknowledges that while the Bill is specifically designed to 
counter the threat from terrorism and foreign fighters, having access to 
delayed notification search warrants for other serious criminal offences 
would be of operational benefit to the AFP. The Committee notes that in 
other Australian jurisdictions, police have access to delayed notification or 
covert search warrants for offences other than terrorism offences.   
2.102 The Committee also notes the increasing collaboration and intersection 
between organised crime and terrorist activity, and considers it important 
the police have the appropriate tools to be able to investigate both sets of 
criminal activity, especially where there is direct interaction between 
them. 
Amendments to the Criminal Code – new offence of 
advocating terrorism 
2.103 The Bill will introduce section 80.2C into the Criminal Code, making it an 
offence for a person to advocate the doing of a terrorist act or the 
commission of a terrorist offence, being reckless as to whether another 
person will engage in a terrorist act or commit a terrorism offence. 
2.104 For the purposes of the section, ‘terrorist act’ is given the same meaning as 
in section 100.1 of the Criminal Code. ‘Terrorism offence’ has the same 
meaning as section 3(1) of the Crimes Act, and is further limited by only 
covering offences that are punishable by 5 or more years imprisonment.80 
2.105 The proposed section also includes a definition of when a person 
‘advocates’ the doing of a terrorist act or commission of a terrorism 
offence, which includes counselling, promoting, encouraging or urging.  
2.106 The offence will be committed even if there is no direct link between the 
act of advocacy and an actual act of terrorism. 
 
80  Proposed section 80.2C (2) of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
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2.107 The Explanatory Memorandum states that as terrorism represents a grave 
threat to Australia, it is reasonable that conduct which increases the 
likelihood of terrorism occurring should be discouraged and penalised: 
Advocating terrorism heightens the probability of terrorist acts or 
the commission of terrorism offences on Australian soil and 
encourages others to join the fight overseas.  The criminalisation of 
behaviour which encourages terrorist acts or the commission of 
terrorism offences is a necessary preventative mechanism to limit 
the influence of those advocating violent extremism and radical 
ideologies.81 
2.108 The AFP requested inclusion of the proposed offence on the basis of 
concern 
about the impact those who advocate terrorism have on the 
foreign fighter problem. Terrorist acts and foreign incursions 
generally require a person to have three things: the capability to 
act, the motivation to act, and the imprimatur to act (eg 
endorsement from a person with authority). The new advocating 
terrorism offence is directed at those who supply the motivation 
and imprimatur. This is particularly the case where the person 
advocating terrorism holds significant influence over other people 
who sympathise with, and are prepared to fight for, the terrorist 
cause.82 
2.109 A number of submissions identified issues with the proposed offence, 
including: 
 the sufficiency of the existing incitement and urging violence offences 
in capturing those who directly encourage others to engage in criminal 
acts 
 a ‘recklessness’ threshold is a disproportionate impingement on the 
right to free speech 
 the potentially counter-productive nature of the offence 
 the definition of ‘advocacy’ is overly vague and does not provide 
sufficient clarity to enable people to know what activity could be 
deemed illegal, and 
 the ‘good faith’ defence does not sufficiently capture the full range of 
activities that should be covered. 
 
81  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 29. 
82  Australian Federal Police, Submission 36, p. 7. 
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Existing offences 
2.110 Section 11.4 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence for a person to urge 
another person to commit an offence. The person must intend that the 
offence incited be committed.83 
2.111 Section 80.2A of the Criminal Code makes it an offence for a person to 
urge force or violence against a particular group. The person must intend 
for the force or violence to occur.84 
2.112 Some submitters claimed that these offences provided sufficient coverage 
for the activity of ‘advocating’ terrorism. For example, the Gilbert + Tobin 
Centre of Public Law noted that: 
To the extent that the proposed offence encompasses genuine 
cases of incitement (namely, where a person urges or encourages 
another person to commit a terrorism act or offence, and does so 
intending that the conduct will occur), it is superfluous. By virtue 
of s 11.4 of the Criminal Code, it is already an offence to incite a 
terrorist act or a substantive terrorism offence.85 
2.113 Against this position, the AFP submitted that the current offences are not 
appropriate for the current range of activity which is increasing the risk of 
terrorism: 
Where the AFP has sufficient evidence, the existing offences of 
incitement (section 11.4 of the Criminal Code) or the urging 
violence offences (in Division 80 of the Criminal Code) would be 
pursued. However, these offences require the AFP to prove that the 
person intended to urge violence or a crime and intended the crime 
or violence to be committed. There will not always be sufficient 
evidence to meet the threshold of intention in relation to the 
second aspect. This is because persons advocating terrorism can be 
very sophisticated about the precise language they use, even 
though their overall message still has the impact of encouraging 
others to engage in terrorist acts.86 [italics in original] 
 
83  Section 11.4 (2) of the Criminal Code. 
84  Section 80.2A (1) (b) of the Criminal Code. 
85  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 14.  See also Australian Lawyers for 
Human Rights, Submission 15, p. 7; Members of the Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee, 
Submission 29, p. 5; Human Rights Watch, Submission 21, p. 2. 
86  Australian Federal Police, Submission 36, p. 7. 
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Recklessness 
2.114 Having a test of recklessness for whether another person would engage in 
or commit a terrorist act or terrorism offence was seen as problematic by a 
number of submitters.   
2.115 By not requiring a direct link between the speech and terrorist acts or 
offences, the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law raised concerns about 
the possible infringement on free speech: 
By taking a broader approach than the law of incitement, the 
proposed offence is likely to criminalise a range of legitimate 
speech acts.87 
2.116 This concern was echoed by the Muslim Legal Network (NSW), which 
stated: 
This provision is an ideological attack on the fundamental human 
right of freedom of expression.88 
2.117 The councils for civil liberties across Australia stated that for any speech to 
be made unlawful there needs to be a necessary connection between the 
speech and unlawful action, with the person providing the speech 
intending such an outcome.89  Gilbert + Tobin agreed, stating that without 
such a link, there was too great a risk that the offence would stifle the 
ability of differing viewpoints about terrorism and foreign conflict to be 
discussed in public debate: 
In any conflict there will be difficult lines as to what acts it is 
legitimate to encourage or promote, but clearly there should be 
scope in a free democratic society to adopt differing viewpoints on 
such difficult and divisive issues. Determining right and wrong in 
a foreign conflict is far too difficult an issue to expose individuals 
to criminal liability for encouraging or promoting the acts of one 
side.90 
2.118 The Law Council of Australia suggested that for the offence to be 
proportionate, there would need to evidence of 
a link between the advocacy and a demonstrable substantial risk 
that the promotion would encourage or lead a person to engage in 
a terrorist act. So it would need to be more than just a minimal 
 
87  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 14. 
88  Muslim Legal Network (NSW), Submission 43, p. 10. 
89  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 15. 
90  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 14. 
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chance that someone would act on the promotion. But if there was 
a substantial risk, that would be sufficient to criminalise the act.91 
2.119 Expanding its position on what sort of connection between the advocacy 
and an act would be required, the Law Council went on to say: 
[a] substantial risk that they might then participate. It would not 
be necessary to prove that somebody acted on the promotion but 
simply to prove that the promotion was of such a character that 
there was a real risk that somebody would be encouraged to 
engage in a terrorist act.92 
2.120 The justification for including a recklessness test in the offence is that it 
will allow police to disrupt and prevent the encouraging of terrorism 
before terrorist activity actually takes place: 
In the current threat environment, returning foreign fighters, and 
the use of social media, is accelerating the speed at which persons 
can become radicalised and prepare to carry out terrorist acts. In 
the AFP’s view, it is no longer the case that explicit statements 
(which would provide evidence to meet the threshold of intention) 
are required to inspire others to take potentially devastating action 
in Australia or overseas. The cumulative effect of more generalised 
statements when made by a person in a position of influence and 
authority, can still have the impact of directly encouraging others 
to go overseas and fight or commit terrorist acts domestically. This 
effect is compounded with the circulation of graphic violent 
imagery (such as beheading videos) in the same online forums as 
the statements are being made. The AFP therefore require tools 
(such as the new advocating terrorism offence) to intervene earlier 
in the radicalisation process to prevent and disrupt further 
engagement in terrorist activity.93 
2.121 Some submitters argued that the offence may actually be counter-
productive in Australia’s efforts to confront terrorist ideology. In not 
requiring an intention of behalf of the advocate and thereby covering a 
broader range of speech, the law  
run[s] the risk of turning people into martyrs in some situations 
and actually causing a problem, as opposed to engaging in a 
 
91  Mr Phillip Boulten SC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, Friday 3 October 2014, p. 60. 
92  Mr Boulten SC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, Friday 3 October 2014, p. 60. 
93  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 29. 
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vigorous debate and making it clear how wrongheaded those 
ideas are.94 
Definition of advocates 
2.122 A range of submitters noted concerns with the proposed definition of 
advocates, particularly the terms ‘promotes’ and ‘encourages’. These 
terms were considered to be overly broad and vague, and to not provide 
sufficient certainty as to what activity the offence covers: 
The terms ‘encourages’ and ‘promotes’ are not defined in the Bill. 
The Law Council notes in this regard that these terms would take 
on their ordinary meaning and that these words are broad in their 
connotations.95 
2.123  Professor Ben Saul similarly stated: 
[I]t is unclear what kinds of speech would fall within the definition 
of the offence, rendering it difficult for individuals to 
prospectively know the scope of their criminal liability, and thus 
raising a separate infringement of the principle of legality under 
Article 15 of the ICCPR.96 
2.124 The Muslim Legal Network (NSW) also questioned what actions would 
constitute ‘advocacy’, particularly in relation to activity on social media 
platforms: 
If for example, a third party posts material either to your social 
media account, or if an individual engages with material deemed 
to be considered ‘advocating terrorism’ through a mere “like” or 
share on social media sites, the charge could arguably be proven. 
This works to place a large proportion of individuals at risk of 
prosecution and could potentially be considered a limitation on 
the expression of free speech… We do not know how this 
provision will relate to social media.97 
2.125 The Network also questioned whether advancing a position that was in 
opposition to Government policy in relation to overseas conflicts would be 
 
94  Professor George Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 52. See also Mr 
Stephen Blanks, councils for civil liberties across Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
3 October 2014, p. 4; Muslim Legal Network (NSW), Submission 43, p. 12. 
95  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 17. See also Islamic Council of Victoria, 
Submission 42, p. 2; Australian National Imams Council, Submission 35, p. 1. 
96  Professor Ben Saul, Submission 2, p. 1. 
97  Muslim Legal Network (NSW), Submission 43, p.11; see also Australian Lawyers for Human 
Rights, Supplementary Submission 15.1, p. 3. 
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deemed as ‘promotion’ of the other parties to the conflict, which could 
include terrorists. The Network questioned whether debates such as 
occurred during the Vietnam War would be legitimate under the 
proposed offence: 
There was a significant degree of support amongst sections of the 
community for the efforts of the communist forces in Vietnam. 
Our concern is that that was a debate that took place back then; the 
question that we have is: if that same debate took place now, is one 
considered to be advocating terrorism? And, if that is the case, we 
say that these provisions go too far.98 
2.126 Similarly, the Human Rights Commission questioned whether 
‘promotion’ might cover general statements or support for particular 
ideas: 
The Commission is concerned that it may include speech and 
conduct which is general, not directed at a specific audience, and 
not directed towards the commission of particular offences. 
Indeed, it is arguable that the ‘promotion’ and ‘encouragement’ of 
terrorist acts might include the praise or the publicising of terrorist 
acts or radical ideologies, or of political movements containing 
extremist elements.99 
2.127 The Human Rights Law Centre expressed concern as to how the definition 
of ‘advocates’ would be read in conjunction with the definition of ‘terrorist 
act’ in section 100.1 of the Code: 
The proposed offence for advocating terrorism goes beyond 
incitement to include ‘promotion’ and ‘encouragement’ which, 
when read together with the broad definitions of ‘terrorist act’ and 
‘terrorist offence’, is likely to have an unduly restrictive effect on 
legitimate free speech. For example, ‘terrorist act’ covers not only 
specific actions but also the threat of those actions, meaning that 
any act preparatory to or in planning for specified actions would 
be captured by the definition.  This means the new offence of 
advocating terrorism would extend to persons who recklessly 
promote or encourage the threat of a terrorist act, but do not 
actually advocate, either intentionally or otherwise, for the doing of 
a terrorist act.100 
 
98  Mr Ertunc Yasar Ozen, Member and Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Turkish 
Advocacy Alliance, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 35. 
99  Australian Human Rights Commission, Supplementary Submission 7.1, p. 5. 
100  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 18, p. 12.   
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2.128 This concern was echoed by the Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance 
who stated their continued objection to the current definition of ‘terrorist 
act’ in the Code : 
[The Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance] has always believed 
that the current definition of ‘terrorist act’ in s 100.1 of the 
Criminal Code has been excessively broad and poorly defined. The 
effect of this is that legitimate areas of free speech and advocacy 
may be caught as ‘terrorism’.101 
2.129 The Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance were also concerned about 
how the advocacy offence may cover journalistic activity in reporting on 
foreign regimes and conflicts and the potential prosecution of 
whistleblowers: 
And because the terrorism definition extends to actions against 
foreign governments, it would capture advocates of even 
legitimate actions against foreign oppressive regimes. This new 
offence could also capture journalists reporting on foreign powers 
using documents that have been leaked to them. 
Under section 100.1(1) of the Criminal Code, a ‘terrorist act’ 
includes, among other things, seriously interfering with, or 
seriously disrupting or destroying an electronic system including 
and information, telecommunications or financial system et al. 
Journalists are often handed information by a source as the basis of 
a news story. Most leaked documents that are given to journalists 
by whistleblowers and other sources, are leaks that originate from 
‘interfering’ with a computer system… 
Under the new offence of advocating terrorism, journalists could 
also be caught for counselling, promoting, encouraging or urging a 
whistleblower to leak a document. Indeed, the provision is drawn 
so widely, that urging leaking of documents in general terms may 
fall within this clause.102   
2.130 The Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance therefore recommended that, 
only in so far as the law applied to journalists, the definition of ‘terrorist 
act’ should be redefined to bring it into line with internationally accepted 
norms and existing definitions.103 
 
101  Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Submission 43, p. 4;  See also Dr Wood, Submission 31, 
p.12; Joint Media Organisations, Submission 23, p. 2. 
102  Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Submission 43, pp. 4–5. 
103  Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Submission 43, p. 6. 
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2.131 The Explanatory Memorandum notes that while there may be some 
degree of duplication between the existing definition of ‘advocates’ in the 
Code and the proposed definition, the new definition provides important 
additional elements to the concept to reflect the intended scope of the new 
offence: 
The terms ‘promotes’ and ‘encourages’ are not defined.  The 
ordinary meaning of ‘encourages’ the doing of a terrorist act could 
include conduct or statements that inspire an individual to commit 
a terrorist act.  The ordinary meaning of ‘promotes’ the doing of a 
terrorist act could include conduct or statements such as launching 
a campaign to commit terrorist acts. 
While there may be some overlap with ‘counsels’ or ‘urges’ the 
doing of a terrorist act, which may include conduct such as 
inducement, persuasion or insistence, or to give advice, or an 
opinion about the doing of a terrorist act, the inclusion of the 
additional terms is designed to ensure coverage of a broader range 
of conduct that may be considered as advocating a terrorist act, 
beyond the conduct of ‘counsels’ or ‘urges’.104   
2.132 The Explanatory Memorandum provides an example of precedent for the 
use of ‘promotes’ and ‘encourages’ in a definition of ‘advocacy’: 
The inclusion of the terms ‘promotes’ and ‘encourages’ in 
paragraph 102.1(1A)(a) is consistent with section 3 of the United 
Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000, which provides that an 
organisation is concerned in terrorism if it promotes or encourages 
terrorism.105 
‘Good faith’ defence 
2.133 The existing defence in section 80.3 of the Criminal Code is said to provide 
an important safeguard against the risk that the offence represents a threat 
to free speech: 
The good faith defence ensures that the communication of 
particular ideas intended to encourage public debate are not 
criminalised by the new section 80.2C. In the context of matters 
that are likely to pose vexed questions and produce diverse 
opinion, the protection of free expression that attempts to lawfully 
procure change, points out matters producing ill-will or hostility 
 
104  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 121. 
105  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 121. 
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between different groups and reports on matters of public 
interests is vital. The maintenance of the right to freedom of 
expression, including political communication, ensures that the 
new offence does not unduly limit discourse which is critical in a 
representative democracy.106 
2.134 While supporting the importance of the application of the existing 
defence, some submitters noted that the defence is limited to, relevantly, 
urging lawful change in another nation’s law or policy.107 Therefore, it 
would not apply to the advocacy of acts that are illegal (such as acts aimed 
at changing a despotic government through use of force).108 The Islamic 
Council of Victoria stated that: 
If the government is to decide what legitimate armed struggle is 
and what terrorism is and which groups are considered terrorists, 
then this measure could see to it that there are no voices of 
disagreement or debate on the subject for fear of prosecution.109 
Committee comment 
2.135 The Committee recognises that the proposed advocating terrorism offence 
is a highly contentious issue which has generated considerable debate, 
both before the Committee and more broadly. The Committee is also 
mindful of any unintended consequences that may arise from the 
operation of such an offence. 
2.136 The Committee accepts that the Government’s intention in introducing the 
offence is to capture a broader range of behaviour than is currently 
covered under the existing incitement and urging violence offences in the 
Criminal Code. The Committee accepts that on the evidence provided to 
it, the current incitement offence is not appropriate to capture the range of 
activity being encountered and investigated by operational agencies. This 
is due to the requirement that police must prove an intention on behalf of 
the accused for another person to undertake a terrorist activity. The 
increasingly sophisticated methods being used by people advocating for 
others to commit terrorist activity means evidence of such intention is 
often not available, despite the risk that advocating can cause.  
 
106  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 29. 
107  Section 80.3 (c) of the Criminal Code. 
108  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 1. See also Mr Bonner, Submission 34, 
p. 8. 
109  Islamic Council of Victoria, Submission 42, p. 2.  See also Muslim Legal Network (NSW), 
Submission 43, p. 12; Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Submission 43, p. 5. 
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2.137 To this end, a ‘recklessness’ threshold is an appropriate element of the 
offence, as it will not require evidence of a direct link between an act of 
advocacy and an act of terrorism. As a preventative tool, this is an 
important consideration in examining the new offence. The ‘recklessness’ 
fault element will mean that the offence, as drafted, would require the 
prosecution to prove that the accused was aware of a substantial risk that 
a terrorist act or terrorism offence would occur as the result of the 
accused’s conduct and, having regard to the circumstances known to him 
or her, it was unjustifiable to take that risk. 
2.138 The Committee considers the ‘recklessness’ test in the Criminal Code is an 
appropriate tool for assessing an individual’s behaviour under the 
proposed offence. The Committee took evidence that, by allowing the 
offence to explicitly take into account a person’s unique circumstances, the 
offence will hold different people to standards which appropriately reflect 
any special positions of power or influence an individual may hold.  
2.139 In coming to this conclusion, the Committee does recognise the range of 
issues that a ‘recklessness’ test may create, such as the impact on the right 
of free speech and uncertainty in the law. Terrorism and foreign conflicts 
are often topics of robust discussion in the community, with greatly 
divergent views, and it should not be the role of the law to strictly police 
such discussions and stifle debate. Advocating for others to undertake 
terrorist activity should be discouraged, regardless of the proximity 
between the act of advocacy and any subsequent actual act of terrorism.   
2.140 As previously outlined, the Committee notes that if a law enforcement 
officer suspects an individual of advocating for a terrorist act, the officer 
must first consider proceeding by way of summons, consistent with the 
existing arrest without warrant power in the Crimes Act. The constable 
may only arrest without a warrant if they reasonably suspect that a 
summons would not achieve one or more of the specified purposes.   
2.141 It was demonstrated in evidence that the capacity for radicalisation to 
occur has increased in pace in recent times. The ability for police to be 
involved early in the radicalisation process is an important preventative 
measure.  Such action can assist in reducing the threat of terrorism by 
removing motivating elements which may influence individuals to 
undertake terrorist activity. The proposed offence will allow police to act 
against those who could otherwise act as a catalyst for terrorist activity.  
2.142 The Committee notes that the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions must take into account the public interest, including the 
public interest in publication, before initiating a prosecution for an offence 
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against section 80.2C of the Criminal Code regarding advocacy of 
terrorism. The Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth states: 
The factors which can properly be taken into account in deciding 
whether the public interest requires a prosecution will vary from 
case to case. While many public interest factors militate against a 
decision to proceed with a prosecution, there are public interest 
factors which operate in favour of proceeding with a prosecution 
(for example, the seriousness of the offence, the need for 
deterrence). In this regard, generally speaking the more serious the 
offence the less likely it will be that the public interest will not 
require that a prosecution be pursued.110  
2.143 A number of submitters raised concerns about the inclusion of the terms 
‘promotion’ and ‘encouragement’ in the definition of advocacy. These 
terms are not defined in the Bill and, ultimately, it would be a 
consideration for judicial authority as to whether an individual had 
actually ‘advocated’ the doing of a terrorist act or terrorism offence. The 
Committee acknowledges the policy reason for including the terms in the 
definition. This definition is intended to broaden the offence beyond 
intentional behaviour.  
2.144 The offence will require the person to intentionally advocate and be 
reckless to the outcome of such advocacy.  To this extent, promoting or 
encouraging requires a degree of willingness; it is not merely that a person 
comments on or draws attention to a factual scenario (such as through a 
news report, social commentary or religious sermon).  Successful 
prosecutions will only be possible where there is evidence that the 
advocate intentionally communicated about activity that is a terrorist act 
or offence, there is a substantial risk that somebody would take this speech 
as advocacy of such behaviour in the particular circumstances, and the 
advocate is aware of this risk and unjustifiably communicates on the topic 
anyway.   
2.145 In the Committee’s opinion, this test will not stifle the true debate that 
occurs within a democratic and free society.  It will, however, capture 
those communications which create an unacceptable risk of terrorist 
activity.   
2.146 However, the Committee does recognise that there is a lack of clarity in 
relation to what behaviour could be deemed to be acts which ‘advocate’, 
 
110  Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth: Guidelines for the making of decisions in the prosecution 
process, pp. 6–7. Available at <http://www.cdpp.gov.au/publications/prosecution-policy-of-
the-commonwealth/>. 
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particularly concerning social media. For example, it is not clear whether a 
person who ‘likes’ a Facebook comment which contains favourable 
reference to terrorist activity is ‘advocating’ that others should undertake 
that behaviour.  
2.147 In light of the evidence received by the Committee, the wide range of 
ordinary meanings of the terms ‘promotes’ and ‘encourages’, and the 
interaction with social and other media, some Committee members 
questioned whether there can be legal certainty established in relation to 
the scope of activities that would constitute offences. 
2.148 The Committee also recognises that further clarity on the terms 
‘encourage’ and ‘promote’ would assist people in prospectively knowing 
the scope of their potential criminal liability.   For example, it is not clear 
whether a person ‘promotes’ a terrorist act or terrorism offence if the 
person states that they support a  terrorist organisation, especially if that 
organisation is party to a conflict that Australia is also a party to. A 
terrorist organisation is one that is specified by regulation, or is one that is 
directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or 
fostering the doing of a terrorist act.111 
2.149 The Committee therefore recommends that the Attorney-General amend 
the Bill or the Explanatory Memorandum to clarify the activities that 
would be covered by the terms ‘encourages’, ‘promotes’ and, ‘advocacy’.  
2.150 The Committee recognises that the Explanatory Memorandum will not 
provide an exhaustive list of examples of what activities could be 
considered as ‘advocacy’ or ‘promotion’.  However, further legislative 
guidance for the public and the judiciary would be beneficial.   
 
Recommendation 5 
 Whilst there were differing views within the Committee, the Committee 
recommends that the Attorney-General further clarify the meaning of 
the terms ‘encourage’, ‘advocacy’ and ‘promotion’ by amendment to 
either the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) 
Bill 2014 or its Explanatory Memorandum in light of the evidence 
provided during the Committee’s inquiry. 
 
 
111  Section 102.1 of the Criminal Code. 
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Recommendation 6 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 to clarify the meaning of 
‘promotion’ in relation to statements of support for the objectives or 
activities of a terrorist organisation as defined by the Criminal Code.    
2.151 The Committee recognises that the Australian Law Reform Commission 
previously completed a significant body of work on issues raised in this 
inquiry.  In its 2006 report, Fighting Words: A review of sedition laws in 
Australia (2006), the Commission recommended that an offence of 
‘encouragement’ (or glorification) of terrorism should not be introduced in 
Australia.112 The Committee considers that this recommendation should 
not preclude the passage of the proposed offence for two reasons.  Firstly, 
the current proposal is not limited solely to ‘encouragement’.  It also does 
not include a ‘glorification’ element.  Criticism of a UK provision by the 
Law Reform Commission and the Attorney-General’s Department itself 
(which could have been the precedent for an Australian offence) was 
largely based on the ‘glorification’ aspect.113 
2.152 A second reason is the markedly different threat environment which the 
Committee recognises that Australia is now facing. The continuing rise of 
social media and the increased sophistication of terrorist propaganda 
material is having an effect on some Australians. The advocacy of terrorist 
acts across a wide variety of media is known to have played a part in the 
decision of some, mostly young, Australian males, vulnerable to 
suggestion, to leave Australia and participate in conflicts overseas. This is 
highly concerning for not only their own safety, but the safety of the 
Australian community and the population of the countries in which they 
are fighting.  
2.153 While terrorist and other illegal groups have always tried to encourage 
others to join their ranks and elevate their cause, the communication tools 
now available to them for this purpose are allowing such messaging on a 
scale and scope which is unprecedented. The Committee accepts that the 
Government does have a responsibility for ensuring that advocacy of 
terrorism is discouraged and prevented, and that the existing offences do 
not cover this type of behaviour. 
 
112  Australian Law Reform Commission, Fighting Words: A review of sedition laws in Australia (2006) 
pp. 126–127. 
113  Australian Law Reform Commission, Fighting Words: A review of sedition laws in Australia (2006) 
pp. 125; See also section 1, Terrorism Act 2006 (UK). 
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2.154 The Committee notes that the existing ‘good faith’ defence is entirely 
appropriate for the existing treason and urging violence offences and the 
proposed advocacy offence. It is proper that the defence should only 
extend to the advocating of acts connected to the lawful change of law or 
policy in Australia or another country. Without this requirement, courts 
would be required to pass judgement on not only whether a particular 
statement should be considered advocacy of a terrorism act or offence, but 
potentially also on the legitimacy of armed groups and foreign 
governments. This has never been, and should never be, a role for judicial 
officers. 
2.155 The Committee notes that the existing defence requires an evidential 
burden on the person claiming the defence. An evidential burden requires 
a defendant to provide evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that 
the exception or defence is made out. Once the defendant has met the 
evidential burden, the prosecution must refute the exception or defence 
and prove all elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The 
Committee notes that under the Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, 
whether a statement was made in ‘good faith’ should be an element for the 
accused to make out: 
In general, the prosecution should be required to prove all aspects 
of a criminal offence beyond reasonable doubt. A matter should be 
included in a defence, thereby placing the onus on the defendant, 
only where the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
defendant; and is significantly more difficult and costly for the 
prosecution to disprove than for the defendant to establish.114 
2.156 The Committee considers that an evidential burden for an accused’s 
defence is appropriate for the proposed offence. 
2.157 The Committee notes that the existing ‘good faith’ defence, other criminal 
law safeguards and the recommendations made in this section will ensure 
that an appropriate balance is struck between free speech, healthy public 
discourse and the illegal and unwanted encouragement of terrorism. 
 
114  Attorney-General’s Department, A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and 
Enforcement Powers (Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences), September 2011 edition. 
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Listing of terrorist organisations 
2.158 The Bill will make three changes to the process and criteria for listing a 
terrorist organisation. These are: 
 amending the definition of ‘advocates’ for the purposes of listing an 
organisation to include where a person encourages or promotes 
terrorist acts 
 enabling the Attorney-General to add, remove or alter the alias of a 
listed terrorist organisation by declaration, and 
 clarifying that any reference to ‘terrorist act’ in Division 102.1 includes a 
reference to the doing of: 
 a terrorist act, even if a terrorist act does not occur 
 a specific terrorist act, and 
 more than one terrorist act. 
Definition of ‘advocates’ 
2.159 Submitters commented on the proposed amendment to the definition of 
‘advocates’ to include where a person ‘promotes’ or ‘encourages’ the 
doing of a terrorist act. These terms are not defined and will have their 
ordinary meaning. 
2.160 The Explanatory Memorandum outlines that 
the inclusion of the additional terms is designed to ensure 
coverage of a broader range of conduct that may be considered as 
advocating a terrorist act, beyond the conduct of ‘counsels’ or 
‘urges’.115 
2.161 The amendment was further justified on the basis that: 
An organisation could continue to have a significant influence in 
promoting or encouraging terrorism by others without necessarily 
engaging in terrorist acts itself, without directly counselling or 
urging the doing of a terrorist act.116 
 
115  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 120. 
116  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 120. 
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2.162 The proposed amendment is consistent with section 3 of the United 
Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000. This section provides that an organisation 
is concerned in terrorism if it promotes or encourages terrorism.117 
2.163 Significant concerns were expressed about the proposed extension of what 
constitutes advocacy for the purposes of listing a terrorist organisation. 
The Law Council of Australia questioned the need for the extension noting 
that: 
Measures to criminalise the encouragement or promotion of 
terrorism may restrain freedom of association and freedom of 
speech. The question is whether those restraints are proportionate 
to the risk and it should be recognised that they may prove 
counter-productive.118 
2.164 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law agreed, noting: 
It is already problematic that an organisation can be proscribed on 
the basis that it advocates terrorism and any expansion of this 
power should be considered with extreme caution.119 
2.165 On this basis, Gilbert + Tobin recommended that the amendment not be 
progressed. In particular:  
In the absence of any significant evidence demonstrating that the 
expansion of the proscription regime would help to prevent 
terrorism, it seems that the dangers of the proposed changes far 
outweigh their potential benefits.120 
2.166 The Law Council of Australia outlined the consequences of an 
organisation being listed, including the offences for which members of 
that organisation are liable. On this point, they noted groups are rarely 
homogenous and there are generally a range of differing opinions within 
one organisation. As such, they expressed concern that this amendment 
(in addition to the existing definition of advocacy) could result in 
attributing the views of a minority of members on the whole group, 
leading to ‘guilt by association’.121 Specifically they stated: 
The result of the proposed amendment is that, under the Criminal 
Code, a person who is a member of an organisation could be 
prosecuted for a criminal offence if another member of that group 
 
117  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 121. 
118  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 19. 
119  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 16. 
120  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 17. 
121  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, paragraph 76. 
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‘encourages or promotes’ a terrorist act, even when the person 
who encouraged or promoted the terrorist act is not the leader of 
the group, or when the statement is not accepted by other 
members as representing the views of the group.122 
2.167 Similar sentiments were expressed by Gilbert + Tobin.123 This was 
supported by Professor George Williams in evidence before the 
Committee: 
[T]he current definition should be not extended to 'promotion' and 
'encouragement'—it takes it considerably beyond where it is—and 
because the underlying problem is that it does enable 
criminalisation in circumstances for mere speech that is not 
justifiable.124 
2.168 The Law Council of Australia also noted that the proposed amendment 
appeared to contradict the COAG review recommendation that 
paragraph (c) of the existing definition (praising the doing of a terrorist 
act) be repealed.125 In support of this position, Gilbert + Tobin called for 
the Committee to give serious consideration to the COAG 
recommendation.126 
2.169 The Law Council of Australia also expressed concerns that the drafting of 
the amendment meant that a group could be listed even where the 
encouraging or promoting has a very low or negligible risk of causing 
others to engage in a terrorist act or terrorism.  
2.170 As such, if this amendment is implemented, the Law Council of Australia 
called for the proposed words to be included in paragraph (c) of the 
definition, rather than paragraph (a). This will require there to be a 
substantial risk that the conduct might have the effect of leading a person 
to engage in a terrorist act.127 In response to questioning on what would be 
necessary to prove this risk before the Committee, the Law Council of 
Australia stated: 
It is something that was likely to convince a court that there was 
such a connection, either direct or indirect, between the act or 
statement that promoted the organisation, and somebody actually 
acting on the promotion so as to carry out a terrorist act. It would 
 
122  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, paragraph 75. 
123  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 16. 
124  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 51. 
125  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, paragraph 80. 
126  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 16. 
127  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, paragraph 85. 
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be difficult to be absolutely comprehensive in describing the 
examples here in this committee context.128 
2.171 Gilbert + Tobin also recommended that ‘promoting’ be included in 
paragraph (c) on the basis that it is more akin to ‘praising’.129 
2.172 In response to questioning on the effectiveness of the amendment and 
whether the conduct in question should be criminalised given the range of 
terrorism related offences already in place, Professor George Williams 
noted: 
If you start jailing people for vague speech about terrorism, that 
has the potential to be very counterproductive where there is not a 
very clear link. As I say, if there is a link, you can be prosecuted. If 
there is any financial support or any of those things, they are all 
offences. 
It gets to some of the big debates we are having about free speech 
in this country as to whether you want to jail people for that or 
whether you think it is better to meet it head on in public debate. I 
am very much of the view that it is usually better to meet this in 
public debate.  
Let's not send this discussion underground; let's have leaders and 
others making it clear how wrong-headed that is. If you start 
jailing people you will radicalise people. Indeed this speech itself 
has been shown very significantly to be a strong source of 
potential radicalisation because it gives the sense of great 
grievance. If someone has not done something, they have merely 
said something, I cannot see that jailing them for a long time is 
going to help. I think it may actually hinder the fight.130 
2.173 In support of this position, Gilbert + Tobin noted the broader effect the 
amendment could have: 
A more general danger with expanding the definition of advocacy 
is that it may further alienate sections of Australia’s Muslim 
population. The proposed reforms would do so by making it 
easier to criminalise organisations that are engaged in public 
debates on current events overseas. This may contribute to 
 
128  Mr Boulten SC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 60. 
129  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 17. 
130  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 52. 
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perceptions that the government is unfairly targeting Muslim 
communities with its counter-terrorism powers.131 
Other amendments 
2.174 The other amendments proposed by this part are that the Bill will clarify 
that any reference to ‘terrorist act’ in Division 102.1 includes a reference to 
the doing of: 
 a terrorist act, even if a terrorist act does not occur 
 a specific terrorist act, and 
 more than one terrorist act. 
2.175 The Bill will also amend the Criminal Code to provide that a regulation 
specifying an organisation to be a terrorist organisation can be updated to 
include another name the organisation is known by or remove a name in 
the regulation that the organisation is no longer known by. 
2.176 While not directly relating their comments to this proposal, the Muslim 
Legal Network (NSW) outlined their view on the use of language in 
evidence before the Committee, specifically how best to reference the 
existing terrorist threat: 
The major terrorist threat has consistently been identified as 
‘Islamic State’ or ‘ISIS’, or in some other way using the term 
‘Islamic’. That is how they would wish to portray themselves. 
They in no way represent the aspirations or indeed the core beliefs 
of Islamic people in this country or indeed the majority of Islamic 
people across the globe. Referring to them continuously as 
‘Islamic’-anything not only plays into their propaganda war but 
tends to marginalise the Muslim population in this country. We 
would commend, to this committee and to legislators in future, 
when referring to organisations such as the ‘Islamic State’, 
adopting the approach that has been adopted with respect to other 
organisations. We do not translate ‘Boko Haram’ or ‘al-Qaeda’, for 
example. And, in the Arab world, what we here know as ‘Islamic 
State’ is known as ‘Daesh’, which is not only an acronym but also 
has quite a critical connotation, and we would commend to this 
committee consideration of identifying the ‘Islamic State’ by the 
name that has been adopted in the Arab world.132 
 
131  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 17. 
132  Mr Ozen, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 32. 
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2.177 No other significant comments were made on these amendments. 
Committee comment 
2.178 The Committee notes that the primary purpose of the proposed change to 
the definition of ‘advocates’ is to address behaviour falling short of 
‘counselling’ or ‘urging’. In its supplementary submission, the 
Attorney-General’s Department noted: 
An organisation may make statements more generally promoting 
or encouraging terrorism without directly stating ‘you should 
commit a terrorist act’. The Government considers that an 
organisation engaging in such conduct should not be able to evade 
the listing process.133 
2.179 The Committee considers it important that any conduct that has a 
demonstrable effect of advocating a terrorist act is able to be used as a 
basis for an organisation to be listed.  
2.180 While the Committee notes the views of submitters that expansion of the 
definition could result in members of an organisation being liable even 
where they do not agree with statements made by others in the group, it 
does not consider this is a sufficient reason to not support this change.  
2.181 On this point, the Committee considers that the proposed amendment 
may have the beneficial effect of discouraging people from belonging to 
groups who subscribe to these views.  
2.182 The Committee also notes further information provided by the Attorney-
General’s Department on how these terms may impact on the use of the 
listing provisions: 
The proposed ‘promotes’ and ‘encourages’ amendments are not 
designed to capture one-off instances of conduct which may fall 
within the definition of ‘advocates’ (such as an individual’s 
statement to carry out terrorism) unless the conduct is considered 
to have been undertaken by an organisation.134 
2.183 The Committee is satisfied that appropriate prosecutorial discretion 
would be used in determining whether to prosecute a person for being a 
member of a group that has been listed on the basis of the expanded 
definition of ‘advocates’. This is supported by the existing use of the 
 
133  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary submission 8.1, p. 10. 
134  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 10. 
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provisions enabling the listing of a terrorist organisation and associated 
terrorism offences in the Criminal Code. 
2.184 The Committee also supports the amendments which will enable the 
Attorney-General to add, remove or alter the alias of a listed terrorist 
organisation by declaration. The Committee considers this is a sensible 
amendment, which will ensure that the listing cannot be defeated simply 
through an organisation changing their name or using a different alias. 
2.185 Additionally, the Committee endorses the comments made by the Muslim 
Legal Network (NSW) in evidence before the Committee as to how best to 
reference the terrorist organisation ‘Islamic State’ or ‘ISIS’.   
2.186 The Committee is determined to ensure that the name used to refer to this 
group, particularly in media reporting, is not used to further its 
propaganda campaign, including to recruit members and further 
marginalise the Muslim community.  The Committee sees great benefit in 
ensuring that there is both clarity and consistency in how this terrorist 
organisation is publicly referenced.  Although the Committee has not 
sought further evidence on this matter, on the evidence presented the 
Committee endorses the view put forward by the Muslim Legal Network 
(NSW) that the group be publicly referred to as ‘Daesh’. 
2.187 Based on the evidence presented, the Committee considers that referring 
to the group as ‘Daesh’ will help counter the group’s desire to portray 
itself as representing the core beliefs of Islam. The Committee notes that 
the United States of America has included ‘Daesh’ in its listing of Islamic 
State and that the French Government refers to the organisation as 
‘Daesh’. 
2.188 Further, while recognising the importance of public messaging, the 
Committee also seeks to ensure that the listing of all terrorist organisations 
(including ‘Islamic State’) are up to date and refer to all known names and 
aliases. This will ensure that the listing regime operates as effectively as 
possible.  
2.189 It is important, however, that any change to the listing of a terrorist 
organisation is subject to appropriate oversight, similar to that provided 
for under the Criminal Code135 when an organisation is listed. 
 
 
135  Section 101.1A of the Criminal Code. 
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Recommendation 7 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General review all 
current listings of terrorist organisations under the Criminal Code to 
determine whether additional names or aliases should be added to any 
listings.  
 
Recommendation 8 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General notify the 
Committee of any proposed Regulation to alter the listing of a terrorist 
organisation by adding or removing a name or alias. The Committee 
also recommends that it have the power to determine if it wishes to 
review any proposed changes to listings. 
Control orders 
2.190 A range of amendments are proposed to the control order regime in 
Division 104 of the Criminal Code. The key elements of these amendments 
are: 
 altering the threshold for a senior AFP member to make an application 
for a control order from ‘considers’ to ‘suspects’ 
 amending the criteria for applying and issuing a control order to 
include where the person has: 
 participated in training with a terrorist organisation 
 engaged in a hostile activity in a foreign country, or  
 been convicted in Australia or a foreign country of an offence 
relating to terrorism, a terrorist organisation or a terrorist act 
 clarifying that a reference to a ‘terrorist act’ includes a reference to:  
 a terrorist act that does not occur 
 a specific terrorist act, or 
 more than one terrorist act 
 limiting the time a person subject to a control order can be required to 
remain at a specified premises to a maximum of 12 hours in any 24 hour 
period 
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 ensuring a person subject to a control order is provided with certain 
information, and 
 extending the operation of the control order regime for a further 10 
years (until 15 December 2025).   
Continued application of regime 
2.191 The continued application of the control order regime was a key issue for 
a number of submitters. This section of the report will canvass those 
views, however the timing and length of the proposed extension will be 
dealt with separately. 
2.192 The Attorney-General’s second reading speech justifies the amendments 
to the regime by noting that ‘in the current heightened threat 
environment, it is vital our law enforcement and security agencies have 
effective mechanisms to manage emerging threats.’136 
2.193 Supporting this position, the Explanatory Memorandum states that the 
extension of the control order regime recognises ‘the enduring nature of 
the terrorist threat and the important role of control orders in mitigating 
and responding to that threat.’137  
2.194 The AFP and the Attorney-General’s Department also noted that the 
COAG review supported the retention of the control order regime.138 
2.195 Despite the justifications above, and the amendments proposed in the Bill 
(including additional proposed safeguards), a number of submitters stated 
that the control order regime in its entirety should be repealed. 
2.196 For example, the Australian Human Rights Commission noted that while 
the COAG Report recommended the regime be extended, it also went on 
to note that the existing safeguards are not adequate and substantial 
changes would be necessary to protect against abuse and ensure a fair 
hearing is held.139 
2.197 In its submission, the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law outlined its 
concerns that the extension of the control order regime contradicts the 
INSLM’s Second Annual Report, which recommended the control order 
 
136  Senator the Hon George Brandis QC, Attorney-General, Senate Hansard, 24 September 2014, 
p. 65. 
137  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 128, 134. 
138  Australian Federal Police, Submission 36, p. 5; Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 8, 
p. 8. 
139  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 9; Law Council of Australia, 
Submission 12, p. 21.  
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regime be repealed.140  In evidence to the Committee, Mr Bret Walker SC 
supported the recommendation he made while INLSM.  In response to a 
question on whether his position has changed because of the raising of the 
terror alert level he noted: 
No, not at all. The terror alert level, not that it is as exact as 
meteorology, has never been something that parliamentarians or 
the rest of us should be unconcerned about. So no critical point has 
been passed at all.141 
2.198 Gilbert + Tobin drew on the INSLM report and noted his view that 
‘control orders in their present form are not effective, not appropriate and 
not necessary’ and that ‘an individual subject to a control order is not 
likely to engage in any further activity that could form the basis for a 
conviction.’142 
2.199 The Human Rights Law Centre agreed, noting that: 
On the whole, control orders are an unnecessary and 
disproportionate limitation on human rights.143  
2.200 Additionally, the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, while noting that 
they consider control orders to be an objectionable device, queried the 
ongoing necessity of the regime given the lowering of the threshold, and 
amendments contained elsewhere in the Act to enable arrest for terrorism 
offences on the basis of suspicion.144  
Threshold for application 
2.201 Currently, in requesting the Attorney-General’s written consent to an 
interim control order, a senior AFP member must: 
 consider on reasonable grounds that the order in the terms to be 
requested would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act, or 
 suspect on reasonable grounds that the person has provided training to, 
or received training from, a listed terrorist organisation.145 
2.202 The amendments proposed by this Bill will require the senior AFP 
member to suspect (rather than consider) on reasonable grounds that the 
 
140  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 3. 
141  Mr Walker SC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 41. 
142  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 4. 
143  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 18, p. 9. 
144  Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission 17, p. 5. 
145  Section 104.2(2) of the Criminal Code.  
54  
 
order in the terms to be requested would substantially assist in preventing 
a terrorist act. 
2.203 The Explanatory Memorandum states that this amendment responds to 
advice from law enforcement that the current threshold is too high.146  It 
states the amendment will align the threshold with the existing threshold 
in the second limb of the test in paragraph 104.4(2)(b). 
2.204 The Explanatory Memorandum also outlines that despite this threshold 
being lowered, the issuing court must still be satisfied of a range of 
matters before making an interim control order on the same threshold that 
currently exists.147  
2.205 Notwithstanding this explanation, concerns were expressed with the 
proposed lowering of the threshold. The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public 
Law called for the threshold in the second limb to be changed to 
‘considers’ rather the first limb lowered to ‘suspects’, in line with the 
recommendation made by the COAG review. Their submission stated that 
COAG 
viewed ‘considers’ as a higher standard that was more consistent 
with the issuing court’s obligation to be satisfied of that conduct 
on the balance of probabilities.148 
2.206 Similarly, the Law Council of Australia questioned the need to depart 
from the COAG recommendation in the absence of further reasons 
justifying the departure.149 
2.207 Meanwhile, the Islamic Council of Victoria noted that lowering thresholds 
will create anger, tension and discontent. Far from addressing 
radicalisation these measures can act as a source of radicalisation, 
provoking those subjected to such socially and legally repressive 
measures to act out.150 
2.208 In response to these concerns, in its supplementary submission, the 
Attorney-General’s Department reiterated that the proposed change will 
only enable an application to the Attorney-General for his or her consent 
‘based on a slightly lower degree of certainty’.151  The Department went on 
to outline that it considered the changed threshold to be ‘appropriate for 
 
146  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 123. 
147  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 123. 
148  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 6. 
149  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, paragraph 95. 
150  Islamic Council of Victoria, Submission 42, p. 3. 
151  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 22. 
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the initial stages of seeking consent to apply for an interim control 
order’.152 
2.209 The Department also confirmed that: 
The same threshold that currently applies to the making of interim 
control orders – that the issuing court is satisfied on the balance of 
probabilities that the terms of the order are reasonably necessary, 
and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of 
protecting the public from terrorism – must still be satisfied before 
an interim control order can be made against a person.153 
2.210 Finally, in relation to the proposed change to the threshold, Mr Bret 
Walker SC in evidence before the Committee doubted the change would 
have a significant effect: 
I am not quite sure that there is any true, appreciable lowering if 
things go as the bill presently proposes, any more than I think that 
there is any appreciable tightening if things went as COAG 
described.154 
Criteria for control orders 
2.211 Currently, the only grounds on which a control order can be issued is 
where the person has provided training to, or received training from, a 
listed terrorist organisation. The Bill will expand the grounds on which an 
order can be sought and issued to also include where the person has: 
 participated in training with a terrorist organisation 
 engaged in a hostile activity in a foreign country, or  
 been convicted in Australia or a foreign country of an offence relating to 
terrorism, a terrorist organisation or a terrorist act. 
2.212 The Explanatory Memorandum states that this amendment follows advice 
from law enforcement agencies that there is an existing gap that 
precludes them from seeking consent to apply for a control order 
against a person who has actually engaged in foreign fighting 
activity or been convicted of a terrorism offence where those 
persons pose a risk to the community.  The inclusion of these 
additional criteria will facilitate the placing of appropriate controls 
 
152  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 23. 
153  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 23. 
154  Mr Walker SC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 45. 
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over such individuals where this would substantially assist in 
preventing a terrorist act.155 
2.213 In relation to this amendment, the Law Council of Australia noted the 
former INSLM’s recommendation in his Second Annual Report that the 
existing control order regime should be replaced with a narrower regime. 
In particular, it noted that the amendments do not ‘include any 
requirement for proven continuing dangerousness and unsatisfactory 
prospects for rehabilitation.’156  
2.214 This position was supported by the Human Rights Law Centre157 and the 
Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law who noted that the proposed 
amendments 
fall short of the recommendations of the INSLM in not requiring 
any finding as to the ongoing dangerousness of the person.158 
2.215 In support of this position, Amnesty International stated that 
although international human rights law allows for some 
limitations to these rights under prescribed certain circumstances 
including national security, Amnesty International does not 
believe that the use of control orders to restrict the rights and 
remove the rights of individuals who have not been convicted of 
any crime can be adequately justified.159 
2.216 Additionally, the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law stated that 
issuing control orders on the basis of past convictions is also 
highly questionable, and when not connected to any obligation to 
prove that the target of the control order is an ongoing threat 
should be opposed.160 
2.217 In response to these concerns, the Attorney-General’s Department argued 
in its supplementary submission that: 
The fact that a person has been convicted of a terrorism offence, 
even where there is strong evidence that the person has not been 
satisfactorily rehabilitated and continues to be dangerous, is not 
sufficient information on which to base an interim control order.  
For example, a person convicted of terrorism could be assessed as 
 
155  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 123. 
156  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, paragraph 97. 
157  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 18, p. 6. 
158  Gilbert + Tobin Submission Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, pp. 7–8. 
159  Amnesty International, Submission 22, p. 2. 
160  Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission 17, p. 5. 
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being a danger only to himself or to members of his family.  
Accordingly, the issuing court must also be satisfied on the 
balance of probabilities that the terms of the order are reasonably 
necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the 
purpose of protecting the public from terrorism.161 
2.218 Additionally, submitters also raised specific concerns about the use of a 
foreign conviction as a basis for a control order in Australia.162   
2.219 Gilbert + Tobin noted that foreign countries may not have the same 
procedural protections as Australia for criminal trials, specifically pointing 
to the possibility of trials in absentia and on this basis recommended this 
aspect of the amendments be removed.163  Human Rights Watch, while 
agreeing with the concerns of others, called for the amendments to be 
limited to those convicted of crimes in Australia or countries that have 
laws which meet international standards.164 
2.220 The Law Council of Australia noted Australia’s international obligations 
not to be complicit in ‘criminal investigations and trials which do not 
comply with accepted fair trial principles.’165  If this amendment proceeds, 
the Law Council of Australia called for the court to be satisfied that there 
were no fair trial concerns with the conviction. 
2.221 The Law Council of Australia additionally proposed that protections 
along the lines of those in the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 
1987 for determining whether or not to provide assistance to a foreign 
country, be considered for inclusion.166  
2.222 In response to these concerns, the Attorney-General’s Department again 
noted that the existence of a conviction is not enough to obtain a control 
order. The court must be also satisfied that the control order is necessary 
to protect the public from terrorism.  The Department also noted: 
When making a request to an issuing court for a control order, the 
AFP member is required to provide the issuing court with any 
facts as to why the order should not be made.  This would include 
 
161  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary submission 8.1, p. 22. 
162  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 7; Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, 
Submission 17, p. 5, Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 22. 
163  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 7. 
164  Human Rights Watch, Submission 21, p. 7. 
165  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, paragraph 99. 
166  These grounds are contained in section 8 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 
and include grounds such as political offence, discrimination, dual criminality, and prejudice 
to the sovereignty, security or national interest of Australia. 
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any relevant information about the foreign investigation and trial 
process.167   
Other issues 
2.223 A range of submitters also argued that the regime should not be extended 
without additional safeguards168 such as: 
 a requirement to inform a person of his or her rights to legal 
representation, and  
 providing for a minimum standard of disclosure of information to be 
given to the subject about the allegations against him or her to 
enable effective legal instructions to be given in response. 
2.224 The Law Council of Australia sought further information on the kind of 
conduct a person would need to engage in to make it impractical for the 
AFP member to comply with the requirements to inform a person of their 
appeal and review rights.169  In response, the Department stated: 
This provision is designed to protect the integrity of an interim 
control order served on a person who, for example, is behaving 
violently towards the AFP member seeking to explain the terms of 
the order.  In contrast, it would not apply in circumstances where 
the person’s limited English skills meant the person did not 
understand the terms.  In such a case it would be reasonably 
practicable – and expected – that the AFP member would make 
arrangements for an interpreter to assist in explaining the person’s 
appeal and review rights.170 
Committee comment 
2.225 The Committee recognises that any proposed amendments to the control 
order regime are likely to trigger significant debate over the continued 
existence of these powers. 
2.226 On the basis of evidence provided, the Committee is satisfied that it is 
necessary and appropriate that the AFP continue to have access to these 
powers in the fight against terrorism. The Committee’s recommendations 
on the timing and length of the proposed extension are outlined separately 
in this chapter.   
 
167  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 23. 
168  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, pp. 22-24; Human Rights Watch, Submission 21, p. 7. 
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2.227 Given the scope of this inquiry, the Committee proposes to confine its 
consideration to the amendments proposed in this legislation.  It is 
appropriate that broader issues raised by submitters be considered as part 
of a more comprehensive review of the operation of the control order 
regime.   
2.228 In relation to the proposed lowering of the threshold for one of the 
elements of applying for a control order, it appears to the Committee that 
there is public confusion as to the effect of the amendment.  On this point, 
the Committee recognises that the threshold for a senior AFP member to 
request an application is proposed to be lower.  However, importantly, the 
amendments do not enable a court to issue a control order on the basis of 
mere suspicion.  The threshold for a court to issue an order continues to be 
on the balance of probabilities.  This is an appropriate threshold and the 
Committee notes that sufficient information will still need to be put before 
the court.  In the enhanced threat environment, the Committee supports 
the amendment, as it will assist a senior AFP officer to make an application, 
noting appropriate safeguards are retained, and in some instances 
enhanced, by the Bill.   
2.229 The Committee also supports the expanded grounds on which a control 
order can be sought. The Committee supports these powers being as 
effective as possible, particularly given the changing threat environment. 
The Committee considers that the existing ground (providing training to, 
or received training from, a listed terrorist organisation) is unnecessarily 
narrow and does not adequately capture the range of circumstances where 
a person may present a risk. For example, the existing grounds would not 
necessarily capture Australians who had returned from fighting in a 
foreign conflict if it could not be shown that they had provided training to, 
or received training from, a listed terrorist organisation.  As such, the 
Committee supports amendments to address existing gaps in the 
circumstances in which control orders can be sought and issued.   
2.230 The Committee notes calls from submitters for an additional requirement 
that there be a link to some ongoing threat or danger before a control 
order can be issued. However, the Committee notes on the basis of 
evidence before it, that the existing process for issuing a control order 
requires some level of ongoing threat. Specifically, the court must be 
satisfied on the balance of probabilities that each of the obligations, 
prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on the person by the order is 
reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of 
protecting the public from a terrorist act.171 If there is no risk, then there are no 
 
171  Section 104.4(1)(d) of the Criminal Code. 
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obligations that would need to be imposed and an order would not be 
sought nor imposed.     
2.231 A number of submitters also called for additional safeguards to apply to 
the criteria enabling control orders to be issued on the basis of a foreign 
conviction. The Committee recognises that the criminal justice systems of 
other countries may not align with, or meet the standards in place in 
Australia. However, the Committee does not consider it to be appropriate 
for a court in issuing a control order to examine the merits of a foreign 
conviction.   
2.232 However, the other criteria on which a control order may be sought are 
based on, or linked to conduct that would constitute a terrorist act, or, 
more broadly, a terrorism related offence. As such, while the Committee 
supports enabling control orders to be sought on the basis of a foreign 
conviction (supported by the requirement that the order be appropriate 
and adapted for the purposes of protecting the public from terrorism), the 
Committee considers it appropriate that the conduct for which the person 
was convicted in the foreign country must also constitute a terrorism 
related offence in Australia.  
 
Recommendation 9 
 The Committee recommends that the Government consider requiring 
that a control order can only be based on a foreign conviction where the 
conduct giving rise to the conviction would constitute a terrorism 
related offence in Australia. 
2.233 The Committee welcomes the additional safeguards to be implemented by 
the Bill and notes that the AFP proposes to develop a document to be used 
when serving control orders.172 
2.234 In addition to this, the Committee also notes the Attorney-General’s 
Department’s supplementary submission in which the Department stated 
that 
current counter-terrorism investigations continue to inform the 
Government’s view of the adequacy of the control order regime.  
The Government is closely examining the application process and 
the purposes for which a control order may be sought with a view 
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to further enhancing the regime and respond to contemporary 
operational challenges.173  
Recommendation 10 
 The Committee notes that the Attorney-General’s Department and the 
Australian Federal Police have flagged the possibility of further 
enhancements to the control order regime given ongoing examination of 
the application process and purposes for which a control order can be 
sought.   
Should further changes be proposed, the Committee recommends that 
these amendments are referred to this Committee with appropriate time 
for inquiry and review.  
Preventative detention orders 
2.235 The Bill proposes five sets of amendments to the preventative detention 
order (PDO) regime.  These are: 
 including a subjective test for the AFP member applying for a PDO to 
‘suspect on reasonable grounds’ that the relevant person will do one of 
things listed in connection to a terrorist act  
 changing the threshold to preserve evidence related to a terrorist act 
that has occurred in the last 28 days to ‘reasonably necessary’ rather 
than ‘necessary’ 
 allowing oral or electronic applications for PDOs or prohibited contact 
orders in urgent circumstances, while retaining written application as 
the usual method  
 enabling PDOs to be issued based on a description of a person 
(including a partial name or nickname) where a person’s full name is 
not known, and 
 extending the operation of the PDO regime for a further 10 years (until 
15 December 2025). 
2.236 The Explanatory Memorandum outlines that the purpose of PDOs is to 
enable law enforcement agencies to take action to prevent a terrorist threat 
from eventuating or to preserve evidence where arrest is not possible.  It 
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further states that PDOs are ‘particularly relevant in respect of emerging 
threats presented by Australians returning from conflict zones overseas.’174  
The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to argue that ‘it is vital that law 
enforcement agencies continue to have access to all tools that could be 
required to combat this threat and protect Australia and Australians from 
terrorist acts.’175 
Extension of PDO regime 
2.237 The continued application of the PDO regime was a key issue for a 
number of submitters. This part will canvass those views, however, the 
timing and length of the proposed extension will be dealt with separately. 
2.238 As with control orders, the Attorney-General’s second reading speech 
justifies extending the PDO regime on the basis that ‘in the current 
heightened threat environment, it is vital our law enforcement and 
security agencies have effective mechanisms to manage emerging 
threats.’176   
2.239 Further, in its submission, the AFP stated that it considers 
continued access to preventative detention orders [is] a critical 
operational response of last resort, to ensure that the AFP can 
undertake action to quickly disrupt imminent threats.177 
2.240 While not commenting directly on the proposed amendments, a number 
of submitters instead called for PDOs to be repealed.  For example, in 
calling for PDOs to be repealed, the Law Council of Australia repeated the 
view of the INSLM and stated: 
In the INSLM’s view, discussions with the AFP ‘strongly 
suggested that ‘in a real, practical, urgent sense’ the ability to 
arrest a person is a more efficient and effective process for dealing 
with imminent terrorist threats than the complex and time 
consuming process of a PDO’.178 
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2.241 Additionally, the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law outlined its 
concerns that the extension of the PDO regime contradicts the COAG 
review and the former INSLM recommendations that it be repealed.179   
2.242 Human Rights Watch also noted that PDOs were unnecessary because 
existing Australian law already enabled persons suspected of terrorism to 
be detained for questioning for up to 24 hours.180 This was also consistent 
with the position taken by the former INSLM in his Second Annual 
Report, where he stated: 
[N]o material or argument demonstrated that the traditional 
criminal justice response to the prevention and prosecution of 
serious crime through arrest, charge and remand is ill-suited or 
ill-equipped to deal with terrorism.181 
2.243 In evidence before the Committee, Mr Bret Walker SC supported the 
recommendation he made as the INSLM to repeal the PDO and control 
order regimes. When asked if he still stood by his previous 
recommendations given the heightened terror threat, he stated that he 
did.182 
2.244 In support of this point, in evidence before the Committee, the Law 
Council of Australia noted: 
In the absence of a justification as to why existing powers of arrest 
are not sufficient, and particularly given the early stage of 
offending captured by terrorism offences, Law Council considers 
these recommendations appropriate in the light of detailed reasons 
provided in those reviews. We support the reviews of the PDOs 
conducted by COAG and by the monitor. We do not see that there 
is any real justification for the continuation of PDOs.183 
2.245 Contradicting this view, and putting forward a case for retaining these 
powers, the AFP noted 
that these recommendations were made prior to any use of 
preventative detention orders in Australia, and prior to the 
significant recent changes to the terrorist threat environment. The 
detention of three men under NSW preventative detention order 
legislation as part of Operation APPLEBY in September 2014 
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demonstrates, in the AFP’s view, the operational utility and 
necessity of this special preventative power. The AFP considers 
the retention of the Commonwealth preventative detention regime 
as a key measure of the Bill … [i]n the AFP’s view, the current 
terrorist threat environment points to an increase in the likelihood 
that the police will need to use such powers to take rapid, 
preventative action to ensure a terrorist attack is not carried out on 
Australian soil.184 
2.246 In response to questions from the Committee, the AFP went on to state 
that  
the COAG review was done some time ago and was actually done 
prior to what I called the ‘heightened operational tempo’ that we 
are currently facing. I know that the COAG is meeting next [week] 
and that there has been some consideration in relation to those 
recommendations. There will probably be some changes to 
incorporate where we are with the current environment.185 
2.247 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law repeated the view of the INSLM 
that the PDO regime is ‘at odds with our normal approach to even the 
most reprehensible crimes.’186  Gilbert + Tobin went on to state:  
Multiple submissions by federal, state and territory police forces to 
the INSLM and COAG Review inquiries indicated that the 
authorities are unlikely to rely upon PDOs because other, more 
suitable, detention powers are available.187 
2.248 Amnesty International also called for the PDO regime to be repealed, 
rather than extended. They outlined their human rights concerns with 
each of these regimes, noting that the PDO regime ‘undermines key 
human rights protections including freedom from arbitrary detention, the 
right to confidential communication with a lawyer and the prohibition of 
secret detention.’188 
2.249 Arguing these powers are unnecessary, Gilbert + Tobin further noted: 
As the Bill aims to lower the threshold for arrest (from reasonable 
belief of the commission of a terrorism offence to reasonable 
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suspicion of the same) it will be even easier for the authorities to 
rely on traditional law enforcement powers.189 
2.250 Further, while not expressly recommending the repeal of the existing 
provisions, the Human Rights Law Centre noted their significant concerns 
with the existing regime.190 
Other amendments  
2.251 While extension of the regime was the focus of submitters, some 
comments were made on the other proposed amendments to the PDO 
regime. 
2.252 The Human Rights Law Centre considered that the proposed reforms to 
enable a person to be specified in a PDO on the basis of a description 
rather than by name weakened the existing regime.191 Similarly, the Law 
Council of Australia commented that 
the recording of a detainee’s name is important for oversight 
purposes. Therefore, the amendments should require that a 
description is only given where reasonable efforts to determine the 
detainee’s name have failed. In that instance, a ‘detailed’ 
description should be provided.192 
2.253 For the Human Rights Law Centre, the change to a subjective test for the 
AFP member to apply for a PDO (compared to the existing objective test) 
only ‘heightened their concerns with the PDO regime.’193 
2.254 The Explanatory Memorandum notes that this amendment responds to 
recommendation III/1 of the INSLM‘s Second Annual Report. The 
Explanatory Memorandum went on to state that the 
threshold is being changed on the advice of law enforcement that 
the use of the subjective test of suspects on reasonable grounds is 
more appropriate. The use of that threshold is designed to ensure 
that, not only are there reasonable grounds upon which to form 
the suspicion, but the AFP member has actually formed the 
suspicion.194  
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2.255 Notwithstanding this explanation, the Australian Privacy Foundation 
commented that 
given the very serious breach of many normal criminal procedural 
protections and the extreme nature of the powers of such  
detention, it is more appropriate that a court be the decision maker 
satisfied.195 
Questioning a person subject to a PDO 
2.256 While not related to any specific reform to the PDO regime, a further issue 
raised was the ability of police to question a person while they are subject 
to a PDO.  Currently, a person subject to a PDO is not able to be 
questioned (subject to a few minor exceptions related to the PDO).196 
2.257 In evidence before the Committee, the Attorney-General’s Department 
noted the two different roles the AFP perform in relation to terrorism.  The 
first is to protect the public by preventing acts of terrorism and the second 
is to have an eye on prosecution and ensure that any evidence collected 
can be adduced in proceedings. On this point, it was noted: 
Preventative detention orders were established, as the title says, 
for the purpose of preventing the commission of a terrorist act, 
effectively. As the Assistant Commissioner has said, you can move 
through from preventative detention to arrest, and that is the point 
at which the police officer and the person in question are then 
governed, effectively, by the provisions of Part 1C of the Crimes 
Act. There would be concern if you could not invoke or you were 
not in a position to make use of those Part 1C protections, such as 
the right to silence, as to whether any evidence collected as part of 
a questioning process would then be admissible later in judicial 
process.197 
2.258 In its submission, the AFP noted the difference between terrorism and 
traditional investigations, and the balance the police need to strike 
between prevention, disruption and prosecution.  Specifically: 
It will not always be appropriate for police to delay traditional 
criminal justice action (ie arrest) until sufficient evidence has been 
obtained to meet relevant threshold tests. There is a need for 
special preventative powers (including preventative detention 
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orders and control orders) to operate alongside traditional 
criminal justice processes in order to effectively respond to and 
manage terrorist threats.198 
2.259 The AFP went on to confirm that they have not requested that the 
legislation be changed to enable questioning, given the purpose of a PDO 
is to prevent rather than investigate.199 
2.260 In a joint submission, the Hon Christian Porter MP and the Hon Jason 
Woods MP called for the PDO regime to be amended to enable 
questioning, arguing that: 
Where a PDO is available on a different threshold to traditional 
arrest powers then it will likely apply in different circumstances 
than those covered by traditional arrest and it may follow that 
allowing questioning in those different circumstances could serve 
a substantial purpose to aid in the investigation, prevention or 
prosecution of terrorist acts.200  
2.261 Further to this, Mr Porter and Mr Woods stated the possible benefits of 
enabling a person to be questioned, particularly where the person 
detained under a PDO may be willing to assist police with their 
inquiries.201 
2.262 In response to calls for PDOs to enable questioning, the Attorney-
General’s Department reiterated that the original purpose of the PDO 
regime was preventing a terrorist act or preventing the destruction of 
evidence relating to terrorist act.  The Department also stated that the 
changing threat level has not resulted in the existing regime for 
questioning in Part IC of the Crimes Act (and the safeguards within) being 
inappropriate.202 
2.263 The Department also noted that: 
The threshold for obtaining a preventative detention order and 
taking a person into detention is different, and should not be used 
to circumvent the requirements in Part IC.203 
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Other issues 
2.264 The existing PDO regime requires the Ombudsman to be: 
 notified of the making of an initial and continued PDO and a prohibited 
contact order 
 given a copy of the order, and 
  notified if a person has been taken into custody.   
This is an important safeguard in the PDO regime. 
2.265 In evidence before the Committee, the acting Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, noted that: 
The Criminal Code Act already imposes an obligation on the AFP 
to notify our office when a preventative detention order is 
executed…It would be helpful for the Act to spell out a time frame 
in which the AFP needs to provide that notification. At the 
moment the Act is silent to that, so it would be useful to augment 
that obligation just slightly.204 
2.266 In the Ombudsman’s supplementary submission, he specifically pointed 
to the ability of a person detained under a PDO to complain to the 
Ombudsman. As such, the Ombudsman outlined: 
It may be reasonable to require the notification as soon as possible, 
to ensure that we are aware of the PDO and that we may receive a 
complaint.205 
Committee comment 
2.267 On balance, the Committee supports the continued operation of the PDO 
regime.  While there has been very limited use of the regime until recently, 
the increased threat environment demands appropriate tools are available 
to law enforcement to both prevent and prosecute terrorist acts. The 
Committee’s recommendations on the timing and length of the proposed 
extension are outlined separately in this chapter.   
2.268 The Committee does not support any change to the regime to allow for 
questioning. As raised in evidence, the PDO regime is focussed on 
preventing a terrorist act, rather than an information gathering tool to 
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assist with investigations and prosecutions. Any change to allow 
questioning would fundamentally change the nature of the regime. 
2.269 Notwithstanding the Committee’s support for continuation of the PDO 
regime, the Committee considers it is essential that the safeguards that 
operate in relation to the regime not be weakened. As such, while the 
Committee recognises there may be circumstances in which a PDO should 
be issued on the basis of a description of a person, this should only occur 
where the name of the person is not known and it was not possible to 
determine the person’s name based on reasonable inquiries. The 
Committee also considers it would be useful in enabling, in similar 
circumstances, the use of an alias as well as, or instead of, a description. 
Recommendation 11 
 The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended: 
 to ensure that a preventative detention order is only able to 
refer to a description in circumstances where the person’s true 
name is not known and not able to be determined based on 
reasonable inquiries. 
 to enable a preventative detention order to refer to an alias (as 
well as, or instead of a description) instead of a name where the 
person’s name is not known and not able to be determined 
based on reasonable inquiries. 
The Committee also recommends that the Bill be amended so that where 
a description is included in the preventative detention order, it has 
sufficient detail so as to identify beyond reasonable doubt the person to 
whom it applies. 
2.270 The Committee agrees with the views of the acting Ombudsman that it 
would be useful to establish a timeframe in the legislation to guide when 
the notification is to be made. While there are benefits to the Ombudsman 
being put on notice that a person may complain, this needs to be balanced 
with the urgent nature of PDOs and the operational environment in which 
they are likely to be sought and executed.  To ensure this safeguard 
operates as effectively as possible, it is important that it is clear on the face 
of the legislation when this obligation must be met by the AFP. 
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Recommendation 12 
 The Committee recommends the existing preventative detention order 
regime be amended to specify that where the Ombudsman is required to 
be notified of certain events by the Australian FederalPolice, this 
notification is required to take place as soon as is reasonably 
practicable. 
Sunset clauses 
2.271 The Bill proposes to extend the operation of the: 
 control order regime for a further 10 years to 15 December 2025 
 preventative detention order regime for a further 10 years to 15 
December 2025 
 stop, search and seizure powers relating to terrorism offences for a 
further 10 years to 15 December 2025, and 
 questioning and detention warrant regime in the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 for a further 10 years to 22 July 2026. 
2.272 Arguments for and against the proposed extension of these powers are 
dealt with in separate parts of this chapter. This section focuses on the  
 timing of the extension 
 length of the extension, and 
 delay of the review of the questioning and detention powers until 2026. 
Timing of extension 
2.273 The Bill proposes to extend the operation of these regimes despite the fact 
that the existing powers would not otherwise cease until 15 December 
2015 (control orders, PDOs and stop, search and seizure powers) or 22 July 
2016 (questioning and detention powers). 
2.274 A range of submitters queried why the powers were being extended at 
this time. For example, the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law noted:  
Doing so is, at this point in time, unnecessary in order to meet the 
danger posed by returning foreign fighters. These powers will 
remain in force until either late 2015 or mid-2016…There is 
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therefore no urgent reason why these powers need to be 
addressed in, and debated as part of, the current Bill.206 
2.275 Amnesty International and the Human Rights Law Centre agreed,207 with 
the Human Rights Law Centre noting: 
There is still sufficient time under the existing sunset clauses for a 
public debate on the necessity of these powers and for relevant 
authorities to exercise their powers to respond to actual or 
potential terrorist acts or terrorism offences, or otherwise manage 
threats to Australia’s national security.208 
2.276 The councils for civil liberties across Australia also agreed, noting that: 
A decision to roll-over these sunset clauses, especially for such a 
lengthy period, should only be made after careful evaluation of 
their necessity, proportionality and broad impact on democratic 
values and civil liberties and rights.209 
2.277 The Australian Human Rights Commission also supported this position 
both in its submission and in evidence before the Committee.210 In its 
submission, the Commission argued that the Government 
has not established that the extension of the sunset clauses is 
necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim. This is especially 
so as the relevant provisions are not due to expire for over 12 
months. There is no urgency in relation to the passage of these 
items of the Bill.211 
Length of extension 
2.278 A recurring theme in submissions and in evidence before the Committee 
was the proposed length of the extension of these powers.   
2.279 In evidence to the Committee, the Attorney-General’s Department noted 
that operational agencies were in support of the powers not sunsetting at 
all.  Specifically, the Attorney-General’s Department noted that 
operational agencies 
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do not see that there will be a date at which these powers will no 
longer be useful. As a result of consultation, particularly with the 
states and territories and the communities, the acknowledgement 
that this threat would continue indefinitely was somewhat 
difficult and the preference would be for there to be a sunset 
provision so that we do revisit these powers in 10 years' time. 
Effectively, the position that we got to was that the powers are 
important and need to continue.212 
2.280 Further: 
A number of these provisions require the agreement of the states 
and territories in order to take effect, to be passed. Through 
consultation with the states and territories the view was that the 
fact that we had a 10-year sunset provision at the moment seemed 
sensible and we should repeat that, so 10 years is really a 
repetition of a regime that the states and territories in particular 
were comfortable with.213 
2.281 In evidence before the Committee, the AFP stated: 
There was a lot of consultation with members of the community in 
relation to this issue and there were some very strong views put to 
Ms Lowe and myself and others that they wanted to see some type 
of sunset provision retained. After those consultations, I think the 
operational agencies were of the view that we were comfortable 
with something like 10 years being maintained based on those 
consultations.214 
2.282 While not commenting on removing the sunset clauses altogether, Mr Bret 
Walker SC, in evidence to the Committee, outlined his position in relation 
to the use of sunset clauses: 
Believing as I do in parliamentary government I think that we are 
bound and our destiny is with all future parliaments to consider 
what laws should remain and what new laws should be made…I 
am assuming that most legislation is important, and I am not 
happy therefore about the idea of legislating under cover of, as it 
were, an apology, by saying that this law will disappear by 
effluxion of time. If after all it has no usefulness, it will either not 
be used—that was true for example of preventative detention 
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orders, until a couple of weeks ago—or it will strike anybody 
interested in the area as something calling for repeal.215  
2.283 In relation to the use of sunset clauses for a truly emergency position, Mr 
Walker commented: 
But that of course would be utterly wrong for counterterrorism, 
which is not an emergency position. It is a crime-fighting position 
and it should be seen as permanent.216 
2.284 A number of submitters argued that a 10 year extension was too long.  For 
example, the councils for civil liberties across Australia noted: 
 [l]aws that will have been in place for over 20 years are likely to 
be de facto permanent.  They will have transformed from 
‘extraordinary’ to normal.  They are likely to have further 
spilled over into ‘ordinary’ state criminal jurisdictions.217 
 This arbitrary and untested proposal to maintain all these 
powers for another decade runs counter to a range of 
recommendations from formal review processes in recent years. 
The INSLM, the COAG review and the PJCIS (and its 
predecessor) have all made recommendations questioning the 
continuation of some of these powers.218 
2.285 Similarly, Professor Ben Saul expressed concern about the extensions 
being for a further 10 years on the basis that it is not possible to know 
what the threat will be in 10 years’ time.219   
2.286 Members of the Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee called for the 
extension to be limited to five years.220  This timeframe accords with the 
COAG recommendation in relation to the stop, search and seizure powers.  
The Human Rights Committee specifically noted that:  
If the search and seizure powers in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) are 
renewed in 2016, the Committee recommends amending 
section 3UK to provide that the relevant provisions should cease to 
exist as at the expiry date, which will be a five year period.221 
2.287 The Australian Lawyers for Human Rights and the Human Rights Law 
Centre222 also noted that the proposal to extend these powers for 10 years 
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goes beyond the COAG recommendation without sufficient justification.  
The Australian Lawyers for Human Rights stated: 
That the reasoning in the Bill's explanatory memorandum for this 
failure…eludes the real issues and does not evidence a 
proportionate and appropriate response.223 
2.288 In evidence before the Committee, the Australian Defence Association 
supported an extension of between five to 10 years.  In supporting the use 
of sunset clauses, the Association stated: 
The importance of sunset clauses in this type of legislation is really 
twofold. The first is simply that any temporary restriction of civil 
liberties must be examined regularly. Secondly, they reassure 
people that the changes are not permanent. To some extent, that is 
very useful in deterring some of the alarmist claims that 
continually seem to accompany any counter-terrorist legislation.224 
2.289 In relation to the timeframe for sunsetting, the Association went on to say: 
One of the problems with the first tranche of counter-terrorist 
legislation was that some of the sunset clauses were arguably too 
short. We would not like to see the pendulum swing the other way 
and have them too long. Certainly somewhere between five and 10 
years appears to be an appropriate time. The beauty of sunset 
clauses in particular is they allow legislation to be reviewed away 
from the heat of the particular crisis that triggered the legislation 
in the first place.225 
2.290 Commenting on a possible timeframe, Professor Gillian Triggs of the 
Australian Human Rights Commission stated: 
I personally think five years is so far into the future. It is a long 
time in the current global environment to wait five years before 
you review or bring those additional powers to an end.226 
Delay of review 
2.291 The amendments also delay a review by this Committee of the 
questioning and detention powers that was due to take place by 
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22 January 2016.  The Bill will extend this provision so that the review is to 
take place by 22 January 2026. The Explanatory Memorandum noted: 
It is appropriate this review be conducted shortly before the 
extended sunset provision expires in 2026.227 
2.292 In its submission, ASIO did not specifically outline a reason justifying the 
delay of the review, other than stating that: 
It is appropriate to amend the PJCIS review requirement in 
paragraph 29(1)(bb) of the IS Act to be consistent with the 
proposed amendment to the sunset provision in section 34ZZ of 
the ASIO Act.228 
2.293 In response to suggestions that a review occur within the next 12 months, 
the ASIO commented: 
We understand absolutely the need for review and total 
accountability, but I do not think the enduring nature of the threat 
would see us having any different view in terms of our need to use 
this as a tool in 12 months time.229 
2.294 Further, in its supplementary submission, the Attorney-General’s 
Department stated that: 
The deferral of the PJCIS review was made because the Bill 
proposes a number of amendments to the questioning and 
detention provisions and there should be a reasonable time to 
assess the operation of the amended provisions before that review 
occurs.  A review in 2016 would be too soon to examine 
arrangements likely to come into effect in late 2014/early 2015.  A 
minimum of at least three years from the commencement of the 
proposed amendments would be needed to allow the PJCIS to 
properly assess the operation of the questioning and detention 
powers as part of its review.230 
2.295 Submitters expressed concerns with the proposed delay.231  The Australian 
Human Rights Commission argued that the 
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review would constitute an opportunity to determine whether the 
warrant powers are justified in the present security environment 
and should be retained.232 
2.296 Professor George Williams also noted the benefits of review.  Specifically, 
he noted in relation to the review and extension of ASIO’s questioning and 
detention powers in 2006: 
That was preceded by a very significant inquiry by this committee. 
We gave evidence to that. It led to deliberations on the 
improvement of the regime. We actually argued for repeal, but in 
the end the committee said, ‘Let’s actually improve it’, and some 
very significant changes were made.233 
2.297 Additionally, Dr Greg Carne outlined that the delay of the review would 
set a dangerous precedent whereby the legislated periodic review 
accountability mechanisms over exceptional powers can be 
peremptorily and hastily set aside due to a executive claim of 
present circumstances or expediency and…also produce a 
legislative elision or slippage from the exceptional or unusual 
nature of such powers to their legislative normalisation and 
permanence.234 
2.298 The Australian Human Rights Commission expressed the view that 
extending the provisions for a further 10 years without conducting a 
review is ‘extremely dangerous’.235  In relation to the purpose that a 
review would serve, Professor Triggs went on to say: 
It underscores the point that we think those safeguards and 
monitoring processes have to be in place. I would have thought 
that good governments would want, in any event, to see how this 
is actually working, for all the practical reasons that you have been 
raising. How is it actually working? Are there ways of getting 
people to come in earlier in some administrative process so that 
they have some sort of checking process? How does the 
evidentiary burden actually work in practice? Have there been any 
prosecutions and, if so, were they successful? If not, why not? 
How often is foreign evidence dubious? How often is it valuable? 
It would be a wonderful opportunity for a proper review.236 
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2.299 This position was supported by Mr Bret Walker SC who, while not 
necessarily supporting the use of sunset clauses, commented that 
if we have sunset clauses in that spirit then at least they should 
always have a procedure mandated whereby a decent time out 
before the sunset occurs there is a minimum and reasonable level 
of public involvement in a highly formal review, such as by this 
committee, in the case of certain forms of legislation, so that there 
can be no concern of a kind that I have felt often, here and in other 
countries, that the sunset clause tends to rush, truncate and detract 
from the overall quality of the legislative deliberations necessary 
in order to continue the important powers in question. We should 
remove entirely the idea of 'Hurry up and pass this otherwise we 
won't have the power.' That is the effect that sunset clauses have in 
a number of areas, and I think it would be a great pity with 
counterterrorist laws if they had that difficulty added to what is 
already a very difficult area.237 
2.300 The councils for civil liberties across Australia argued: 
These proposals should be withdrawn from the Foreign Fighters 
Bill and referred to the Independent National Security Legislation 
Monitor and to the PJCIS for review prior to their respective 
expiry dates.238 
2.301 Professor George Williams also supported a parliamentary review: 
And the review that Bret Walker has done is of course very 
important, but even that is not sufficient; it needs to be a 
parliamentary review, because the houses are going to be voting 
on this, so this committee is the obvious vehicle for that.239 
Committee comment 
2.302 As outlined in separate parts of this report, the Committee notes the 
continuing extension of each of the powers identified in paragraph 2.271. 
It is the Committee’s view that, given the nature of these powers, it is 
important that their use and ongoing need is assessed within a reasonable 
time-frame. This is particularly relevant given that this Bill proposes to 
alter the grounds on which some of these powers could be used. 
Specifically, the Bill will: 
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 alter the threshold for a senior AFP member to apply for a control order 
from ‘considers’ to ‘suspects’ 
 expand the grounds on which a control order can be sought and issued 
to include where the person has: 
 participated in training with a terrorist organisation 
 engaged in a hostile activity in a foreign country, or  
 been convicted in Australia or a foreign country of an offence 
relating to terrorism, a terrorist organisation or a terrorist act 
 include a subjective test for the AFP member applying for a PDO to 
‘suspect on reasonable grounds’ that the relevant person will do one of 
the things listed in connection to a terrorist act 
 amend the relevant threshold for applying for a PDO to preserve 
evidence related to a terrorist act to ‘reasonably necessary’ rather than 
necessary, and 
 replace the ‘last resort’ test for an ASIO questioning warrant with a 
requirement that the Attorney-General be satisfied that, having regard 
to other methods (if any) of collecting the intelligence that are likely to 
be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the warrant 
to be issued. 
2.303 Notwithstanding agreement that a review in a reasonable timeframe is 
necessary, the Committee holds differing views as to when the specified 
provisions should sunset and when a statutory review should occur.  
2.304 The Committee has considered the views of participants in the inquiry 
and ultimately determined that it is important that the next Parliament 
have the opportunity to assess whether these powers continue to be 
necessary.  The Committee notes a sunset date 24 months after the next 
Federal election would balance the need for agencies to have access to 
each of these powers in response to the current and emerging threat 
environment and ongoing justification for the existence of these powers.   
2.305 The Committee also considers it is essential that the Parliament has 
sufficient time to consider whether these powers need to be further 
amended, repealed, extended or made permanent prior to the powers 
being due to sunset. This should be done through a thorough review of 
each power. The Committee therefore recommends that the Intelligence 
Services Act 2001 be amended to require the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security to complete a public inquiry into 
each of the powers 18 months after the next Federal election. Such a 
timeframe would provide sufficient time for a thorough review of the 
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powers as well as an opportunity for the Government to respond prior to 
the following Parliament. 
2.306 The Committee also recommends that the use of each of these powers be 
subject to ongoing scrutiny. As such, the Committee recommends that the 
Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 be amended to 
require the INSLM to review the operation of these powers 12 months 
after the next Federal election. This timeframe would enable the INSLM 
report to be taken into account in this Committee’s reviews of these 
powers. 
 
Recommendation 13 
 The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended so that the 
following powers sunset 24 months after the date of the next Federal 
election: 
 control order regime in Division 104 of the Criminal Code Act 
1995 
 preventative detention order regime in Division 105 
 the stop, search and seizure powers relating to terrorism 
offences in Division IIIA of the Crimes Act 1914 
 questioning and questioning and detention warrant regime in 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to require the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security to complete a review of each of the powers listed above 18 
months after the next Federal election. 
The Committee recommends that the Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor Act 2010 be amended to require the INSLM to 
finalise a review of the operation of each of these powers 12 months 
after the next Federal election. 
2.307 While it is appropriate that this Committee review the use of each of these 
powers given their application to terrorism and national security matters, 
it highlights that this Committee does not have the power to otherwise 
consider the counter terrorism activities of the AFP more generally. 
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2.308 The Committee notes the AFP is already subject to a rigorous internal and 
external accountability regime which includes: the AFP Values and Code 
of conduct; a statutory based internal professional standards regime; 
independent oversight by the Ombudsman and the Australian 
Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity; scrutiny by the INSLM; 
oversight by the courts (in relation to the use of evidence in criminal 
proceedings); and oversight by Parliament through the Senate Estimates 
process, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement and the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security in relation to 
specific topics of inquiry referred to it (such as this Bill). 
2.309 While not wanting to impinge on these oversight mechanisms including 
the important role played by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law 
Enforcement, the Committee considers its oversight powers should be 
extended to include the counter-terrorism activities of the AFP. The 
Committee can provide a useful additional oversight function, particularly 
in relation to classified material that is not able to be considered by other 
parliamentary committees. 
 
Recommendation 14 
 The Committee recommends that the functions of the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security be extended to encompass 
the counter-terrorism activities of the Australian Federal Police, 
including, but not limited to, anything involving classified material. 
Foreign incursions and recruitment 
2.310 Schedule 1 to the Bill includes the proposed repeal of the Crimes (Foreign 
Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (the Foreign Incursions Act) and its 
replacement with a new Part 5.5 in the Criminal Code.240 The intention of 
proposed Part 5.5 is to ‘modernise the provisions of the Foreign Incursions 
Act’ and to address the ‘anomalies and mismatches’ identified in the 
Fourth Annual Report of the INSLM.241 
2.311 The provisions contain a series of offences relating to foreign incursions 
and recruitment. The part is ‘designed to simplify the offences to ensure 
 
240  Items 110 and 144 of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
241  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 135. 
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they are easier to understand, and to respond to the significant threat to 
the safety and security of Australia and Australians posed by those who 
engage in foreign fighting or seek to do so’.242 The offences include: 
 An offence carrying a life sentence for incursions into foreign countries 
with the intention of ‘engaging in a hostile activity’ (clause 119.1). 
 Offences carrying life sentences for preparations for incursions into 
foreign countries for the purpose of engaging in hostile activities 
(clause 119.4), including: specific offences for ‘preparatory acts’; 
accumulating weapons; providing or participating in training; and 
giving or receiving goods or services to promote the commission of an 
offence. An exception is provided for conduct ‘solely by way of, or for 
the purposes of, the provision of aid of a humanitarian nature’. 
 Further offences for providing buildings, aircraft or vessels used for 
preparatory activities (clause 119.5); recruiting persons to join 
organisations engaged in hostile activities against foreign governments 
(clause 119.6); and recruiting persons to serve in or with armed forces of 
a foreign country, unless declared by the Foreign Minister to be in 
Australia’s defence or international relations interests (clauses 119.7 and 
119.8). 
2.312 Additionally, clause 119.2 proposed to create a new offence, carrying a 
penalty of up to 10 years imprisonment, for ‘entering into or remaining in’ 
certain areas declared by the Foreign Affairs Minister.  
2.313 The Attorney-General would be required to consent to any prosecution 
under any of the foreign incursions and recruitment offences contained in 
the proposed new Part 5.5. Further, defence and international relations 
officials would be exempted from the offences. 
2.314 Evidence received from inquiry participants regarding both the reforms to 
the existing foreign incursions and recruitment offences, and the new 
‘declared area’ offence, is discussed in the following two sections. 
Reforms to existing foreign incursions and recruitment offences 
2.315 In evidence to the Committee, the former INSLM Mr Bret Walker SC 
indicated his support for the proposed reforms to the existing Foreign 
Incursions Act and its incorporation into the Criminal Code, noting they 
 
242  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 135. 
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the proposals were in accordance with the ‘urgent’ recommendations 
made in his Fourth Annual Report.243 
2.316 Mr Neil James from the Australia Defence Association also welcomed the 
reforms to the Foreign Incursions Act, suggesting that the legislation they 
would replace was ‘outmoded’. Mr James said that the existing offences 
had resulted in very few prosecutions because the evidence thresholds 
were ‘set far too high’.244  
2.317 However, many participants in the inquiry also argued against aspects of 
the proposed new foreign incursions regime.245 Many of the concerns 
centred on the scope of activity potentially falling under the offence 
provisions. The breadth of the proposed definition of ‘engaging in a 
hostile activity’, which underpins many of the offences in the proposed 
part 5.5 of the Criminal Code, was particularly highlighted by 
participants. For example, the councils for civil liberties across Australia 
submitted: 
[T]he inclusion of the terms ‘subverting society’ and ‘intimidating 
the public or a section of the public’ in paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
the proposed definition make this a much broader concept than 
the corresponding concept in the Crime (Foreign Incursions) Act. 
Accordingly, all of the offences proposed to be added to this part 
of the Criminal Code Act, which turn on this much broader 
concept of ‘engaging in a hostile activity’, have much broader 
scope than the existing offences in the Crimes (Foreign Incursions) 
Act.246 
2.318 The term ‘engaging in a hostile activity’ is defined in clause 117.1 of the 
Bill as follows: 
A person engages in a hostile activity in a foreign country if the 
person engages in conduct in that country with the intention of 
achieving one or more of the following objectives (whether or not 
such an objective is achieved): 
 
243  Mr Walker SC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 38. 
244  Mr James, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 20. 
245  Gilbert and Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, pp. 11–13; Australian Lawyers Alliance, 
Submission 13, pp. 3–4; Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission 15, p. 2; Castan 
Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission 17, p. 5; Amnesty International Australia, 
Submission 22, p. [4]; Joint media organisations, Submission 23, p. 3; councils for civil liberties 
across Australia, Submission 25, pp. 6–12; Dr A J Wood, Submission 31, p. 9; Mr Adam Bonner, 
Submission 34, pp. 10–14. 
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(a) the overthrow by force or violence of the government of 
that or any other foreign country (or of a part of that or any 
other foreign country); 
(b)  the engagement, by that or any other person, in subverting 
society in that or any other foreign country; 
(c)  intimidating the public or a section of the public of that or 
any other foreign country; 
(d)  causing the death of, or bodily injury to, a person who: 
 (i) is the head of state of that or any other foreign country; or 
 (ii) holds, or performs any of the duties of, a public office of that 
or any other foreign country (or of a part of that or any other 
foreign country); 
(e)  unlawfully destroying or damaging any real or personal 
property belonging to the government of that or any other 
foreign country (or of a part of that or any other foreign 
country). 
2.319 The Law Council of Australia questioned the inclusion of item (e) 
regarding the unlawful destruction or damaging of property, noting: 
Technically, this means that a person may be subject to life 
imprisonment for entering a country with the intention of (or 
actually) defacing a government building (section 119.1). This 
penalty is not commensurate with the level of culpability 
involved.247 
2.320 Other participants focused on the proposed definition of ‘subverting 
society’, which is also contained in clause 117.1 of the Bill. For example, 
Amnesty International contested that 
the inclusion of activities which are aimed at subverting society in 
the definition for engaging in hostilities in a foreign country 
encompasses a range of activities which would not be connected to 
any terrorist or attack against a foreign government or assets. 
There is the potential that these activities – while undoubtedly 
criminal – would attract a significantly higher penalty than if they 
were conducted in Australia.248 
2.321 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law similarly submitted to the 
Committee that: 
 
247  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 33. 
248  Amnesty International Australia, Submission 22, p. [4]. 
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The definition of ‘subverting society’ would include the list of 
harms referred to in the definition of a ‘terrorist act’ in the 
Criminal Code and it would incorporate the same exemption for 
political advocacy and protest. However, the definition of 
‘subverting society’ does not include other important elements in 
the definition of a ‘terrorist act’, namely, that an act is done or a 
threat is made with a particular intention (to influence a 
government by intimidation, or to intimidate a section of the 
public) and a particular motive (to advance a political, religious or 
ideological cause). In the absence of these additional requirements, 
some of the harms listed in the definition of terrorism would 
constitute much less serious offences (such as vandalism and 
assault) … [s]uch conduct might be criminal, but it should not 
attract a maximum penalty of life imprisonment under foreign 
incursions offences.249 
2.322 At a public hearing, Mr Bret Walker SC expressed his dislike for the term 
‘subverting society’, and suggested the need for the term could be avoided 
if it was replaced in the definition of ‘engages in a hostile activity’ with a 
direct cross-reference to the definition of ‘terrorist act’ in section 100.1 of 
the Criminal Code ‘minus the ideological motivation’.250 Such cross-
referencing was also supported by other participants in the inquiry, 
although with a preference that the elements of intention be retained.251 
2.323 The Attorney-General’s Department explained to the Committee that the 
term ‘subverting society’ was intended to replace the term ‘armed 
hostilities’ in the existing Foreign Incursions Act, because the meaning of 
‘armed hostilities’ had not been interpreted in the way intended when it 
had originally been inserted into the Foreign Incursions Act: 
‘[A]rmed hostilities’ has a very particular meaning in international 
law which I do not think was completely acknowledged or 
understood or thought through at the time of those particular 
amendments. ‘Armed hostilities’ is basically in international law 
limited to the kind of conduct that takes place on a battlefield in an 
actual war. That is not what the insertion of that expression was 
intended to capture; it was intended to capture much broader 
conduct like mercenaries—people who are paid and do not have a 
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political motivation necessarily; they just want to get paid and 
they will do all sorts of heinous things.252 
2.324 The Department added that the definition of ‘subverting society’ included 
in the Bill, while not directly cross-referencing to the definition of a 
‘terrorist act’, picked up the same conduct as covered in that definition.253  
2.325 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) pointed out to 
the Committee the link between the definition of ‘engaging in a hostile 
activity’ for the purposes of the foreign incursions offences and the 
definition of ‘security’ for the purpose of a range of ASIO functions. This 
interaction is discussed separately later in this chapter. 
2.326 Several contributors to the inquiry raised concerns about the severity of 
the penalties attached to the proposed offences for foreign incursions and 
recruitment.254 The existing maximum penalties under the Foreign 
Incursions Act are 20 years imprisonment for entering a foreign state with 
intent to engage in hostile activities, and 10 years imprisonment for acts 
preparatory to that offence. Responding to a recommendation by the 
INSLM for parity between the penalties for comparable Criminal Code 
and Foreign Incursions Act offences,255 the maximum penalties for both 
actual and preparatory offences are proposed to be lifted to life 
imprisonment under the Bill.  
2.327 The Law Council of Australia argued for a distinction between the two 
types of offences to be maintained: 
It would seem appropriate to distinguish between the maximum 
penalties between actual and preparatory conduct. This provides 
an incentive for youths who arrive in a foreign country with the 
intention of engaging in hostile activity, but who wish to 
withdraw, to do so. If the penalties are the same for both, they may 
feel they have little to lose.256 
2.328 Mr Bret Walker SC highlighted a concern about the definition of 
‘prescribed organisation’ in proposed part 5.5 of the Bill,257 which has 
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implications both for the foreign incursion offence in clause 119.1 and the 
‘declared area’ offence in clause 119.2. The proposed definition of 
‘prescribed organisation’ is that 
the Minister must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the 
organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, 
planning, assisting in or fostering: 
(a) a serious violation of human rights; or 
(b) subverting society in Australia or a foreign country allied 
or associated with Australia (see subsection (3)); or 
(c) a terrorist act (within the meaning of section 100.1); or 
(d) an act prejudicial to the security, defence or international 
relations of Australia. 
2.329 Mr Walker suggested that the inclusion of acts prejudicial to Australia’s 
international relations in this definition was a ‘dangerous generalisation’ 
and should be removed. He illustrated his argument as follows: 
I expect there will be prejudice to the international relations of 
Australia by successful, peaceful agitation against, for example, 
foreign tyrants including, in particular, agitation to impose, for 
example, various kinds of sanctions, statutory or otherwise, on 
Australia's dealing with such a regime. If that is a regime in a 
country with which Australia trades, and that would be true of 
most, then it would be difficult to resist the proposition that the 
international relations of Australia may be prejudiced—that is, we 
may lose trade in order to advance an ethical principle. It seems to 
me that prejudicing the international relations of Australia is really 
most inappropriate to be put alongside prejudicing our security or 
defence, concepts which are well understood.258 
2.330 Mr Walker also raised a further concern to the Committee regarding 
clause 119.12 of the Bill, which provides for declarations to be made by the 
Minister for the purposes of court proceedings. Mr Walker indicated his 
preference that such declarations should be considered conclusive, rather 
than prima facie evidence, to avoid a situation in which an Executive 
matter was required to be ‘second guessed’ by the Judiciary.259 
2.331 A joint submission from Australian media organisations raised concerns 
about the provisions in clause 119.7 of the Bill relating to ‘publishing 
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recruitment advertisements’ for armed forces of foreign countries. The 
submission noted a lack of clarity about who and what the proposed 
offence was targeting. It called for subclause 119.7(3) to be removed from 
the Bill, or for defences for acts done in good faith and the public interest 
to be added. The submission also called for amendments to the wording of 
the offences and for a sliding scale of penalties to be introduced.260 
Committee comment 
2.332 The Committee notes the proposed strengthening of the Foreign 
Incursions Act and its amalgamation into the Criminal Code are consistent 
with recommendations made by the former INSLM. The Committee 
understands that weaknesses in the existing Act have meant that 
prosecution under the offences has been extremely difficult. The proposed 
enhancements to the foreign incursions offences contained in this Bill will 
help strengthen the ability for authorities to respond to the threat posed by 
Australian’s engaging in conflicts overseas. 
2.333 A concern raised by inquiry participants in regard to the proposed 
amendments to the foreign incursions regime was that, due to the broad 
definition of ‘engaging in a hostile activity’, persons could be charged 
under foreign incursions offences for actions overseas that would not be 
considered especially serious if conducted in Australia (such as defacing a 
government building with graffiti). Given that the foreign incursion 
offences would attract a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, this is a 
legitimate concern. The Committee notes, however, that this same 
difficulty could be said to apply to elements of the existing Foreign 
Incursions Act, from which the definition of ‘engaging in a hostile activity’ 
was based. Despite its existing coverage over actions such as damage to 
foreign government property, and causing ‘bodily injury’ to public 
officials, no evidence was presented to the Committee that these laws had 
been misdirected towards minor offences. On the contrary, the Committee 
heard that there had been very few prosecutions under the existing 
foreign incursions regime. 
2.334 The Committee also acknowledges concerns raised about the term 
‘subverting society’ that is proposed to be introduced within the definition 
of ‘engaging in a hostile activity’. The Committee notes that this term is a 
replacement for the term ‘armed hostilities’ in the existing Foreign 
Incursions Act. The Committee understands that ‘armed hostilities’ was 
intended to have a broad application, including for mercenary behaviour, 
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but that the term was being interpreted more narrowly than had been 
anticipated when it was initially inserted into the Act.  
2.335 The Committee notes that the elements of the proposed definition of 
‘subverting society’ are taken directly from the definition of ‘terrorist act’ 
in section 100.1 of the Criminal Code, with the exception of provisions for 
motivational intent (for example, that the action is undertaken to advance 
a political, religious or ideological cause). To avoid introducing a new 
term that does not explicitly convey the conduct that it encapsulates, the 
Committee agrees with the former INSLM that it would be better for the 
term ‘subverting society’ to be replaced with a direct reference to the 
conduct described in section 100.1.  
2.336 Some participants raised concerns that excluding motivational intent from 
this definition would broaden the scope of the offences beyond actions 
normally considered to be terrorism or foreign incursion. The Committee 
considers this to be a legitimate concern, as it is clear that the conduct in 
section 100.1—which includes acts such as interfering with an information 
system—goes well beyond the conduct suggested by the original term 
‘armed hostilities’, however it is interpreted. The Committee considers, 
however, that the precise motivational intent of persons who have 
committed serious crimes overseas could be very difficult for a 
prosecution to prove. The addition of motivational intent provisions could 
significantly undermine the purpose of the Bill to strengthen the foreign 
incursions legislation. The Committee also notes that the exclusion of 
intent would align with a former recommendation of the INSLM, and that 
the current Foreign Incursions Act also lacks any requirement for intent to 
be proven. 
2.337 The Committee considers that a more useful way to limit the possibility of 
foreign incursions offences being used to punish relatively minor offences 
(such as vandalism of government buildings overseas) would be to limit 
the application of the term ‘engaging in a hostile activity’ to conduct that 
would be treated as a serious offence if it was undertaken in Australia. 
While the Committee has not sought evidence on precisely how a ‘serious 
offence’ should be defined for this purpose, it would be appropriate for a 
definition to be developed that is broadly in line with ‘serious offence’ 
provisions in other comparable areas of Australian criminal law. For 
example, for the purpose of controlled operations, section 15GE of the 
Crimes Act defines a ‘serious Commonwealth offence’ as an offence 
punishable by imprisonment for a period of three years or more (or one of 
a number of specific offences listed in the legislation). 
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Recommendation 15 
 The Committee recommends that the definition of ‘subverting society’ 
in proposed section 117.1 of the Criminal Code be replaced with a cross-
reference to the conduct contained in the definition of ‘terrorist act’ in 
section 100.1 of the Criminal Code. 
 
Recommendation 16 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General consider 
amending the definition of ‘engaging in a hostile activity’ in proposed 
section 117.1 of the Criminal Code to constrain it to conduct that would 
be considered to be a ‘serious offence’ if undertaken within Australia. 
The definition of ‘serious offence’ for the purposes of this section 
should be made in consideration of other comparable areas of 
Australian criminal law. 
2.338 Some inquiry participants raised concerns about the proposed increased 
maximum penalties for foreign incursion offences compared to the 
existing Foreign Incursions Act, particularly for offences relating to 
preparatory conduct. The Committee considers, however, that the 
increased penalties proposed in the Bill are a legitimate response to the 
serious nature of the conduct being targeted by the provisions, and the 
need to strengthen the capacity of foreign incursions legislation to 
appropriately penalise that conduct. The proposed penalties also 
implement a recommendation by the former INSLM for parity between 
the penalties for comparable Criminal Code and Foreign Incursions Act 
offences. The Committee further notes that while maximum life sentences 
would be available for some of the proposed offences, it would remain up 
to the discretion of courts to determine on a case-by-case basis the 
appropriate sentence to be applied. The availability of life sentences would 
give courts a greater range of penalties to impose in accordance with the 
seriousness of the specific crime. 
2.339 In his evidence to the Committee, the former INSLM raised a concern that 
the proposed definition of ‘prescribed organisation’, which has 
implications for the applicability of serious foreign incursions offences, 
was too broad. In particular, he considered that including prejudicial to 
the ‘international relations’ of Australia in the criteria was open to much 
broader interpretation than was likely to be intended. Although the 
Committee has not received evidence on the rationale behind the term 
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‘international relations’ being included in the definition, the Committee is 
inclined to endorse Mr Walker’s proposal that it be removed. At a 
minimum, further specificity is needed as to the intent of the term. 
 
Recommendation 17 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General remove 
from, or more specifically define, acts prejudicial to the 
‘international relations’ of Australia in the definition of 
‘prescribed organisation’ contained in clause 117.1(2) for the 
proposed foreign incursions and recruitment offences. 
2.340 In regard to the other matter raised by Mr Walker concerning declarations 
to be made by the Minister for the purposes of court proceedings, the 
Committee does not consider it has received sufficient evidence to warrant 
change in this area.  
2.341 Additionally, the Committee did not receive sufficient evidence to form a 
view with regard to the concern raised by media organisations about 
offences for the publication of ‘recruitment advertisements’ for foreign 
armed forces. The Committee notes, however, that the key elements of the 
proposed offences are taken directly from section 9 of the existing Foreign 
Incursions Act. Given this Act has been in operation for many years 
without problems occurring in this area, the Committee does not consider 
further amendment is required. 
‘Declared area’ offence 
2.342 Clause 119.2 of the Bill proposes to create a new offence for persons who 
enter, or remain in, specific overseas areas declared by the Foreign Affairs 
Minister.  
2.343 To make a declaration, the Foreign Affairs Minister would need to be 
‘satisfied that a listed terrorist organisation is engaging in a hostile activity 
in that area of the foreign country’. The Foreign Affairs Minster’s 
declaration would take place via legislative instrument, and a single 
declaration could cover an entire foreign country or areas in two or more 
foreign countries. The Bill also includes a requirement for the Leader of 
the Opposition to be briefed before a declaration is made. The Foreign 
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Affairs Minister’s declaration of an area would expire after three years, if 
not revoked before then due to changed circumstances.261 
2.344 The following exception is included in relation to the proposed ‘declared 
area’ offence: 
Subsection (1) does not apply if the person enters, or remains in, 
the area solely for one or more of the following purposes: 
(a) providing aid of a humanitarian nature; 
(b) satisfying an obligation to appear before a court or other 
body exercising judicial power; 
(c) performing an official duty for the Commonwealth, a State 
or a Territory; 
(d) performing an official duty for the government of a foreign 
country or the government of part of a foreign country (including 
service in the armed forces of the government of a foreign 
country), where that performance would not be a violation of the 
law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory; 
(e) performing an official duty for the United Nations or an 
agency of the United Nations; 
(f) making a news report of events in the area, where the 
person is working in a professional capacity as a journalist or is 
assisting another person working in a professional capacity as a 
journalist; 
(g) making a bona fide visit to a family member; 
(h) any other purpose prescribed by the regulations.262 
2.345 The Bill notes that the defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to 
the ‘legitimate purposes’ exception. Further exceptions to the ‘declared 
area’ offence are provided for persons serving in armed forces other than 
‘prescribed organisations’, and for instances of ‘intervening conduct or 
event’ or a ‘sudden or extraordinary emergency’.263 
 
261  Item 110, subclause 119.3 of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
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2.346 The Bill includes a ‘sunset’ clause for the declared area offence provisions, 
meaning they would cease to have effect 10 years after their 
commencement. 
2.347 Many inquiry participants expressed strong in-principle concerns about 
the impact of the proposed ‘declared area’ offence, and argued against its 
retention in the Bill.264 Participants claimed that the offence would 
unjustifiably impact on the right to freedom of movement. For example, 
Professor Ben Saul summarised the offence as follows: 
The offence relating to a ‘declared area’ would criminalise conduct 
which is not of itself demonstrably harmful, violent or terrorist—
namely, travelling to a declared place. As such, it is an 
unnecessary, disproportionate and unjustified restriction on the 
human right to freedom of movement and contrary to Australia’s 
obligations under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1966 (‘ICCPR’). It is also a misuse and over-
extension of the criminal law in view of existing, extensive 
offences of foreign incursion and terrorism.265 
2.348 The Islamic Council of Victoria submitted that the proposed offence 
would have a particularly large impact on the Muslim community: 
[T]his law is discriminatory against the Muslim community 
because it could potentially deem many parts of the Middle East 
and other parts of the Muslim world which are currently 
experiencing a great deal of political turmoil as “no go zones”. 
This directly impacts large sections of the Muslim community who 
have family and other business in the region and who may need to 
travel to that region without wanting to be involved in any conflict 
or violence.266 
2.349 The Law Council of Australia similarly raised concerns about the 
particular impact the proposed offence would have on certain segments of 
the community, such as those with family connections or trading 
engagements in declared areas: 
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This impact (when combined with the breadth of the offence and 
the evidential burden on the accused) risks marginalising precisely 
those segments of the Australian community whose cooperation 
and goodwill is most essential to curbing the terrorist threat.267 
2.350 Despite this opposition, a number of participants in the inquiry indicated 
a level of support for the declared area offence provisions.268 Dr David 
Connery, for example, said that while the power to declare areas as ‘no-go 
zones’ would be ‘hard to operationalise … in a fair way’ and need to be 
‘limited to some very specific circumstances’, that did not mean the power 
should not be available: 
We have seen people go to Somalia, we have seen people go to 
southern Lebanon, and when they get in trouble they expect the 
Commonwealth to come and pluck them out. We have also seen 
other places where areas have been lawless or ungoverned, and 
we have seen people enter for nefarious purposes … I think the 
Australian government has an obligation to stop people, if it can, 
from going into these areas and fuelling this kind of conflict. I 
think that is a contribution that we can make to international 
security.269 
2.351 Mr Neil James of the Australia Defence Association argued that the 
‘declared areas’ offence would be an effective way to overcome some of 
the limitations in the existing Foreign Incursions Act: 
There have always been enormous problems with prosecutions 
under the act, because the evidence thresholds were set far too 
high and the act basically came from a philosophical belief that 
Australians going to undertake armed operations in a foreign 
country were motivated by a political ideology and not a terrorist 
one as such. In some ways the 1978 act was a bit of a carryover 
from the Spanish Civil War way of looking at how Australians 
fought overseas. It is completely outdated and we think the 
changes in this area, with the ability by governments to proscribe 
areas and say Australians should not go there—because the only 
reason you would go there basically would be to undertake quite 
serious crimes, potentially even war crimes—is really just 
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updating a piece of outmoded legislation that our experience since 
1978 has proved does not work.270 
2.352 The Attorney-General’s Department informed the Committee that it was 
not aware of any equivalent provisions to the proposed ‘declared area’ 
offence being enacted in other countries. However, it noted that other like-
minded countries were ‘actively considering their existing laws’.271 
2.353 Many inquiry participants raised concerns about the wide range of 
legitimate activities not included in the list of exceptions that might 
require persons to travel to, or remain in, a declared area. Examples 
provided to the Committee included: 
 visiting a friend or partner, 
 conducting business, 
 retrieving property, 
 attending to personal or financial affairs, 
 teaching, research or study, 
 freelance journalism, 
 providing legal advice, 
 a pilgrimage or other religious obligation, 
 missionary work, 
 tourism, 
 transits to other destinations.272 
2.354 Members of the Victorian Bar Association pointed out a further range of 
scenarios in which a person may enter, or remain in, a declared area 
unintentionally. These included: 
 being already present in the area before it was declared and while 
seeking to leave the area, 
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 being already present in the area at the time it was declared and not 
being able to leave due to circumstances beyond their control,  
 persons kidnapped or otherwise taken into an area against their will, 
and  
 persons fleeing into an area in order to escape threat or violence in an 
adjoining area.273 
2.355 In its submission, the Law Council of Australia highlighted the rule of law 
principle that ‘offences should not be so broadly framed that they 
inadvertently capture a wide range of benign conduct and are overly 
reliant on law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion’. It further noted 
that while the fault element of ‘recklessness’ would apply to the offence, 
persons could nevertheless be ‘caught within the ambit of the offence 
without knowing that an area was declared and without any intention of 
engaging in a terrorist activity’.274 
2.356 Participants also pointed out that the requirement for a defendant to prove 
that they were in a declared area solely for one of the listed acceptable 
reasons would present difficulties. For example, Professor George 
Williams told the Committee: 
What is critically important here is that it must be demonstrated 
that the sole purpose of that person was to enter into those areas. It 
means, for example, that if someone went to visit a family member 
and to conduct some business then they would not be covered by 
the defence, because they have an additional thing that moves 
them out of having the ‘sole purpose’ of visiting a family 
member.275 
2.357 In its submission, the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law argued that the 
‘sole purpose’ requirement would place too high a burden of proof on the 
defendant: 
[I]t could very well mean that defendants are placed in the very 
difficult position of proving a negative; that is, a defendant may be 
required to adduce evidence not only that he or she travelled to 
the area for one of the enumerated purposes but also that this was 
the only purpose for the travel. This would require the defendant 
to provide factual evidence that he or she did not travel to the area 
with the intention of engaging in a terrorism-related purpose. It is 
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not clear what evidence a defendant would be able to adduce to 
establish the absence of such an intent.276 
2.358 Other inquiry participants similarly noted that, while the provisions may 
not technically reverse the onus of proof due to the requirement for the 
prosecution to prove the offence of entering or remaining in the declared 
area, a substantial burden would remain on the defendant to prove their 
innocence. The councils for civil liberties across Australia explained: 
[I]f the prosecution can establish that the accused entered or 
remained in a declared area after the declaration, the accused will 
be guilty of the offence unless he or she can demonstrate that a 
defence applies. In this way, it is the accused who will bear the 
burden of demonstrating an innocent intent, rather than requiring 
the prosecution to demonstrate a nefarious intent (or the lack of 
innocent intent). While this might technically satisfy the 
requirements of the presumption of innocence, the substantive 
burden of exonerating oneself clearly lies with the accused as the 
proposed offence is structured.277 
2.359 The Muslim Legal Network (NSW) added that: 
Although the burden of proof initially lies with the Prosecution, 
the elements of the offence are easier to prove than the defences 
set out in 119.2(3). The only element to the offence that the 
prosecution is required to prove is simply the entering into or 
remaining in a declared area … As the legislator assumes that by 
travelling to a declared area, the accused has travelled to that area 
for an illegitimate purpose, it is highly likely that the accused 
would be convicted if he exercised his right to silence and did not 
give evidence. Therefore it is a reversal of onus and a presumption 
of guilt.278 
2.360 Mr Rabih Alkadamani raised particular concerns that would arise if an 
entire country, such as Syria or Iraq, were to be declared under the 
provisions. Mr Alkadamani highlighted the personal impact that such a 
declaration would have on his wife if she were to visit her family members 
in Syria: 
It is simply frightening to contemplate the personal stress and 
anxiety to which she would thereby be subjected. Similarly, the 
expense associated with having to retain lawyers to prove that she 
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is entitled to the defence in section 119.2(3)(g), particularly in the 
event of a prosecution, is an oppressive burden.279 
2.361 In response to concerns raised about the evidential burden on defendants, 
the Attorney-General’s Department explained that the persuasive burden 
would remain on the prosecution: 
The onus of proof for this offence has not been reversed … 
If a defendant who relies on the offence-specific defence 
discharges the evidential burden, the prosecution must then 
disprove that matter (i.e. that the defendant entered or remained 
in a declared area not solely for a legitimate purpose or purpose) 
beyond reasonable doubt.280 
2.362 Professor Gillian Triggs of the Australian Human Rights Commission, told 
the Committee that the approach of placing a preliminary element of 
evidence onto the defendant was ‘not unreasonable’ and was consistent 
with other areas of criminal law: 
In the general scheme of things, my personal preference is always 
to have both the persuasive and evidentiary burden on the Crown, 
but this is a difficult area. In understanding people’s motives in 
going to an area that has been declared to be a conflict zone where 
there are dangers, one could accept the argument of the 
government that it is not unreasonable to place some evidentiary 
burden on the person concerned, and I think that is really the key 
here … They have taken the risk and they are in the best position 
to provide at least a first level of evidence before the persuasive 
burden is reactivated in terms of the crown.281 
2.363 The Commission recommended to the Committee that, if the declared area 
offence was to be retained, it should include an overarching exception for 
persons who enter, or remain in, an area ‘solely for the purpose or 
purposes not connected with engaging in hostile activities’.282 Professor 
Triggs explained to the Committee that this approach would be preferable 
to attempting to list all possible legitimate purposes in the legislation: 
[I]t would be our preference to have an opportunity for the 
evidential burden to rest on that person to demonstrate they had a 
legitimate reason and then for an officer conducting that inquiry to 
say, ‘On the evidence you have produced, that looks to us to fit 
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within what we broadly see as an innocent or legitimate purpose.’ 
The other drafting mechanism is to have the overarching provision 
of legitimate purpose for a list of examples so that the officer 
dealing with the matter would have some illustrative examples—
family, study or a pilgrimage—but would not be limited to them. 
It is a very nice drafting technique that gives you an overarching 
principle and gives the person an opportunity to raise something 
that is not on the list at all but which would be taken into account 
by an officer questioning them.283 
2.364 Similarly, the Law Council of Australia suggested that the words ‘without 
limiting this subsection’ could be inserted into the wording of subclause 
119.2(3). Such an amendment would allow the courts to exercise discretion 
to determine whether travel into a declared area was for a legitimate 
purpose, while retaining the current proposed list of defences. The 
Council suggested that this change would remove the need for other 
‘legitimate purposes’ to be added by regulation.284 
2.365 Some participants argued that, if the proposed offence was to be retained, 
the offence should specify, as one of its elements, an intention to enter a 
declared area to engage in a terrorist activity or other ‘illegitimate 
purpose’.285 However, as the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law noted in 
its submission, such an amendment would render the offence 
‘superfluous’ because it ‘would overlap very significantly with the foreign 
incursions offences’ contained elsewhere in the Bill.286 
2.366 Mr Bret Walker SC, while not opposing the concept of a declared area 
offence in principle, similarly indicated doubts about its utility in light of 
the other foreign incursions offences in the Bill: 
 I do think that there is a problem in the exceptions provided in 
subsection 3, by the use of the word ‘solely’ because it 
contemplates the evidentiary burden, if it has been successfully 
discharged by the defendant so that the prosecution then has to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the trip was not solely for one 
of these permitted purposes. The difficulty that then arises is, if the 
Crown succeeds in that it will not have proved, of course, 
positively, necessarily any particularly bad conduct on the part of 
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the defendant; simply that the remaining and entering was not 
solely for one of the permitted purposes. That I think means that 
there will be most invidious decisions to be made concerning how 
to sentence such a person. There are other offences, which include 
life sentences, for carrying out hostile activities. It does seem to me 
that the utility of 119.2, which has understandably attracted a lot 
of attention, is greatly to be doubted.287  
2.367 At a public hearing, the Attorney-General’s Department argued that a 
limited range of exceptions was necessary in order for the offence to 
achieve the desired effect of deterring persons from travelling to declared 
areas: 
We have specifically prescribed what the legitimate purposes 
would be in an attempt, quite deliberately, to limit range of 
exceptional circumstances that could arise, or the legitimate 
purposes that could arise, in an effort to discourage people from 
travelling in the first place. So the intent is to actively discourage 
people from travelling to a place that, by definition, is 
dangerous.288 
2.368 In a supplementary submission, the Department added that the limited 
list of legitimate purposes in the defence was intended to address 
the need to provide clear guidance to individuals about the 
acceptable reasons for entering or remaining in a declared area 
and the need to ensure the court is not being asked to exercise a 
legislative function by determining whether particular purposes 
are legitimate.289 
2.369 The Department cautioned against an approach that did not provide a 
specific list of acceptable legitimate purposes:  
Adopting a broad defence that provides no guidance to 
individuals could act as an even greater deterrent to people 
proposing to travel to or remain in a declared area because of the 
uncertainty about whether the person would be committing a 
criminal offence … Conversely, leaving it open to the court to 
determine the scope of legitimate purpose could result in purposes 
not considered of sufficient significance being determined to be 
legitimate by the court. For example, the list of legitimate purposes 
does not include study or business activities. The government 
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considers that if an area is dangerous enough to warrant 
declaration, it will be too dangerous for Australian to enter for 
business or study purposes.290 
2.370 Some participants in the inquiry suggested a mechanism for members of 
the public to seek advice or pre-approval prior to travel to a declared area 
would be beneficial in helping reduce the burden placed on individuals to 
demonstrate the purpose of their travel.291 The Australian Human Rights 
Commission indicated its support for such a mechanism at a public 
hearing: 
I would like to see very clear public information as to which areas 
are now declared zones and, as you say, a very sensible support 
process so that you can go to the relevant authorities and advise 
them that you want to pursue a business arrangement or 
safeguard your investments or property there. It would be very 
sensible to do that in advance of visiting. It may be that the official 
says, ‘My advice would be that you do not go there at all,’ or ‘Go 
there exclusively for that purpose and do what is required for your 
business purposes and come back.’ In other words, if you have 
done it in advance you have a better chance of meeting that 
evidentiary burden if you take the risk of going. I would have 
thought that is thoroughly sensible.292 
2.371 Responding to this suggestion, however, the Attorney-General’s 
Department argued that a pre-approval process would be at odds with the 
intention of the provisions to deter travel to declared areas and would be 
‘open to misuse’. The Department also noted that there was already a 
mechanism for people to register with Smart Traveller website prior to 
travel, and that the Department had been encouraging people to use this 
service.293 The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade advised that it 
had already made information about the proposed ‘declared areas’ 
provisions available on the Smart Traveller website, and that if the 
legislation was passed and an area was declared that information would 
also be made available.294 
2.372 The Attorney-General’s Department also highlighted that not all travellers 
would be required to adduce evidence of their ‘legitimate purpose’: 
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The only point at which you would be required to adduce 
evidence as to your legitimate purpose is if you get to the point 
where you are prosecuted—where a decision is made by the 
Federal Police in consultation with the DPP that there is a reason 
to prosecute. It would be at that point that you would adduce 
evidence as to your legitimate purpose as a defence to the 
offence.295  
2.373 Regarding the process which would apply to the declaration of an area by 
the Foreign Affairs Minister, the Attorney-General’s Department advised 
that a public protocol would be developed similar to the listing of terrorist 
organisations. While noting the protocol was still under development, the 
Department gave a brief summary of the likely process to the Committee: 
[T]he kind of process we are anticipating is that ASIO would do an 
assessment, and that would come to the department as the area 
responsible for this legislation, and we would use that assessment 
and any information that we require and would make a 
recommendation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, probably 
through the Attorney-General.296 
2.374 The Department added that much consideration had been given as to how 
adjustments to the boundaries of declared areas would be made in 
response to changing situations on the ground. It advised that 
the legislation really constrains our ability to declare an area to 
that area in which the hostilities are actually occurring. It does not 
give us ambit to declare an area surrounding that just in case the 
hostilities shift … the Minister for Foreign Affairs, once he or she is 
no longer satisfied that the hostilities are occurring in a particular 
area, is required under the legislation to revoke that declaration. 
What we are anticipating there is that if it is simply that the 
hostilities move from here to an area a small way away, then the 
process would be somewhat streamlined… But the whole process 
would need to be revisited.297 
2.375 Noting that the declaration of an area would be in the form of a 
disallowable instrument, the Committee asked the Attorney-General’s 
Department whether provision could be made for the PJCIS to review 
such instruments during the 15 day parliamentary disallowance period, in 
a way similar to the existing PJCIS reviews of listings of terrorist 
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organisations under subdivision 102.1A of the Criminal Code. The 
Department indicated that including such a provision would be 
possible.298  
2.376 The Australian Human Rights Commission noted in its submission that, 
under the proposed provisions for a declaration to be made, the Foreign 
Affairs Minister would not need to consider the extent of hostile activity 
taking place in the area considered. It recommended that clause 119.3 be 
amended so that the Minister may only declare an area if she is satisfied 
that a terrorist organisation is engaging in a hostile activity to a significant 
degree in that area.299 
2.377 In a joint submission, the Islamic Council of Queensland, the Council of 
Imams Queensland, the Queensland Association of Independent Legal 
Services and 818 signatories called for more stringent requirements to be 
enacted for the determination of a declared area. These included: 
 a limit on the size of the declared area to, at a minimum, prevent entire 
countries from being declared, 
 a requirement for the Minister to review the declaration of areas on at 
least a monthly basis, 
 a mechanism to ensure against the Minister continually adding to a 
declared area rather than replacing areas which should no longer be 
declared, and  
 requiring the Minister to obtain parliamentary approval to deem an 
area to be declared.300  
2.378 The joint submission also called for the proposed 10 year sunset clause on 
the declared area offence provisions to be reduced to five years.301 
Similarly, the Islamic Council of Victoria recommended that the sunset 
clause be reduced to two years.302 
2.379 The Muslim Legal Network (NSW) recommended that the automatic 
cessation of the declaration of an area be reduced from three years to one 
year. It also called for a statutory limitation period of six months to be 
applied to the offence in order to limit the amount of time over which the 
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accused would be required to recall the minute detail of their travel in 
order to support their defence.303 
2.380 At a public hearing, the Committee asked the Law Council of Australia if 
it would support a reduction in the sunset period to three years, 
accompanied by PJCIS review of the Foreign Affairs Minister’s 
declarations. The Council indicated it would support those proposals, but 
that it would also like to see other improvements (as noted above). 
Committee comment 
2.381 The Committee received compelling evidence in its inquiry about 
limitations of existing offences in regard to foreign incursions and their 
reliance on foreign evidence. These limitations have meant that the 
existing set of laws in this area have not been strong enough to deal with 
the current threat posed by Australians travelling overseas to fight in 
foreign conflicts on behalf of listed terrorist organisations. While 
improvements to the existing offences and ability to admit foreign 
evidence in court are proposed in this Bill, the Committee is convinced 
that the new offence for entering, or remaining in, a declared area is 
necessary.  
2.382 The areas targeted by the ‘declared area’ provisions are extremely 
dangerous locations in which terrorist organisations are actively engaging 
in hostile activities. The Committee notes the declared area provisions are 
designed to act as a deterrent to prevent people from travelling to 
declared areas. The Committee considers it is a legitimate policy intent for 
the Government to do this and to require persons who choose to travel to 
such places despite the warnings to provide evidence of a legitimate 
purpose for their travel. This is particularly the case given the risk 
individuals returning to Australia who have fought for or been involved 
with terrorist organisations present to the community. Additionally, there 
is a high cost to taxpayers in providing assistance to any persons who 
become trapped in a dangerous situation in a declared area. 
2.383 The Committee is aware that the proposed ‘declared area’ offence has 
caused angst amongst sections of the community, primarily because of 
concerns that persons with legitimate reasons to travel to, or remain in, 
areas with which they have a connection may find themselves accused of a 
serious criminal offence. There are also concerns that the structure of the 
offence will place too high an evidential burden on the defendant to prove 
that they were in a declared area solely for a legitimate reason. The 
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Committee considers that this does not amount to the onus of proof being 
reversed, as a prosecution would still need to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt that the defence offered by a defendant was unfounded. However, 
the Committee acknowledges those concerns and has identified a number 
of areas in which safeguards and oversight can be enhanced without 
reducing the efficacy of the provisions. 
2.384 The Committee notes that there are a range of existing important 
safeguards in the Bill that would make it unlikely that any prosecution 
would proceed against a person who entered a declared area for a 
legitimate reason, who unwittingly found themselves in a declared area, 
who entered a declared area against their will, or who remained in a 
declared area when it was not safe to leave. These safeguards include:  
 The exception for entering, or remaining in a declared area for one of 
the listed ‘legitimate purposes’. This includes a defence for ‘aid of a 
humanitarian nature’, which would cover not only aid organisations, 
but may also apply, for instance, to a person who travelled to a declared 
area to help a friend leave.304 
 The application of the fault element of ‘recklessness’, which would 
require the prosecution to prove that the defendant was ‘aware of a 
substantial risk’ that the area was declared, and that, having regard to 
the circumstances known to the defendant, it was ‘unjustifiable to take 
the risk’ by entering or remaining in the declared area.305  
 The availability of additional defences for entering, or remaining in, a 
declared area due to circumstances outside the defendant’s control, or 
due to an emergency situation.306  
 The requirement for the Attorney-General to provide written consent 
prior to any prosecution being initiated (clause 119.11). 
 The normal policy requirement for the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions to take into account the public interest before 
initiating a prosecution. 
2.385 The Committee notes concerns raised by many inquiry participants that 
the list of ‘legitimate purposes’ for travelling to a declared area is too 
narrow. Given that declared areas will be restricted to specific areas in 
which terrorist organisations are currently engaging in hostilities, it is 
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difficult to see why persons would want to travel to those areas for non-
essential purposes such as study, research, tourism or to conduct business. 
The Committee accepts the argument that including such purposes as 
specific exceptions to the proposed offence would be contrary to the intent 
of providing a deterrent against travel to declared areas.  
2.386 However, the Committee accepts that there are likely to be some 
legitimate reasons for travel to an area that are not covered in the 
proposed grounds of defence listed in subclause 119.2(3) of the Bill. It may 
be inconsistent, for example, for persons to be allowed to travel to a 
declared area for a social visit to a family member, while prohibiting travel 
to a declared area to visit a close friend who is dying. The Committee 
supports the inclusion in the Bill of a provision to allow additional 
legitimate purposes to be prescribed by regulation if needed. The 
Committee encourages the Attorney-General’s Department to review the 
evidence provided by participants to this inquiry to identify legitimate 
purposes that could be added to the regulations in this manner, without 
reducing the deterrent effect of the offence.  
2.387 Committee members had different views about whether the declared area 
offence as currently drafted would be an effective and workable provision. 
Some members of the Committee questioned whether the legitimate 
concerns presented in evidence had been adequately addressed, 
particularly in relation to the evidential burden and the limited range of 
legitimate purposes for travel to declared areas. The Committee notes that 
the proposed INSLM and Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security reviews leading into the sunset provision will enable this to 
be more fully explored. 
2.388 Some members of the Committee believed that, given the seriousness of 
offences arising under this section that it is appropriate for there to be a 
‘wholly legitimate purposes’ general provision in the legislation. 
2.389 The Committee also notes the difficulties raised by requiring the 
defendant to prove that they entered, or remained in, a declared area solely 
for one or more of the legitimate purposes. For example, as was pointed 
out to the Committee, it may be hard for a person who travelled to a 
declared area primarily to visit a family member, but who also visited 
friends or attended to some business matters, to prove that they were 
solely in the declared area for visiting the family member. The Committee 
notes, however, that while this requirement may place an initial burden on 
the defendant to prove their sole reason for being in the area was 
legitimate, removing the requirement could make it impossible for a 
prosecution to succeed against a person who entered a declared area to 
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fight for a terrorist organisation, but who also visited a family member 
while they were there. 
2.390 One solution offered to the Committee to circumvent these difficulties was 
to add a broad ‘legitimate purpose’ defence for travelling to, or remaining 
in, a declared area. This approach would give the court discretion to 
determine on a case-by-case basis what is a legitimate purpose, while the 
existing list of legitimate purposes could be retained as ‘examples’ to 
provide guidance. However, the Committee is concerned that, given the 
perils of relying on foreign evidence or the impossibility of being able to 
gather it, such an approach could risk placing too high a burden on the 
prosecution being able to persuasively prove that any evidence presented 
by a defendant was not legitimate. A broad definition of ‘legitimate 
purpose’ would also substantially reduce the deterrent intent of the 
legislation.  
2.391 The Committee considers the most effective means of building on the 
existing safeguards in the Bill is by ensuring the integrity of the process 
behind the Foreign Affairs Minister’s declarations. The test for an area to 
be declared by the Minister is that a ‘terrorist organisation is engaging in a 
hostile activity’ in that area. The Committee considers that, if this test is 
applied as intended, declared areas will only cover the most dangerous 
places in the world where terrorist organisations are actively engaged in 
hostile activity, to which the desire of people to travel to, even for 
‘legitimate purposes’, will be extremely rare. The Committee notes 
concerns were raised by some participants that entire countries could be 
declared. The Committee considers, however, that declarations will be 
based on specific areas, not on borders. The likelihood of an entire country 
being declared is small, and the Committee does not consider that any 
country in the world would currently meet the necessary criteria, or 
would be likely to in the near future.  
2.392 The Committee notes, however, that there is a provision in the Bill which 
explicitly states that a whole country could be declared, if the Minister 
was satisfied that a terrorist organisation was engaging in a hostile activity 
throughout the entire country. The Committee recommends that this 
provision should be removed. While the provision gives clarity that a 
declared area is not to be limited by borders, it also has the effect of 
implying that an entire country being declared is a likely circumstance to 
arise. While the Committee does not wish to remove the ability for the 
Minister to make such a declaration—if rare and exceptional 
circumstances demanded it— if such clarity is needed, it is suggested that 
it be included in the Explanatory Memorandum rather than in the Bill 
itself. 
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Recommendation 18 
 The Committee recommends that proposed subsection 119.3(2)(b), 
which explicitly enables the Minister to declare an entire country for the 
purposes of prohibiting persons from entering, or remaining, in that 
country, be removed from the Counter Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014. 
2.393 The Committee considers that it is crucial that the declaration of an area be 
strictly reserved for only those areas where terrorist organisations are 
actively engaging in hostilities. If declarations were to be applied too 
widely, or were to not keep up with current events in the areas concerned, 
then the considerable restrictions on travel would be open to much greater 
criticism. 
2.394 The Committee considers that additional parliamentary oversight could be 
built into the process for declaration of an area to ensure that these 
conditions are met. As declarations will be made in the form of 
disallowable instruments, this oversight could be achieved through a 
similar provision to the existing process for the listing of terrorist 
organisations under subdivision 102.1A of the Criminal Code. This 
subdivision enables the PJCIS to review the listing of a terrorist 
organisation as soon as possible after it is made, and to report the 
Committee’s comments and recommendations to both Houses of 
Parliament before the end of the 15 sitting day disallowance period. 
Extending the Committee’s oversight to declared areas would provide a 
greater degree of assurance to the Parliament and to the public that 
thorough consideration has been given to the necessity of declaring a 
particular area.  
2.395 Through its reviews, the Committee would examine the evidence as to 
why the particular area was declared. The Committee would seek to 
ensure that declarations were made only in the most pressing 
circumstances; that a sufficiently high level of specificity was included in 
regard to the areas declared; and that any overextension of the boundaries 
was minimised. 
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Recommendation 19 
 The Committee recommends that the Counter Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended to insert a clause 
that enables the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security to conduct a review of the declaration of each area made under 
proposed section 119.3, within the disallowance period for each 
declaration. The clause should be modelled on the existing subdivision 
102.1A of the Criminal Code in relation to the listing of terrorist 
organisations. 
 
2.396 The Committee notes that ‘declared area’ offences of the kind proposed in 
the Bill do not exist in any comparable jurisdictions overseas. It will 
therefore be particularly important that the laws be reviewed at an 
appropriate time after their implementation to ensure they are operating 
as intended. The Committee considers that a reduction in the proposed 
sunset clause from 10 years to two years after the next Federal election 
would provide a more timely opportunity for the Parliament to review 
and consider amendments to the regime after an initial period of 
operation.  
2.397 It is further recommended that this Committee be given the opportunity to 
conduct a public inquiry into the operation of the provisions, including 
the list of ‘legitimate purposes’, well before the legislation’s sunset. It 
would assist the Committee if this inquiry was informed by a review of 
the provisions by the INSLM, prior to its commencement. 
 
Recommendation 20 
 If legislated, the Committee recommends that subclause 119.2(6), 
relating to the proposed offence for entering, or remaining in, a declared 
area, sunset two years after the next Federal election. 
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Recommendation 21 
 If legislated, the Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services 
Act 2001 be amended to require the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security to complete a public inquiry into the ‘declared 
area’ provisions in clauses 119.2 and 119.3 of the Counter-Terrorism 
Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014, including the list 
of ‘legitimate purposes’, 18 months after the next Federal election. 
The Committee further recommends that the Independent National 
Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 be amended to require the 
Independent National Security Legislation Monitor to review and report 
on the operation of the ‘declared area’ provisions 12 months after the 
next Federal election. 
Amendments to the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 
2.398 The Bill includes proposed amendments to the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 
(the Foreign Evidence Act), in particular to introduce a new Part 3A into 
the Act regarding the use of ‘foreign material’ and ‘foreign government 
material’ in terrorism related proceedings.307 According to the Explanatory 
Memorandum, the primary purpose of the amendments is  
to provide Australian judicial officers with greater discretion in 
deciding whether to admit foreign material in terrorism-related 
proceedings, while still providing appropriate judicial protection 
of the rights of the defendant.308 
2.399 The Explanatory Memorandum notes that, currently, only foreign 
evidence obtained as a result of a ‘mutual assistance request’ (a formal 
government-to-government request by or on behalf of the Attorney-
General to a foreign country) may be adduced as evidence in Australian 
court proceedings. The amendments aim to  
avoid a situation where evidence is automatically excluded on the 
basis of a technical rule of evidence that may have no substantial 
bearing on the defendant‘s right to a fair trial. 309 
 
307  Items 115 to 126 of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
308  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 151. 
309  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 152–153. 
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2.400 The proposed amendments respond to a recommendation in the Fourth 
Annual Report of the INSLM. In the report, the INSLM noted that there 
was ‘very limited scope, if any at all’ for making mutual assistance 
requests or obtaining evidence from those requests under the existing Part 
3 of the Foreign Evidence Act. This was because the procedures under the 
existing regime ‘presuppose a level of functioning government including 
judicial authorities that will be quite unrealistic in many cases’.310 
2.401 The INSLM recommended that:  
Consideration should be given to examining the merits of 
amendments to the Evidence Act 1995 and the Foreign Evidence Act 
1994 so as to permit the collection of information and its admission 
into evidence, from foreign countries, where political 
circumstances or states of conflict render impracticable the making 
of a request of the government of that country, for assistance in 
gathering evidence.311 
2.402 In supporting comments, the INSLM indicated it was essential for the 
existing safeguard to be retained that a court be ‘satisfied that adducing 
the foreign material would not have a substantial effect on the right of the 
defendant to a fair trial’. Further, he added that the admission of such 
information as evidence ‘must be conditioned on specially adapted 
warnings’ to juries about the reliability of the evidence.312 The INSLM had 
referred to provisions under the Evidence Act 1995 for evidence to be 
admitted subject to the jury being warned that it ‘may be unreliable’, and 
‘the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence and 
the weight to be given to it’.313 
2.403 The proposed new Part 3A of the Bill would, subject to specific 
requirements, enable foreign evidence obtained on an agency-to-agency 
basis (‘foreign government material’) to be adduced as evidence in 
terrorism-related proceedings, in addition to ‘foreign material’ obtained 
through the existing mutual assistance processes. The new provisions also 
apply a streamlined set of rules to the process for adducing and admitting 
both types of material, applying ‘broad judicial discretion’ to the decision 
on whether the material be adduced, rather than the existing rules of 
evidence that would otherwise apply. Only material that was ‘obtained 
directly as a result of torture or duress’ by an official would be 
 
310  INSLM, Annual Report, 28 March 2014, p. 35. 
311  INSLM, Annual Report, 28 March 2014, p. 36. 
312  INSLM, Annual Report, 28 March 2014, pp. 34, 36. 
313  INSLM, Annual Report, 28 March 2014, p. 34; section 165, Evidence Act 1995. 
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inadmissible, in line with Australia’s obligations under Article 15 of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment.314 
2.404 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill highlighted that the 
amendments would retain the discretion of the court to direct that 
evidence not be adduced if doing so would have a ‘substantial adverse 
effect’ on the defendant’s right to receive a fair hearing’. It also noted that 
in any criminal proceedings, the defence will have the opportunity 
to challenge such evidence and produce their own evidence to 
discredit the prosecution’s case … notwithstanding the change to 
the rule of evidence that will apply, the prosecution will continue 
to need to prove all elements of the specific offence have been 
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.315 
2.405 Several participants in the inquiry indicated in-principle support for the 
intent behind the proposed amendments.316 For example, Dr David 
Connery highlighted the challenges faced by law enforcement agencies 
when gathering evidence about the activities of persons overseas: 
For the most part, the well-practiced Mutual Assistance Request is 
used effectively to provide that evidence. However, there are 
many situations where a foreign government may not want to 
help, or places where a legitimate foreign government cannot 
collect evidence due to civil war or strife. In these latter 
circumstances, perpetrators of crimes against Australian law have 
a veritable free ticket to committee crimes. As the recent activities 
of some in Iraq appear to show, these can be very barbaric.317 
2.406 The AFP indicated that it ‘strongly supports’ the proposed reforms to the 
Foreign Evidence Act, and also referred to the problems with the existing 
regime: 
Currently, foreign evidence must be obtained under [Mutual 
Assistance] and meet domestic rules relating to admissibility. This 
has created genuine issues for the AFP, meaning that particular 
material cannot be led in terrorism prosecutions, leading to 
pursuing lesser offences or not proceeding with a prosecution at 
 
314  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 52, 157–158. 
315  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 52. 
316  Ms Abby Zeith, Submission 16, p. [2]; Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 19; 
Dr David Connery, Submission 26, p. 4; Mr Neil James, Executive Director, Australia Defence 
Association, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 15. 
317  Dr Connery, Submission 26, p. 3. 
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all. The nature of the Syria and Iraq conflicts will heighten the 
difficulties that AFP has already experienced relating to collecting 
evidence in admissible form and meeting [Mutual Assistance] 
requirements.318 
2.407 Notwithstanding this level of support, many inquiry participants also 
highlighted areas for possible improvement in the proposed regime. For 
example, several participants called for a more precise adoption of the 
INSLM’s recommendation by restricting the applicability of proposed new 
Part 3A to circumstances in which it is impractical to obtain formal 
assistance from the foreign government.319 Dr Connery, for example, 
suggested an additional safeguard be added in which the AFP was 
required to show that a mutual assistance request was not feasible before 
being able to adduce foreign evidence under the proposed new powers.320 
2.408 The Muslim Legal Network (NSW) registered its concerns about the 
reliability of foreign evidence obtained from areas of conflict, where there 
may be less stringent methods of collection and an increased likelihood of 
bias due to political allegiances.321 
2.409 In line with the INSLM’s call for warnings to be issued to juries about the 
reliability of foreign evidence (noted above), the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of 
Public Law recommended that the proposed Part 3A should include a 
requirement for judges in terrorism-related proceedings to direct the jury 
as to the ‘potentially prejudicial nature of foreign evidence’.322 
2.410 Other inquiry participants highlighted the desirably of expanding the 
provisions, found in subclause 27D(2), for evidence to be inadmissible if it 
was obtained ‘directly as a result of torture or duress’. Suggestions 
included:  
 amending subclause 27D(2) to further exclude material that was 
obtained indirectly as a result of torture or duress323 
 further prohibiting material obtained as a result of ‘ill-treatment’, such 
as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which may 
fall below the threshold set by the definition of ‘torture’324 
 
318  Australian Federal Police, Submission 36, p. 8. 
319  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 19; Law Council of Australia, Submission 
12, p. 39; Dr David Connery, Submission 26, p. 4. 
320  Dr Connery, Submission 26, p. 4; Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, pp. 29-31. 
321  Muslim Legal Network (NSW), Submission 43, p. [8]. 
322  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 19. 
323  Ms Abby Zeith, Submission 16, p. 6; Members of the Victorian Bar Human Rights Committee, 
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 removing the parts of subclause 27D(2) that limit the mandatory 
exclusion of material to instances of torture or duress by, or associated 
with, public officials325 
 expanding the definition of ‘duress’ in subclause 27D(3) to include 
threats to person’s associates, threats to property and threats that are 
real but not necessarily imminent326 
 amending the provisions to place the burden of proof on the 
prosecution to satisfy the court that the material was not obtained 
under torture or duress.327 
Committee comment 
2.411 The Committee notes that there appears to be broad support for the policy 
intent of allowing courts greater flexibility in determining whether to 
admit foreign evidence in terrorism-related proceedings. However, some 
inquiry participants had concerns about the adequacy of safeguards built 
into the scheme. Most of these concerns revolved around the possibility 
that, despite the ban on evidence obtained directly by torture or duress, it 
would be possible that evidence of questionable reliability could be 
admitted. 
2.412 The Committee strongly opposes the admission of any evidence obtained 
under torture or duress being used in criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, 
the Committee considers the use of the word ‘directly’ is in line with the 
policy intent of the amendments to provide the court with greater 
discretion to admit foreign material in appropriate cases. Requiring the 
prosecution to fully satisfy a court that foreign evidence has not indirectly 
been obtained under torture or duress could be an impossible task in 
relation to evidence from some countries. Setting too high a threshold for 
the admissibility of evidence, or specifically placing the burden of proof 
on the prosecution, could risk an unintended consequence of important 
foreign evidence in a terrorism-related trial being unable to be admitted. 
This would defeat the purpose of the proposed amendments.  
2.413 However, the Committee notes concerns expressed by some submitters in 
relation to the torture and duress mandatory exclusion being limited to 
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material obtained by a person in the capacity of a public official, acting in 
an official capacity or acting at the instigation, or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person action in an official 
capacity. The Committee notes these comments and recommends that 
material obtained by torture or duress should not be admissible, 
regardless of who originally obtained the material. 
 
Recommendation 22 
 The Committee recommends that proposed section 27D of the Foreign 
Evidence Act 1994, which currently applies only to public officials and 
persons connected to public officials, be broadened to apply in 
circumstances where any person has directly obtained material as a 
result of torture or duress. 
2.414 The Committee also notes concerns expressed over the definition of 
duress. Under the definition in the Bill, ‘duress’ is limited to a threat to 
imminently cause death or serious injury to a person or a member of their 
family, to which a ‘reasonable person would respond by providing the 
material or information’. The Committee notes that a reasonable person 
could be just as likely to respond to threats made to them against a close 
friend, innocent third parties (for example, a threat made against innocent 
schoolchildren) or a significant asset, such as their home or business. The 
Committee considers broadening the definition to capture threats of this 
nature would be appropriate and would not diminish the policy intent of 
the amendments. 
 
Recommendation 23 
 The Committee recommends that the Government broaden the 
definition of ‘duress’ in proposed Part 3A of the Foreign Evidence Act 
1994 to include other threats that a reasonable person might respond to, 
including threats against a person’s assets, personal associates or other 
third parties. 
2.415 As the INSLM pointed out in his Fourth Annual Report, the admissibility 
of evidence cannot be equated with reliability.328 The clause excluding 
evidence obtained under torture or duress exists in fulfilment of 
 
328  INSLM, Annual Report, 28 March 2014, p. 34. 
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Australia’s obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. If evidence passes 
this test, it would remain up to the court to determine the value and 
reliability of that evidence and for the prosecution to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. The wide range of material that 
could potentially be admitted is part of the policy intent of the provisions 
to allow the court to exercise more discretion as to the reliability of the 
foreign evidence. 
2.416 The Committee is concerned, however, that the risks pertaining to the 
reliability of foreign evidence admitted in such circumstances should be 
made clear to the court. The Committee agrees with the INSLM that it is 
important that appropriate direction be given to juries about the potential 
unreliability of foreign evidence, particularly if there are any doubts as to 
whether torture, duress or other forms of ill-treatment were involved. 
While conscious that it would be inappropriate for Government to direct 
the operation of the Judiciary, the Committee notes that a requirement for 
such ‘warnings’ already exists in the Evidence Act 1995.329 The Committee 
supports similar provisions being incorporated into the proposed new 
Part 3A of the Foreign Evidence Act.  
 
Recommendation 24 
 The Committee recommends that proposed Part 3A of the Foreign 
Evidence Act 1994 be amended, based on section 165 of the Evidence Act 
1995, to require courts to provide appropriate direction to juries, where 
necessary, about the potential unreliability of foreign evidence admitted 
under Part 3A. 
2.417 The Committee does not consider it necessary for the proposed new Part 
3A to be restricted in the legislation to instances where it is impractical to 
request formal assistance from a foreign government due to political 
circumstances or a state of conflict. In forming this view, the Committee 
notes the proposed requirement for the Attorney-General to certify that it 
was not practicable for evidence obtained at an agency-to-agency level to 
be obtained through a mutual assistance request. The Committee expects 
that this requirement, and the requirement for a senior AFP member to 
provide a statement with details of how the material was obtained, will 
ensure the primacy of mutual assistance request regime will be retained 
wherever practicable. The Committee also notes the observation of the 
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INSLM that, with respect to terrorism-related cases, there was ‘very 
limited scope, if any at all’ for making such mutual assistance requests or 
obtaining evidence from those requests under the existing provisions in 
Part 3 of the Foreign Evidence Act. 
Amendments to the TIA Act – definition of serious 
offence 
2.418 The Bill includes a proposed amendment to the definition of ‘serious 
offence’ within section 5D of the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) to include a breach of a control order, and 
offences against Subdivision B of Division 80 and Division 119 of the 
Criminal Code. 
2.419 The Explanatory Memorandum states that these amendments are 
necessary to enable police to gain access to interception warrants for 
offences which have been deemed sufficiently serious as to warrant the 
availability of such powers: 
The offences identified, being treason, control order breaches and 
foreign incursion offences are those that jeopardise Australia and 
its national security interests and for which prevention and 
disruption are critical elements of the counter-terrorism strategy. 
The gravity of the threat posed by possible breaches of these 
regimes demonstrates a need to take reasonable steps to detect, 
investigate and prosecute those suspected of engaging in such 
conduct.330   
2.420 The definition of ‘serious offence’ within section 5D of the TIA Act already 
includes offences relating to terrorism and other specifically named 
offence provisions within the Code, including offences under Divisions 
101 (terrorist acts), Division 102 (terrorist organisation offences) and 
Division 103 (terrorist finance offences). 
Committee comment 
2.421 The Committee is satisfied that the addition of offences relating to treason, 
control orders and the proposed foreign incursion offences to the TIA Act 
regime is justified, as all the offences are sufficiently serious as to justify 
police access to the interception warrants. The Committee is confident that 
 
330  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 54. 
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the existing safeguards and oversight regime for the TIA Act continues to 
be robust and appropriate.   
Amendments to the ASIO Act – definition of security 
2.422 Schedule 1 to the Bill includes proposed amendments to the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act).  One of the 
amendments is to amend the definition of ‘security’ within section 4.  
2.423 The definition of security includes reference to ‘politically motivated 
violence’: 
security means: 
(a)  the protection of, and of the people of, the 
Commonwealth and the several States and Territories 
from: 
(i)  espionage; 
(ii)   sabotage; 
(iii)  politically motivated violence; 
(iv)  promotion of communal violence; 
(v)  attacks on Australia’s defence system; or 
(vi)  acts of foreign interference; 
whether directed from, or committed within, Australia 
or not; and 
(aa)  the protection of Australia’s territorial and border 
integrity from serious threats; and 
(b)  the carrying out of Australia’s responsibilities to any 
foreign country in relation to a matter mentioned in any of 
the subparagraphs of paragraph (a) or the matter 
mentioned in paragraph (aa).331 
2.424 The definition of politically motivated violence includes offences against 
the Foreign Incursions Act and acts that are terrorism offences.332   
2.425 As outlined in detail above, the Bill also proposes to repeal the Foreign 
Incursions Act, and recreate its provisions, with amendments, in new 
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Division 119 of the Criminal Code. Division 119 includes a definition of 
‘engage in a hostile activity’ which relies on a subsequent definition of 
‘engage in subverting society’. This definition differs from the existing 
definition within the Foreign Incursions Act. 
2.426 The new Division 119 offences will be cross-referenced in the definition of 
‘politically motivated violence’ in the ASIO Act. The Explanatory 
Memorandum states that the amended definition of ‘security’ within the 
ASIO Act is merely technical in nature, designed to 
ensure that ASIO can continue to perform its statutory functions 
with respect to matters relevant to security that relate to politically 
motivated violence, in the form of the offences presently in the 
Foreign Incursions Act and proposed to be relocated to new 
Division 119 of the Criminal Code.  As this amendment is technical 
in nature it does not extend, in any material way, ASIO’s statutory 
functions or powers.333 
2.427 The IGIS queried, in both her submission and evidence to the Committee, 
whether the amendment was solely technical in nature. Clarification on 
this point was considered important by the IGIS as: 
The definition of ‘security’ of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 (the ASIO Act) is central to ASIO’s function 
in s17 of that Act and underpins all of the tests for warrants and 
other intrusive powers that ASIO is able to access. Any changes to 
the definition of security has consequences for ASIO’s mandate 
and the circumstances in which its special powers can be accessed 
(including warrants).334 
2.428 The IGIS also commented in relation to the definition of ‘subverting 
society’: 
Despite the phrase ‘engaging in subverting society’ being used 
there is no requirement that these acts be accompanied by an 
intention to coerce or intimidate a government or to intimidate the 
public or a section of the public or to have any other ‘subverting 
society’ effect. Such an intention is part of the definition of a 
terrorist act in the Criminal Code. This means that the offence in 
proposed s119.1 and related offences can be enlivened by conduct 
(such as serious damage to property or causing serious physical 
harm to a person) that does not have the political or ideological 
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intention associated with, for example, the current fighting in Iraq 
and Syria and could be motivated by purely criminal or financial 
motives. For example, going overseas to commit an assault as part 
of a family dispute or to rob a bank could come within the 
definition of ‘security’ and be a legitimate focus for ASIO 
attention. Such conduct, while serious, has not previously been 
considered ‘security’ related.335 
2.429 The IGIS considered that the ‘expanded scope’ of the offence may have the 
potential to expand ASIO’s current powers and functions: 
The consequence of this expansion of the definition of security is 
that ASIO’s powers would be able to be used in a broader range of 
circumstances. The definition of ‘security’ underpins when ASIO 
can obtain search or computer access warrants and also when 
ASIO employees can authorise access to telecommunications 
metadata. The definition of security also regulates when a person 
can be assessed as a ‘risk to security’ for the purpose of a visa 
security assessment or other security assessments.336 
2.430 In response to these concerns, ASIO referred the Committee to the over-
arching definition of ‘security’, which requires that the concept must be 
related to the protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and 
the several States and Territories from, inter alia, politically motivated 
violence: 
The term 'politically motivated violence' does not exist in a 
vacuum in the ASIO Act definition of security. PMV—politically 
motivated violence—is only a security issue if it is relevant to the 
security of Australia and its people or where Australia has a 
responsibility to a foreign country in that respect, as it does in 
relation to terrorism. Neither of those sorts of requirements would 
be fulfilled in respect of collecting intelligence on a person who, 
for example, was going overseas to commit an assault in a family 
dispute or to rob a bank. We have to look at it in the context of the 
mandate around security, in relation to the security of Australia 
and Australians.337 
2.431 The Attorney-General’s Department also provided evidence about how 
the definition of ‘security’ in the ASIO Act should be read: 
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The definition of security sets it out to say, with an opening 
chapeau of words, that it must be in relation to the protection of 
the people of the Commonwealth of Australia from politically 
motivated violence… 
those opening words and the definition of 'security' saying that it 
must always relate to, 'the protection of the people of Australia'—
that, in itself, is a limiting effect. We cannot simply have ASIO 
then having an investigation into a criminal conduct in another 
country; it must always be viewed through lens of whether or not 
the investigation of that activity could be seen to be for the 
protection of and of the people of the Commonwealth in the 
several states and territories of Australia.338 
2.432 In its supplementary submission, the Attorney-General’s Department 
provided further clarification as to how the definition in Division 119 will 
interact with the existing definition of ‘security’ for ASIO purposes: 
‘Security’ (defined as is PMV [politically motivated violence] in 
section 4 of the ASIO Act) relevantly means 
(a) the protection of, and of the people of, the 
Commonwealth and the several States and Territories from 
PMV;  
(aa) the protection of Australia’s territorial and border 
integrity from serious threats; and 
(b) the carrying out of Australia’s responsibilities to any 
foreign country in relation to PMV.  
… It is the Department’s view that a mere connection between an 
offence constituting PMV and the Commonwealth and its people 
is insufficient. The conduct constituting PMV would need to be 
capable of supporting a need to provide protection from that 
conduct.  
The criminal conduct (eg assault) would only engage paragraph 
(b) of the definition of ‘security’ above if Australia had 
responsibilities to the foreign country, in respect to the relevant act 
of PMV.  While we consider that Australia would have 
responsibilities in respect of its people engaging in terrorism or 
other conduct which is hostile to a foreign government, there 
would only be rare occasions where routine criminal conduct 
overseas (assault or bank robbery) would engage Australia’s 
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responsibilities to a foreign country.  This might arise for instance 
on those occasions in which a foreign country seeks extradition of 
the alleged perpetrator from Australia.339 
Committee comment 
2.433 On this matter, the Committee notes the evidence provided by the 
Attorney-General’s Department and ASIO is sufficient to address the 
concerns raised by the IGIS. The Committee accepts that conduct 
constituting ‘politically motivated violence’ within the ASIO Act must be 
read in relation to a need to provide protection from that conduct. Mere 
criminal conduct, which is arguably picked up by the ‘subverting society’ 
definition in new Division 119, would not be covered by this definition.   
2.434 The Committee also notes that if the IGIS continues to be concerned about 
the new definition, the IGIS can investigate and report to that effect. 
2.435 However, given the views of the IGIS, and the benefits which arise from 
absolute clarity in relation to the exercise of powers by intelligence and 
law enforcement authorities, the Committee recommends that the 
Attorney-General’s Department amend the Explanatory Memorandum to 
clarify that the definition of ‘politically motivated violence’ must be read 
with reference to the opening words in the definition of ‘security’ in 
section 4 of the ASIO Act. This would ensure that consequential ASIO 
powers and processes reflect the national security focus of the 
organisation.   
 
Recommendation 25 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General amend the 
Explanatory Memorandum to make it clear that the definition of 
‘politically motivated violence’ must be read with reference to the 
opening words in the definition of ‘security’ in section 4 of the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. 
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Questioning and detention powers 
2.436 The Bill proposes a number of amendments to the questioning and 
detention powers in Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979.  Specifically, the Bill will: 
 replace the ‘last resort’ threshold for the issuing of questioning warrants 
with a requirement for the Attorney-General to be satisfied that, having 
regard to other methods (if any) of collecting the intelligence that are 
likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the 
warrant to be issued   
 insert a new offence for destroying or tampering with ‘records or 
things’ requested to be produced under a questioning warrant  
 removal a specific threshold governing the use of lethal force by a 
police officer during execution of a warrant  
 extend the ‘sunset clause’ on the special powers in Division 3 of Part III 
of the ASIO Act (questioning warrants and questioning & detention 
warrants) from 22 July 2016 to 22 July 2026, and 
 under a proposed related amendment to the Intelligence Services Act 
2001, extend the deadline for the PJCIS review of the special powers to 
22 July 2026. 
Extension of regime and delay of review 
2.437 The continued application of the questioning and detention warrant 
regime was a key issue for a number of submitters.  This part will canvass 
those views, however, the timing and length of the proposed extension 
and timing of the review has been dealt with separately. 
2.438 In justifying the extension of the questioning and detention powers, the 
Explanatory Memorandum outlines that there is a continued need for 
these powers.  Specifically, it states: 
The Government is of the view that there are realistic and credible 
circumstances in which it may be necessary to conduct coercive 
questioning of a person for the purposes of gathering intelligence 
about a terrorism offence – as distinct from conducting law 
enforcement action, or obtaining a preventive order under 
Divisions 104 and 105 of the Criminal Code – particularly in time 
critical circumstances.  Intelligence is integral to protecting 
Australia and Australians from the threat of terrorism, and it is 
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important to ensure that ASIO has the necessary capabilities to 
perform this function. 340 
2.439 Since 2003, 16 questioning warrants have been obtained. ASIO considered 
that in the current heightened security environment the powers would 
continue to play an important role. In particular: 
The ongoing and persistent threat of terrorism, particularly from 
Australians involved in and returning from armed conflicts in 
Syria and Iraq, presents a significant challenge to ASIO and other 
intelligence agencies. ASIO needs to be equipped with the 
necessary powers and capabilities to fulfil its statutory functions.341 
2.440 However, a number of submitters questioned the extension, calling for the 
regime to be repealed.342  For example, in his submission Professor 
Ben Saul called for the detention powers to be repealed on the basis that: 
Detaining non-suspects for up to seven days, virtually 
incommunicado and without effective review at the time, 
removing the right to silence on penalty of imprisonment, and 
criminalizing any disclosure of detention, is excessive and 
disproportionate in view of existing powers, the level of terrorist 
threat, and the absence of any declared public emergency 
justifying derogation from protected human rights.343  
2.441 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law argued that the extension of the 
questioning and detention warrant regime contradicts the INSLM’s 
Second Annual Report, which recommended the detention component of 
the regime be repealed.344 
2.442 ASIO noted in relation to this report that: 
Since the INSLM published his Second Annual Report, the 
terrorism threat in Australia has increased, as indicated by the 
raising of the terrorism threat level in September 2014.  
Notwithstanding that ASIO has not previously applied for a 
questioning and detention warrant, ASIO strongly believes the 
current security environment, including the risk of onshore 
 
340  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 128. 
341  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission 11, p. 6. 
342  Professor Saul, Submission 2, p. 2; Human Rights Watch, Submission 21, p. 6, Amnesty 
International, Submission 22, p. 2–3, Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission 15, 
p. 8-10.  The ALHR outlined a range of concerns with the existing regimes, but did not 
explicitly call for them to be repealed; Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 18, p. 6. 
343  Professor Saul, Submission 2, p. 2. 
344  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 3. 
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terrorist attacks, supports the proposed extension of the sunset 
date for the questioning and questioning and detention warrant 
regime in Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act. In addition, 
current statutory thresholds ensure these special powers are not 
used arbitrarily or unnecessarily at any time.345 
2.443 The Human Rights Law Centre also recommended that the Committee 
strongly object to any extension to the sunset clause.  On this point they 
noted: 
The powers also restrict access to legal counsel and the secrecy 
provisions prevent the media, academics and human rights 
advocates from independently monitoring the use of ASIO 
questioning and detention powers, which has the potential to 
allow human rights violations to go unnoticed in a climate of 
impunity.346 
2.444 This view was supported by the Law Council, who stated to the 
Committee that the Council has 
always been opposed to the questioning and detention power in 
substantive form, and we would call upon the parliament to 
undertake a very careful review of that, if there is to be a sunset 
clause.347 
2.445 Amnesty International contended that: 
These powers further undermine the fundamental principles of 
detention without charge, undermining of rights while in 
detention, and the presumption of innocence.348 
2.446 The Explanatory Memorandum, in contrast, makes the following 
statement on the use of these powers in practice: 
The judicious use of the powers conferred by Division 3 of Part III 
is consistent with their extraordinary nature and the intention that 
they should be used sparingly. Independent reviews of Division 3 
of Part III have been undertaken by the INSLM in 2012-14 and the 
predecessor committee to the PJCIS in 2005 (the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD), which found no 
evidence of impropriety in the use of these provisions. The IGIS, in 
 
345  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission 11, p. 6. 
346  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 18, p. 10. 
347  Mr Boulten SC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 61. 
348  Amnesty International, Submission 22, p. 3. 
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undertaking her standing oversight functions, has similarly found 
no evidence of impropriety or aberrant use.349 
Change to requirement for issuing a questioning warrant 
2.447 Prior to applying to an issuing authority for a questioning warrant, the 
Director-General of ASIO must first obtain the Attorney-General’s 
consent. 
2.448 To consent to a questioning warrant application, the Attorney-General 
must currently be satisfied (among other matters) that relying on other 
methods of collecting that intelligence would be ineffective. The Bill 
proposes to replace this requirement so that the Attorney-General must 
instead be satisfied that having regard to other methods (if any) of 
collecting the intelligence that are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable 
in all the circumstances for the warrant to be issued. The Bill does not alter 
the test the issuing officer is to apply in considering a questioning warrant 
application.350  
2.449 This amendment implements a recommendation from the INSLM’s 
Second Annual Report, which recommended that: 
The last resort requirement for QWs [questioning warrants] 
should be repealed and replaced with a prerequisite that QWs can 
only be sought and issued where the Attorney-General and 
issuing authority are ‘satisfied that it is reasonable in all the 
circumstances, including consideration whether other methods of 
collecting that intelligence would likely be as effective’.351 
2.450 The Explanatory Memorandum provides a detailed explanation of, and 
rationale for, this amendment. The Explanatory Memorandum states that 
the current test effectively operates as a last resort and therefore does not 
recognise that 
other available methods may be significantly less effective than a 
questioning warrant, may take considerably longer in time critical 
circumstances, or may involve a considerably greater risk to the 
lives or safety of persons collecting the intelligence.352 
 
349  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 89. 
350  Paragraph 34E(1)(b) of the ASIO Act. The test is that the issuing authority is satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant will substantially assist the collection of 
intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism offence. 
351  INSLM, Annual Report, 20 December 2012, p. 74. 
352  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 85. 
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2.451 Further to this, the INSLM noted in his Second Annual Report that in 
relation to the existing test, the 
Attorney-General would need evidence from ASIO that it had 
assessed all other methods of intelligence collection to be 
ineffective. In order to make this assessment, ASIO would usually 
have to use, or at least attempt to use, some of those methods.353 
2.452 The Explanatory Memorandum also states that the new requirement 
means that 
rather than being available only if the Attorney-General is satisfied 
that they are the sole means of collecting intelligence, questioning 
warrants will be available if the Attorney-General is satisfied that 
it is reasonable in the circumstances to obtain intelligence by way 
of a questioning warrant.  The existence of other, less intrusive 
methods of obtaining the intelligence will therefore be a relevant 
but non-determinative consideration in decisions made under 
section 34D(4).354 
2.453 In its submission, ASIO noted: 
Questioning warrants are an important power for ASIO to compel 
a person to appear before a prescribed authority and answer 
questions and produce records (or other things). The proposed 
amendment will improve the effectiveness of these warrants as an 
intelligence collection tool.355 
2.454 In evidence before the Committee, ASIO outlined that: 
The removal of that 'last resort' requirement is certainly something 
we believe is going to make it easier for us to get those questioning 
warrants and to utilise those questioning warrants.356 
2.455 The Explanatory Memorandum went on to note the safeguards that will 
continue to operate in relation to the issuing of a questioning warrant, 
which include: 
The requirement for questioning warrants to be issued by an 
issuing authority who, before issuing a questioning warrant, must 
be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
 
353  INSLM, Annual Report, 20 December 2012, p. 71. 
354  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 85. 
355  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission 11, p. 5. 
356  Ms Hartland, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 26. 
SCHEDULE 1—MAIN COUNTER-TERRORISM AMENDMENTS 127 
 
warrant will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is 
important in relation to a terrorism offence.357 
2.456 The Explanatory Memorandum also notes that the Attorney-General’s 
Guidelines require ASIO to undertake inquiries and investigations, 
wherever possible, using the least intrusive techniques to collect 
information. 
2.457 These safeguards were also recognised by the INSLM.  In relation to the 
Attorney-General’s Guidelines and the statement of procedures required 
in relation to questioning warrants, he noted: 
These Guidelines and statement of procedures constitute 
formidable and reassuring prerequisites for the issue and control 
of the execution of QWs. They are an appropriate reflection of the 
gravity of the power sought to be exerted against individuals in 
the public interest by way of QWs.358 
2.458 The IGIS noted the safeguards, including the role of her office, in her 
submission. While not playing a role in reviewing decisions to issue a 
warrant, the IGIS noted that: 
A submission from ASIO to the Attorney-General in relation to 
such a request would be subject to IGIS inspection. My expectation 
is that such an inspection would take place as part of a review 
after the warrant operation had been completed.359  
2.459 The IGIS also noted in her submission and evidence before the Committee, 
that while she had no comment on the proposal itself, she would seek to 
be present during any such questioning.360 
2.460 Despite the assurances in the Explanatory Memorandum, some submitters 
still expressed concern with this change.361  Specifically, the Australian 
Human Rights Commission argued that the proposed amendment is not 
consistent with Australia’s human rights obligations and do not achieve 
an appropriate balance: 
Human rights may only be limited where a measure is necessary 
and proportionate to a legitimate objective. A questioning warrant 
necessarily entails a severe curtailment of liberty. It can only be 
 
357  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 85–86. 
358  INSLM, Annual Report, 20 December 2012, p. 73. 
359  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 1, p. 9. 
360  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 1, p. 9. 
361  Australian Human Rights Committee, Submission 7, p. 10; Castan Centre for Human Rights 
Law, Submission 17, p. 3, Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission 15, p. 5. 
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justified where no less intrusive alternatives exist. The 
Commission considers that the present standard more 
appropriately protects the right against arbitrary detention and the 
right to privacy. 362 
2.461 The Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, in expressing its concerns at 
what it saw as a major expansion of a coercive power, noted that ‘[t]he 
regularisation of the use of powers of compulsory questioning, by 
reducing the threshold for the issuing of a warrant’ could lead to ASIO 
becoming a secret police.363 
Use of force 
2.462 The Bill will amend subsection 34V(3) of the ASIO Act so that it is not 
limited to action that a police officer can take when a person is attempting 
to escape being taken into custody by fleeing. Specifically, it will enable an 
officer to do anything that is likely to cause the death of, or grievous 
bodily harm to, a person where the officer believes on reasonable grounds 
that doing that thing is necessary to protect life or to prevent serious 
injury.   
2.463 In support of this amendment, ASIO outlined that the existing  
restrictions are inconsistent with the modern law of self defence 
and defence of others and are duplicating the restrictions already 
present in the current subsection (s34V(3)(a)).364 
2.464 In contrast, the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law argued that: 
The permissible use of force, including deadly force, should not be 
greater in relation to fugitives from compulsory questioning by an 
intelligence agency than it is in respect of fugitive criminals.365 
Committee comment 
2.465 The Committee notes the extension of the questioning and detention 
powers regime, including the proposed amendment to the ‘last resort’ test 
for the use of questioning warrants. The Committee recognises that the 
amendment would change the circumstances in which the Director-
General of ASIO may seek the Attorney-General’s consent to apply for a 
 
362  Australian Human Rights Committee, Submission 7, p. 10. 
363  Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission 17, p. 3. 
364  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission 11, p. 6. 
365  Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission 17, p. 4. 
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questioning warrant. The Committee also notes that while this will expand 
the circumstances in which an application may be made, it will not alter 
the test that the issuing officer is to apply in considering a questioning 
warrant application. 
2.466 Given the current threat environment, the Committee understands the 
need for this change as requested by ASIO. 
2.467 Further, while the last resort test is changed, the issuing authority will still 
be required to be satisfied that ‘there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that issuing the warrant will substantially assist the collection of 
intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism offence.’ Finally, 
this amendment only applies to the use of questioning warrants and not to 
the use of questioning and detention warrants.   
2.468 The Committee notes the safeguards which will continue to govern the 
use of these powers and ensure that they are only used where necessary 
and appropriate. These include: 
 extensive requirements to apply for a warrant including obtaining 
Director-General and Attorney-General consent before an application 
can be made to an issuing authority  
 Attorney-General’s Guidelines requiring ASIO to undertake inquiries 
and investigations, wherever possible, using the least intrusive 
techniques to collect information, and 
 IGIS oversight and attendance at questioning. 
2.469 The Committee also notes comments made by Mr Bret Walker SC in 
evidence to the Committee. Mr Walker noted in relation to the use of 
questioning warrants by ASIO: 
I was very impressed with over my three years in the office—
namely, the professionalism and seriousness of the agencies and 
the officers in relation to these matters ... one of the overwhelming 
impressions I had was of the seriousness and earnestness with 
which the safeguards were observed.366 
2.470 Finally, an important oversight mechanism will be the review of the use of 
these powers, particularly given the proposed change to the last resort 
test. This matter was discussed separately in this chapter in relation to 
sunset clauses. The Committee’s recommendations on the timing and 
length of the proposed extension are also outlined above.   
 
366  Mr Walker SC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 44. 
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2.471 In relation to the proposed amendments regarding the use of force, the 
Committee notes the justification provided. The Committee notes that 
agencies should not be hampered by differing legislative provisions 
(within the ASIO Act) governing the use of force in the execution of their 
duties. 
Amendment to AML/CTF Act – Listing of the Attorney-
General’s Department as a ‘designated agency’ 
2.472 The Bill proposes to amend the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act) to include the 
Attorney-General’s Department as a ‘designated agency’. 
2.473 The Explanatory Memorandum states that making the Attorney-General’s 
Department a designated agency 
will enable the AGD to have access to the financial intelligence of 
AUSTRAC [the Australian Transaction Report and Analysis 
Centre].  This amendment will result in administrative efficiencies 
where it is necessary for AGD to consider AUSTRAC information 
when formulating AML/CTF policy.  Access to this information 
would allow AGD to more efficiently and effectively develop and 
implement policy around terrorism financing risks, and ensure a 
more holistic approach to the Government’s foreign fighters 
national security response… 
Enabling the AGD to access AUSTRAC information will enhance 
AGD’s abilities to bring together whole-of-government resources 
to properly advise the Government on important questions of 
counter-terrorism policy.367 
2.474 Currently, the ability of the Attorney-General’s Department to access 
AUSTRAC information is limited to: 
 under section 129 for the purposes of an investigation or a 
proposed investigation of a possible breach of a law of the 
Commonwealth, or 
 if disclosed by an entrusted public official under section 121 for 
the purposes of the AML/CTF Act or the Financial Transaction 
Reports Act 1988, or for the purposes of the performance of the 
functions of the AUSTRAC CEO. 
 
367  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 10. 
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This disclosure regime imposes significant constraints on the 
ability of AGD to efficiently and effectively develop policy to 
combat money laundering and terrorism financing, and impedes 
the ability of partner agencies to share AUSTRAC information that 
is considered relevant to the development of policy with AGD.368 
2.475 The Australian Privacy Commissioner raised doubts about the need for 
the Department to become a designated agency: 
I am concerned that the extension of the definition of a designated 
agency to include AGD represents a significant shift in the types of 
entities that are permitted to access AUSTRAC information; 
specifically, that designated agencies are primarily agencies that 
have law enforcement functions and activities, whereas AGD is 
seeking access to assist in its policy making activities.369 
2.476 Noting these concerns, the Attorney-General’s Department drew the 
Committee’s attention to the fact that 
the Department of Human Services, DFAT, DIBP, and Treasury all 
currently have designated agency status; these are all policy—
rather than law enforcement or operational—agencies.370 
2.477 The Department also noted that AUSTRAC was consulted during the 
development of the proposal and supports it.371 
2.478 While recognising several important existing privacy and secrecy regimes  
within the AML/CTF regime,372 the Privacy Commissioner noted that his 
concerns related to the possibility of information being able to identify 
individuals.373  
2.479 In its supplementary submission, the Attorney-General’s Department 
provided further information to justify their need for the type of 
information they may have access to, and the existing secrecy provisions 
which would apply to that information: 
In addition to the obligations under the Privacy Act, including the 
requirements to comply with the APPs, Part 11 of the AML/CTF 
Act contains rigorous secrecy and access provisions which set out 
limitations on access to and disclosure of AUSTRAC information.  
 
368  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 35. 
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These obligations continue to apply regardless of the level of 
aggregation of personal information. 
… It is intended that AGD will only seek to access the minimum 
amount of information necessary to support its policy functions, 
and that, where possible, such information will be sufficiently 
aggregated to ensure that it is de-identified.  While it is not 
possible to predict the types of information likely to be sought by 
AGD in all future circumstances, AUSTRAC information has 
previously been sought, by way of example, in relation to the 
remaking of the AML/CTF countermeasures against Iran under 
Part 9 of the AML/CTF Act, which allows for regulations to be 
made regulating or prohibiting transactions with prescribed 
foreign countries… In order to determine the effectiveness of the 
existing countermeasures regime and to properly assess the need 
for any amendments to the prohibited transaction threshold, AGD 
required access to details of the quantum of all International Funds 
Transfer Instructions involving Iran, as well as to the types and 
numbers of entities reporting International Funds Transfer 
Instructions (including foreign currency services, remittance 
providers and cash carriers) with Iran.374 
Committee comment 
2.480 The Committee accepts that the Attorney-General has a genuine need for 
access to AUSTRAC information for the purposes of developing whole-of-
government policy.  However, it is also conscious of the concerns raised 
by the Privacy Commissioner about the increased access to personal 
information that this access would enable. 
2.481 The Committee accepts, based on the evidence presented to it, that the 
Attorney-General’s Department will only seek the minimum amount of 
information required for its policy functions, and that this information 
will, where possible, be sufficiently aggregated to ensure that it is de-
identified.  
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Suspending, cancelling and refusing to issue passports 
2.482 The Bill makes two sets of amendments to the Australian Passports Act 
2005. The first will enable the Minister for Foreign Affairs to suspend a 
person’s travel documents (such as passports) for a period of 14 days if 
requested by ASIO.  The second amendment provides that a person not be 
notified of the refusal or cancellation of an Australian travel document in 
certain limited circumstances. 
2.483 The Bill provides that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has the discretion to 
suspend a passport for a period of 14 days on receipt of advice and a 
recommendation from ASIO.375 Under the amendments, ASIO may 
request the Minister for Foreign Affairs to suspend all Australian travel 
documents issued to a person, if it suspects on reasonable grounds that: 
 the person may leave Australia to engage in conduct that might 
prejudice the security of Australia or a foreign country, and  
 all the person‘s Australian travel documents should be suspended in 
order to prevent the person from engaging in the conduct.376 
2.484 Mirroring amendments are proposed to the Foreign Passports (Law 
Enforcement and Security) Act 2005 to enable the suspension of a person’s 
foreign travel documents (with the same justifications as outlined below).  
2.485 The Explanatory Memorandum states that: 
Currently, there are no provisions in the Passports Act which 
allow the Minister for Foreign Affairs to take temporary action in 
relation to a person‘s passport where there are security concerns in 
relation to the person, but there is not enough information and/or 
time to permit ASIO to make a competent authority request that 
the person‘s Australian passport be cancelled under section 14 of 
the Act.377 
2.486 The purpose of the amendments is to 
enhance the Australian government‘s capacity to take proactive, 
swift and proportionate action to mitigate security risks relating to 
Australians travelling overseas…The amendments provide that 
ASIO would need to make a further competent authority request 
 
375  Schedule 1, Part 1, Clause 21 of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
376  Schedule 1, Part 1, Clause 21 of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
377  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 81. 
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recommending passport cancellation to give longer term effect to 
the disruption of the security threat. 378 
2.487 Under the proposed amendments, Australian travel documents are not 
valid travel documents while suspended.379   
2.488 These amendments implement recommendations by the INSLM in his 
Fourth Annual Report.  However, this provision goes further than the 
INSLM recommendation in enabling a passport to be suspended for 14 
days compared with the seven days recommended by the INSLM.  In 
justifying this, the Explanatory Memorandum noted: 
While the suspension period is longer than the maximum 7-day 
suspension period proposed by the INSLM this is necessary to 
ensure the practical utility of the suspension period with regard to 
both the security and passports operating environment.380  
Threshold for making an application 
2.489 Under the amendments, ASIO will be able to make a request for the 
suspension of a passport where it suspects on reasonable grounds that the 
person may leave Australia to engage in conduct that might prejudice the 
security of Australia or a foreign country. This is a lower threshold than 
required to cancel a passport which, in relation to potential harmful 
conduct, is where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person 
would engage in certain conduct.381 
2.490 The Explanatory Memorandum justified this threshold on the basis that: 
The requisite threshold is commensurate with the temporary 
nature of the contemplated administrative action by the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 382 
2.491 The Explanatory Memorandum also noted that: 
The making of a suspension request by ASIO must be based on 
credible information which indicates that the person may pose a 
security risk. The written request will include the security 
rationale for the making of the request.383  
 
378  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 79. 
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2.492 The Law Council of Australia queried this threshold in its submission: 
The Law Council questions whether the threshold for a request 
under subsection 22A(2) should be lower than that required for a 
passport refusal or cancellation request under section 14 of the Act 
as, unlike the latter provision, the former will not be subject to the 
same level of review.384 
2.493 The IGIS also expressed concern in her submission that the legislation as 
drafted does not specify who needs to form the state of mind necessary to 
make an application. Rather the Bill enables ASIO to ‘request the Minister 
to suspend all Australian travel documents issued to a person if it suspects 
on reasonable grounds…’.  Specifically, the IGIS noted: 
Better practice would be for the legislation to provide that the 
request come from an individual (such as the Director-General or a 
Deputy Director-General of Security). That individual could then 
be held accountable for establishing the reasonable basis for their 
suspicion.385 
2.494 The IGIS elaborated on this point in evidence before the Committee, 
outlining: 
In my view, it does reduce accountability somewhat because the 
decision has to be based on a 'suspicion on reasonable grounds'. If 
it is an individual having a suspicion on reasonable grounds, you 
can question the individual and identify the individual. If it is an 
agency making it, you would have to find the person who is 
actually responsible for the decision, but it is much more 
transparent to us if there is an individual who is enabled to make 
these decisions.386 
Period of suspension 
2.495 As outlined above, the amendments will enable a passport or other travel 
document to be suspended for 14 days. 
2.496 While generally supporting the measure enabling the urgent suspension 
of passports, some submitters noted that the amendment went further 
 
384  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 26. 
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than that recommended by the INSLM.387  On this point, the Gilbert + 
Tobin Centre of Public Law noted in its submission that: 
The INSLM did recommend that the government enact a 
temporary power to suspend passports and travel documents, but 
he emphasised as a ‘trade-off’ for this power that it only be 
permitted for an initial 48-hour period.388 
2.497 Gilbert + Tobin went on to state that: 
If the temporary suspension power is to be enacted, it should be 
limited to the 7-day period recommended by the INSLM. The 
government has claimed that the longer 14-day limit is 
‘necessary to ensure the practical utility of the suspension 
period’. However, it has not produced sufficient evidence to 
justify this claim.389 
2.498 The Law Council of Australia similarly saw the utility in such a power but 
shared the concerns of Gilbert + Tobin, stating: 
The Law Council questions whether a single 14-day time limit, 
which is not reviewable or necessarily linked to ASIO ultimately 
resolving a person’s security assessment (which is generally 
reviewable by the AAT), intrudes overly into individual liberties. 
The least intrusive means which is also practically useful should 
be adopted and this may indicate that some lesser period is 
appropriate.390  
2.499 Further, the Law Council noted that the Bill as drafted leaves it open to 
multiple suspensions.  Specifically: 
While the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill notes that 
subsection 22A(3) is not intended to allow for consecutive rolling 
suspensions, which would defeat the purpose of the limited 14-
day suspension, the Law Council queries whether there are 
adequate safeguards in place to avoid this outcome. The Bill 
should be amended to permit a strict and limited number of 
multiple requests for suspension.391  
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391  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, pp. 26–27. 
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Review rights 
2.500 Under the amendments, a decision to suspend a person’s travel document 
will not be reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act 1977 (ADJR Act).  This position was supported by the IGIS who noted: 
Limited access to review rights is not unreasonable where the 
suspension is for 14 days and there is opportunity for merits 
review of any subsequent cancellation decision.392 
2.501 However, the IGIS did go on to note that: 
Suspension requests are not subject to AAT review and I anticipate 
that suspension requests, particularly any cases of multiple 
requests, will be subject to IGIS oversight.393 
2.502 The Law Council also commented on the benefits of oversight of 
applications for the suspension of passports given the lack of review 
rights.394 
Delegation of powers 
2.503 The amendments will enable the Minister to delegate the power to 
suspend a passport to a wide range of people including ASIO officers.  
Noting advice to suspend a passport will come from ASIO, the IGIS noted: 
If the power to suspend travel documents based on a 
recommendation from ASIO is delegated to one or more ASIO 
employees there will need to be arrangements in place to ensure 
that the delegates can make an appropriately independent 
decision.395 
Notification of refusal or cancellation of travel documents 
2.504 The amendments will enable a person to not be notified of the cancellation 
of their passport, or refusal of a decision in relation to a travel document 
‘where it is essential to the security of the nation or where notification 
would adversely affect a current investigation into a terrorism offence.’396  
2.505 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill outlines that: 
 
392  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 1, p. 8. 
393  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 1, p. 8. 
394  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 27. 
395  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 1, p. 8. 
396  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 79. 
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In some situations, notifying a person that their passport has been 
cancelled (or that a decision to refuse to issue a passport has been 
made) will adversely affect the security of the nation or the 
investigation of a terrorism offence. New section 48A has been 
inserted to ensure that, in certain limited circumstances, a person 
does not need to be notified of the decision relating to that 
person‘s passport or passport application.397  
2.506 The councils for civil liberties across Australia opposed this amendment, 
noting: 
We have taken a consistent position of opposing the increasing use 
of devices allowing governments to withhold from citizens the 
bases of decisions depriving them of basic rights or of the evidence 
upon which accusation have been made against them.398 
2.507 The Law Council of Australia also expressed concern that a certificate 
issued by ASIO or the AFP recommending a person not be informed of the 
refusal or cancellation of a travel document is not subject to review.  The 
Law Council stated that: 
Without such a requirement it is likely that a person will receive 
subsequent refusals or cancellation of an Australian document 
despite there being a possible change in circumstances which 
warranted the initial making of the certificate; it is also likely that 
without such a requirement the person will continue to not receive 
notification of the refusal or cancellation.399  
Committee comment 
2.508 The Committee supports measures directly aimed at preventing persons 
traveling overseas to participate in conflicts. The Committee sees the 
reforms in this part as necessary and appropriate to the stated aims of the 
Bill.   
2.509 While noting concerns expressed by participants, the Committee supports 
the lower threshold and lack of review for the suspension of travel 
documents given the temporary nature of the power and the ability to 
review any permanent cancellation of a travel document.   
2.510 However, the Committee considers it is important that the power is only 
used in a temporary and proportionate way. Accordingly, the Committee 
 
397  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 83. 
398  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 18. 
399  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 28. 
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makes several recommendations to strengthen accountability in relation to 
these provisions. 
2.511 Firstly, in relation to the application, the Committee agrees with the IGIS 
that it is important that the state of mind necessary to found an 
application is the state of mind of a specific person—rather than an 
organisation as currently proposed. On this point, the Committee agrees 
with the statement made by the IGIS in evidence before the Committee: 
It does reduce accountability somewhat because the decision has 
to be based on a ‘suspicion on reasonable grounds’. If it is an 
individual having a suspicion on reasonable grounds, you can 
question the individual and identify the individual. If it is an 
agency making it, you would have to find the person who is 
actually responsible for the decision, but it is much more 
transparent to us if there is an individual who is enabled to make 
these decisions.400  
2.512 The Committee therefore recommends that the Bill be amended to require 
applications for passports to be suspended to be made by the Director-
General, or one of his deputies, rather than by ASIO as an organisation. 
 
Recommendation 26 
 The Committee recommends that proposed subsection 22A(2) of the 
Australian Passports Act 2005 and proposed section 15A of the Foreign 
Passports (Law Enforcement and Security) Act 2005 be amended so that 
the Director-General of ASIO or a Deputy Director-General must 
suspect on reasonable grounds the factors necessary to apply for the 
suspension of travel documents. 
2.513 Secondly, given the request to suspend a travel document can only be 
made by ASIO, the Committee sees value in ensuring that a decision to 
suspend a person’s travel document is not also made by an ASIO official, 
if the Foreign Minister decides to delegate that power. Further, given this 
decision is not subject to review, the Committee considers that only an 
appropriately senior person should be able make the decision. 
 
 
400  Dr Thom, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 2 October 2014, p. 4. 
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Recommendation 27 
 The Committee recommends the ability of the Foreign Affairs Minister 
to delegate the power to suspend a travel document be limited to the 
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
2.514 The Committee also supports the new power to prevent a person being 
notified of a decision to refuse or cancel their Australian travel documents. 
This power is premised on a certificate from either the Attorney-General 
or the Minister for Justice. However, the amendments as they stand do not 
contain any requirement to review these certificates, meaning a person 
may never be notified of the refusal or cancellation of their travel 
documents. The Committee considers the issuing of these certificates 
should be reviewed to avoid this consequence. 
 
Recommendation 28 
 The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014  be amended to require the 
Attorney-General or Minister for Justice to conduct: 
 a review of the decision to issue a certificate under paragraph 
38(2)(a) of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 
1979 or proposed subsection 48A(4) of the Australian Passports 
Act 2005 within 12 months of issuing that certificate; and 
 ongoing reviews every 12 months for the time period the 
certificate remains active. 
2.515 Finally, the Committee notes that the 14 day suspension period is 
substantially longer than the seven day period recommended by the 
INSLM.  However, the Committee considers that this timeframe 
appropriately balances the need to allow sufficient time for a full 
assessment to be made by ASIO (to inform whether cancellation of the 
travel documents should be requested) with the impacts on the individual, 
particularly noting the lower threshold that applies and lack of judicial 
review of such a decision.   
2.516 The Committee also notes comments made in relation to whether the Bill 
could more clearly outline whether or not a suspension can be extended, 
and if so, for how long. The Committee considers that the existing 
provisions appropriately protect against any extensions to a suspension 
given: 
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 there is no power to extend a suspension, and 
 further requests for suspensions are limited to where new information 
has been obtained by ASIO after the end of the suspension.  
2.517 The Committee notes on this basis that these provisions could not be 
misused to effectively suspend a person’s passport indefinitely without 
seeking cancellation of the passport. 
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 3 
Schedules 2 to 7 
Introduction 
3.1 This chapter addresses the main issues arising from Schedules 2 to 7 of the 
Bill, which contain provisions relating to: 
 stopping welfare payments (Schedule 2) 
 Customs’ detention powers (Schedule 3) 
 cancelling visas on security grounds (Schedule 4) 
 identifying persons in immigration clearance (Schedule 5) 
 identifying persons entering or leaving Australia through advance 
passenger processing (Schedule 6), and 
 seizing bogus documents (Schedule 7). 
3.2 As with its discussion of Schedule 1 in chapter 2, the Committee has 
focussed on those issues that were of most concern, informed by evidence 
from inquiry participants. 
Schedule 2 – Welfare payments 
3.3 Schedule 2 of the Bill amends a number of laws to provide for the 
cancellation of welfare payments for ‘individuals of security concern’.1 The 
Attorney-General stated in his second reading speech that these 
amendments ‘will ensure that the Government does not inadvertently 
 
1  Senator the Hon George Brandis QC, Attorney-General, Senate Hansard, 24 September 2014, 
p. 68. 
144  
 
support individuals engaged in conduct that is considered prejudicial to 
Australia’s national security’.2 
3.4 In its submission, the Law Council of Australia suggested that these 
measures respond to public outrage in July 2014 that Khaled Sharrouf, 
who was allegedly photographed executing Iraqi soldiers, received a 
disability support pension for several months.3 The Committee did not 
receive any other evidence to indicate how widespread this issue might 
be. 
Overview of proposed amendments 
3.5 Schedule 2 amends the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999, the 
Paid Parental Leave Act 2010, the Social Security (Administration) Act 1991, 
the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999, and the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.4 These amendments provide that 
welfare payments can be cancelled for individuals whose passports have 
been cancelled or refused, or whose visas have been refused, on national 
security grounds.  
3.6 The Explanatory Memorandum states:  
This is to ensure that the Government does not support 
individuals who are fighting or training with extremist groups. It 
is for the benefit of society’s general welfare that individuals 
engaged in these activities do not continue to receive welfare 
payments.5 
3.7 Currently, welfare payments can only be suspended or cancelled if the 
individual no longer meets social security eligibility rules, such as 
participation requirements, and residence (offshore longer than 6 weeks) 
or portability qualifications.6   
3.8 The new provisions will require the cancellation of a person’s welfare 
payment when the Attorney-General provides a security notice to the 
Minister for Social Services.7 The Attorney-General will have discretion to 
issue a security notice where either: 
 
2  Senator the Hon George Brandis QC, Attorney-General, Senate Hansard, 24 September 2014, 
p. 68. 
3  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 44. 
4  Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 [CTLA(FF) Bill], 
Explanatory Memorandum, p. 55.  
5  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 55. 
6  Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation, Submission 11, p. 10.   
7  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 55 
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 the Foreign Affairs Minister has notified the Attorney-General that the 
individual has had their application for a passport refused or had their 
passport cancelled on the basis that the individual would be likely to 
engage in conduct that might prejudice the security of Australia or a 
foreign country, or 
 the Immigration Minister has notified the Attorney-General that an 
individual has had their visa cancelled on security grounds.8 
3.9 The Foreign Affairs Minister and the Immigration Minister will have 
discretion as to whether to advise the Attorney-General of the passport or 
visa cancellation.9 
3.10 The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) advocated that 
the ‘discretionary aspect of the Attorney-General’s decision making 
process will enable the requirements of security to be considered on a case 
by case basis’.10 The Explanatory Memorandum states that, in making the 
decision to issue a security notice  
it would be appropriate for the Attorney General to have regard to 
relevant human rights considerations.  In particular, the discretion 
means the Attorney-General is able to consider the individual 
circumstances of each case, including the applicable security 
concerns, the effect of welfare cancellation on the individual 
(including the availability of other sources of income), and the 
purposes for which the welfare payments are used.11 
3.11 ASIO may also provide the Attorney-General with further information ‘to 
assist his consideration of welfare cancellation for an individual’.12 ASIO 
explained that its advice to the Attorney-General would address, for each 
case   
the extent of the nexus between the receipt of welfare payments 
and the assessed conduct of security concern. ASIO’s advice will 
also address the likely impact of welfare payment cancellation, 
given the individual’s particular circumstances and the security 
and operational environment, to support the case by case 
consideration and ensure the best overall security outcome is 
achieved.13 
 
8  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 55. 
9  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 55. 
10  Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation, Submission 11, p. 11. 
11  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 56. 
12  Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation, Submission 11, p. 11. 
13  Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation, Submission 11, p. 11.  
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3.12 The Bill as drafted does not require the Attorney-General to consider any 
criteria when exercising the discretion.  
3.13 In his second reading speech, the Attorney-General stated his expectation 
that this new power ‘will only be used in exceptional circumstances where 
welfare payments are assisting or supporting criminal activity’.14 The 
Explanatory Memorandum elaborated that: 
Welfare payments will only be cancelled in circumstances where 
the receipt of welfare payments was relevant to the assessed 
security risk posed by the individual...  It is not intended that 
every person whose passport or visa has been cancelled on 
security grounds would have their welfare payments cancelled, 
but would occur only in cases where it is appropriate or justified 
on the grounds of security.15 
3.14 Where the Attorney-General has issued a security notice against an 
individual to the Minister for Social Services, the Secretary of the 
Department for Social Services will be required to take reasonable steps to 
notify the affected individual of the cessation of welfare payments. The 
Explanatory Memorandum explains however that ‘in practice, notifying 
individuals who may be participating in overseas conflicts may not be 
possible’.16 
3.15 The Bill also provides that in specific cases where family assistance 
payments (for example, family tax benefits and the single income family 
supplement) have been cancelled as a result of the security notice, the 
Attorney-General can recommend the appointment of a nominee to 
receive that payment on the individual’s behalf.17 The whole or a part of 
any amount that would have been payable may instead be paid to a 
payment nominee under Part 8B of the Family Assistance Act.18 In 
determining the nominee to receive the payment, the Explanatory 
Memorandum notes: 
In practice it may be very difficult to contact the individual, 
especially if they are overseas fighting.  In these circumstances, the 
parent is unable to fulfil their responsibilities and duties as a 
parent.  Accordingly, the Secretary [of the Department of Social 
 
14  Senator the Hon George Brandis QC, Attorney-General, Senate Hansard, 24 September 2014, 
p. 65. 
15  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 55.  
16  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 56. 
17  See proposed section 57GI (4) of the Bill. 
18  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 57. 
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Services] would appoint a nominee so that the benefit could still 
be paid to assist the child.19 
3.16 The Committee notes however that these nominee arrangements are 
limited specifically to family assistance payments, and do not cover other 
payments captured under the Bill, including parental leave pay, dad and 
partner pay, or a social security payment.20   
3.17 A security notice issued by the Attorney-General comes into force on the 
day it is given to the Minister for Social Services and remains in force until 
it is revoked.21 Under the proposed amendments, the Attorney-General 
may revoke a security notice in writing.22 
Review and oversight under the proposed amendments  
3.18 Schedule 2 also amends the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 
1977 (ADJR Act) so that section 13 of the ADJR Act will not apply to 
decisions made in relation to welfare cancellations. This means that the 
decisions of the Foreign Affairs Minister, Immigration Minister and 
Attorney-General to issue notices will be reviewable under the ADJR Act 
but there will be no requirement to provide reasons for the decision.23  
3.19 The Explanatory Memorandum states that ‘this is because the decision to 
issue the notices will be based on security advice which may be highly 
classified and could include information that if disclosed to an applicant 
may put Australia’s security at risk’.24 
3.20 The IGIS advised that although the original security assessment from 
ASIO to the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the Minister for Immigration in 
relation to the travel documents or visa may be inspected by the IGIS, 
decisions of the Attorney-General to issue a security notice and cancel an 
individual’s welfare payments fall outside IGIS jurisdiction.25 
Stakeholder feedback 
3.21 A number of human rights organisations, welfare groups, academics and 
think tanks submitted concerns regarding the amendments contained in 
Schedule 2.26 For example, the Australian Human Rights Commission was 
 
19  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 57. 
20  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 18.  
21  For example, see proposed section 57GN of the Bill. 
22  For example, see proposed section 57GO of the Bill. 
23  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 56. 
24  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 56. 
25  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 1, p. 9. 
26  Professor Ben Saul, Submission 2, p. 2; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, pp. 
17-18; Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 45; Australian Lawyers Alliance, Submission 
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generally concerned that the ‘wide range of welfare payments that may be 
cancelled under the proposed provisions, will negatively affect the 
families of individuals, including children’.27  
3.22 The Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney) similarly submitted that:  
The consequences of cancelling a person’s income support 
payments may be severe [and] … the bar on receiving income 
support payments may be indefinite and may, in practice, be 
difficult if not impossible for a person to challenge.28  
3.23 The Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney) also questioned whether there were 
existing powers that could be used to respond to instances where welfare 
payments were funding terrorist activity.29  
3.24 In addition to more general concerns, inquiry participants raised concerns 
around the following specific issues, which are addressed below: 
 the Attorney General’s wide-ranging discretion to issue security notices 
without limitation 
 that the cancellation of welfare payments will continue indefinitely 
 the absence of reasons given to individuals subject to a security notice 
and the review mechanisms available to challenge that decision, and 
 the limitation on nominee arrangements to family assistance payments 
only. 
Attorney-General’s discretion to issue security notices 
3.25 As the Bill is currently drafted, the Attorney-General is not required to 
consider any criteria or supporting evidence when exercising the 
discretion to issue a security notice and cancel an individual’s welfare 
payments. A number of individuals and organisations recommended that 
the Bill be amended to require the Attorney-General’s decision to be made 
on reasonable grounds, after considering legislated criteria. 
3.26 For example, Professor Ben Saul advocated that the cancellation of welfare 
payments could ‘only be justified as necessary and proportionate where 
there is evidence that such payments are being used to contribute to 
terrorism’.30 Further, Professor Saul submitted:  
                                                                                                                                                    
15, p. 5; Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney), Submission 14, p. 2; Castan Centre for Human Rights 
Law, Submission 17, p. 7; councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 19; and 
Pirate Party Australia, Submission 32, p. 2. 
27  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, pp. 17-18.  
28  Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney), Submission 14, pp. 1-2. 
29  Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney), Submission 14, p. 2. 
30  Professor Ben Saul, Submission 2, p. 2.  
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Pre-emptive restriction in the absence of concrete evidence of 
abuse of welfare cannot be justified given the importance of social 
security to the survival of a person still present in Australia. Nor is 
it justifiable to withdraw payments to punish a person for their 
involvement with terrorism, where the payments have not been 
misused.31  
3.27 The Law Council of Australia also questioned the lack of specific criteria. 
Noting that it is not the Bill’s intent that every passport/visa 
cancellation/refusal will result in the issuing of a security notice, the Law 
Council expressed concerned that there is no limitation upon the 
discretion to do so.32 Accordingly, the Law Council recommended that the 
Attorney-General’s decisions should be made on ‘reasonable grounds’, 
having regard to key criteria including: 
 whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is or will 
be directly involved in activities which are prejudicial to security (based 
on ASIO’s security assessment), 
 whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person’s welfare 
payments are being or will be used to support these activities, 
 the necessity and likely effectiveness of cancelling welfare payments in 
addressing the prejudicial risk, having regard to the availability of 
alternative responses, and 
 the likelihood that the prejudicial risk of the person to security may be 
increased as a result of issuing the security notice.33 
3.28 Similarly, the Australian Human Rights Commission noted that, although 
it is a legitimate aim of the Government to seek to control the transfer of 
public monies to terrorist organisations: 
The intention of limiting the number of cases where welfare 
payments are cancelled is not incorporated into the substantive 
provisions of the Bill. Rather, the discretion of the Attorney-
General, the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Immigration 
Minister in giving notices is left undefined.34 
3.29 To address these concerns, the Australian Human Rights Commission 
recommended that the Attorney-General’s discretion to issue security 
notices be defined to ‘include a consideration that the “receipt of welfare 
payments was relevant to the assessed security risk posed by the 
 
31  Professor Ben Saul, Submission 2, p. 2.  
32  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 45. 
33  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, pp. 11-12. 
34  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 17.  
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individual”‘.35 In addition, the Commission recommended that the 
Attorney-General’s discretion include ‘a consideration of the effect of 
welfare cancellation on the individual, including any family members and 
children’.36 
3.30 The Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney) also recommended that Schedule 2 be 
amended to include ‘legislative restrictions on the circumstances when the 
Attorney-General may exercise this discretion’.37 
Cancellation of payments will continue indefinitely 
3.31 The Bill currently provides that the Attorney-General’s decision to issue a 
security notice and cancel welfare payments will operate indefinitely. 38 
The Law Council of Australia recommended that the Attorney-General 
should be required to regularly consider whether revocation of a security 
notice is warranted.39 
3.32 Similarly, the Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney) commented that the 
Explanatory Memorandum did ‘not explain why this matter should be left 
up to the unrestrained discretion of the Attorney-General or why there is 
no provision for periodic reassessment of these decisions’.40 
Reasons and review 
3.33 A number of inquiry participants expressed concern regarding the ability 
of affected individuals to access reasons for the Attorney-General’s 
decisions, and the ability of that decision to be reviewed.41  
3.34 For example, the Law Council of Australia expressed concerns regarding 
the review and reasons provisions in Schedule 2, commenting that the lack 
of reasons ‘may reduce the effectiveness of judicial review’.42 To address 
its concern, the Law Council recommended that ‘merits review should be 
available by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Security Division in 
respect of the Attorney-General’s decision to issue a security notice’.43 
Furthermore:  
 
35  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, pp. 17, 19.  
36  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, pp. 17, 19 
37  Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney), Submission 14, p. 2.  
38  For example, see proposed section 57GO of the Bill. 
39  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, pp. 12, 46. 
40  Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney), Submission 14, p. 2. 
41  Professor Ben Saul, Submission 2, p. 2; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, 
p. 18; Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 45; Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney), 
Submission 14, p. 3; councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 19; and Pirate 
Party Australia, Submission 32, p. 2.  
42  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 45. 
43  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, pp. 12, 46. 
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Consideration could also be given to ensuring that a minimum 
standard of disclosure of information must be given to the subject 
about the reasons for the allegations against him or her. This 
would be sufficient to enable effective instructions to be given in 
relation to those allegations.44 
3.35 Similarly, the Australian Human Rights Commission expressed concern 
regarding the current oversight mechanisms, commenting that ‘in practice, 
the ability to challenge [these] decisions… will be extremely limited’.45 The 
Commission considered that sufficient information should be provided to 
an individual ‘to understand the information … relied upon’. 46 In 
evidence, Professor Gillian Triggs suggested that 
where payments are being blocked, stopped, for the reason of 
suspecting terrorism, there should be some sort of monitoring 
through an advocacy or appeals process that would allow the 
family to argue that they need that payment for perfectly 
legitimate reasons…We are very worried that this will cut the 
entire family out because one member of the family—a brother, 
sister, father or mother—has engaged in these activities. Again, it 
brings us back to this point about discretion and oversight, and we 
have suggested that there be some form of appeal process to some 
form of advocate... We would like to see that in there so that we 
can catch those cases where perfectly innocent members of the 
family are going to be jeopardised.47 
3.36 In its submission, the Australian Human Rights Commission 
recommended the establishment of a ‘Special Advocate’ who would 
‘appear in judicial review proceedings where there is a national security 
reason to withhold part or all of the reasons from an individual’.48   
3.37 The Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney) supported the Commission’s 
recommendation for a Special Advocate as a mechanism to address its 
concerns regarding the current review mechanism.49 The Welfare Rights 
Centre (Sydney) considered the Bill as currently drafted limits the right to 
review, and commented that ‘this right may be practically ineffective 
given the possibility that evidence may be kept secret from the person on 
national security grounds’.50 Professor Ben Saul similarly noted that the 
 
44  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 46. 
45  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 18.  
46  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 18.  
47  Professor Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 15. 
48  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 19. 
49  Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney), Submission 14, p. 3. 
50  Welfare Rights Centre (Sydney), Submission 14, p. 3.  
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Bill’s current limitation on the right to review may be contrary to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.51  
Extending nominee arrangements for all affected welfare payments 
3.38 As discussed above, the Bill currently provides for the receipt of cancelled 
family assistance payments by a nominee. However, these arrangements 
do not extend to the full range of welfare payments which can be 
cancelled under the Bill. The Australian Human Rights Commission noted 
that the power to make family assistance payments to a nominee did not 
apply to ‘parental leave pay’, ‘dad and partner pay’ or a ‘social security 
payment’ despite these payments also potentially assisting an individual 
to provide for children.52 The Commission therefore recommended 
extending the power to make payments to a nominee in the event that the 
latter payments were cancelled.53 The Law Council of Australia similarly 
recommended that a payment nominee should be required to act in the 
best interests of a child or dependants.54 
Committee comment 
3.39 The Committee believes that cancelling welfare payments that are used to 
finance, sustain or assist terrorist activity both domestically and abroad is 
a reasonable proposition.  
3.40 The Committee is concerned that the Bill grants the Attorney-General 
unencumbered discretion to issue a security notice and cancel welfare 
payments. The Bill does not require the Attorney-General to give 
consideration to any specific matters when making this decision, nor does 
it require the decision to be made on reasonable grounds or evidence that 
public monies are being used to finance, sustain or assist terrorism.  
3.41 To address this concern, the Committee recommends that the proposed 
sections 56GJ, 278C, 38N of Schedule 2 (Part 1) of the Bill be amended to 
require the Attorney-General to make the decision to issue a security 
notice on reasonable grounds, having regard to: 
 whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is, or will 
be, directly involved in activities which are prejudicial to security (with 
consideration given to ASIO’s security assessment); and 
 the likely effect of the cancellation of welfare payments on any 
dependents.  
 
51  Professor Ben Saul, Submission 2, p. 2.  
52  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 18.  
53  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 19.  
54  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, pp. 12, 46. 
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3.42 The Committee notes the Australian Human Rights Commission’s 
recommendation that the nominee provisions of family assistance 
payments be extended to other welfare payments captured by the Bill. 
Responding to these concerns, the Attorney-General’s Department 
advised the Committee that  
except for the family assistance payments, the social security 
system is otherwise based on a scheme of individual entitlements, 
not dependency based payments, and it is therefore not normally 
necessary to provide for alternative payment arrangements.55 
3.43 Amending the Bill to require the Attorney-General to give due 
consideration to the likely effect of the cancellation of welfare payments 
on any dependents, as proposed above, would address the Committee’s 
concerns in this area.   
 
 Recommendation 29 
 The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended to require the 
Attorney-General to make a decision to issue a security notice ‘on 
reasonable grounds’, having regard to: 
 whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person 
is, or will be, directly involved in activities which are 
prejudicial to security (with consideration given to ASIO’s 
security assessment); and 
 the likely effect of the cancellation of welfare payments on any 
dependents and what alternative arrangements might apply. 
3.44 While noting that the Bill provides mechanisms for the Attorney-General 
to repeal a security notice and reinstate welfare payments to the affected 
individual, the Committee is concerned that the Bill could allow a security 
notice issued by the Attorney-General to continue indefinitely.  
3.45 The Committee is of the view that the Attorney-General should be 
required to conduct an initial review 12 months after issuing a security 
notice, and conduct ongoing reviews every 12 months for the time period 
the notice remains active. The Committee believes that this requirement 
will provide an appropriate balance to the Attorney-General’s wide-
ranging discretion granted in the Bill.  
 
55  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 37. 
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3.46 When reviewing these decisions, the Committee considers that the 
Attorney-General should have regard to any new evidence and security 
assessments in combination with the following criteria: 
 whether there remains reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
individual is, or will be, directly involved in activities which are 
prejudicial to security (with consideration given to ASIO’s security 
assessment) 
 whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the resumption of 
welfare payments will be used to support these activities 
 the necessity and likely effectiveness of the ongoing cancellation of 
welfare payments in addressing the prejudicial risk, having regard to 
the availability of alternative responses, and 
 submissions made by the affected individual and their family in 
regards to the ongoing cancellation of the payment. 
 
Recommendation 30 
 The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended to require the 
Attorney-General to conduct: 
 an initial review of the decision to issue a security notice 
within 12 months of making that decision; and 
 ongoing reviews every 12 months after for the time period the 
security notice remains active.  
3.47 Some stakeholders called for the establishment of a Special Advocate in 
relation to the proposed amendments contained in Schedule 2. The 
Committee notes that the INSLM examined whether special advocates 
would improve the fairness of the National Security Information (Criminal 
and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 in his Third Annual Report. The INSLM 
concluded that Australia should not pursue such a system, commenting 
that: 
The INSLM does not believe that a special advocate can provide 
the court with assistance to an extent that would remedy the fair 
trial issues that would arise where a defendant’s lawyer was 
excluded from the court during argument over whether 
potentially critical and exculpatory evidence should be adduced in 
a criminal proceeding.56 
 
56  Independent National Security Monitor, Third Annual Report, p. 152. 
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3.48 The Committee also notes the recent recommendation from COAG for a 
‘nationwide system of “special advocates”… [which] could allow each 
State and Territory to have a panel of security-cleared barristers and 
solicitors who may participate in closed material procedures whenever 
necessary’.57 The Committee notes that the Government is yet to respond 
formally to the COAG report, and observes that some of the 
recommendations made in that report are included in this Bill. The 
Committee will await the final response from the Government on the 
matter of special advocates. 
Schedule 3 – Customs detention powers 
3.49 Schedule 3 of the Bill proposes amendments to the Customs Act 1901 (the 
Customs Act) in regards to the powers of Customs officers to detain a 
person and to conduct a search of a person. 
3.50 The Explanatory Memorandum states that the amendments are to 
‘overcome vulnerabilities in the detention power of Customs’.58 
Specifically, the Explanatory Memorandum states that the amendments to 
Customs’ detention powers encompass: 
 extending ‘serious Commonwealth offence’ to any 
Commonwealth offence that is punishable upon conviction by 
imprisonment for a period of 12 months or more, 
 expanding the applicability of the detention powers to include 
where an officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
person is intending to commit a Commonwealth offence, 
 expanding the required timeframe by which an officer must 
inform the detainee of their right to have a family member or 
other person notified of their detention from 45 minutes to 4 
hours.59 
3.51 Schedule 3 also includes a proposed amendment to extend the power to 
conduct a search of a person ‘where it is to prevent the concealment, loss 
or destruction of information relating to a threat to national security’.60 
3.52 In explaining how these powers would enhance the national security 
capacity of Customs officers, the Australian Customs and Border 
Protection Service (Customs), commented that:   
 
57  COAG, Final Report of the COAG Review of Counter-terrorism legislation, March 2013, viewed 
10 October 2014, <http://www.coagctreview.gov.au/Report/Pages/default.aspx>, 
Recommendation 30, pp 59–60. 
58  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 8. 
59  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 57. 
60  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 58. 
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Customs officers, at points of ingress and egress into the country, 
intervene where there is intelligence or other assessments 
indicating that persons are carrying prohibited goods or goods 
that are subject to duty or excise. The powers we are seeking 
under this bill will extend the horizon of our officers in terms of 
aspects where there may be a threat to our national security or the 
security of a foreign country. The material we would be seeking to 
evidence that suspicion or that belief comprises things such as 
extremist material carried on digital devices, undeclared excess 
currency and things of that nature that would indicate to our 
officers that there is a suspicion or a belief that these persons are a 
threat to national security or are going to be engaged in some 
activity that relates to terrorism.61 
Serious Commonwealth offence 
3.53 The Attorney-General described the proposed expanded detention powers 
of Customs officers as measures to ‘ensure Australia’s borders remain safe 
and secure’ as the amendments aim to ‘prevent individuals from 
travelling outside of Australia where their intention is to commit acts of 
violence’ and prevent ‘these individuals from returning to Australia with 
greater capacity to carry out terrorist attacks on Australian soil’.62 
3.54 The Customs Act currently provides for the detention of a person if the 
customs officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person has 
committed or is committing a serious Commonwealth offence.63 The 
current definition of a ‘serious Commonwealth offence’ is an offence 
which involves particular conduct (including threats to national security, 
espionage, sabotage, violence, firearms, theft, forgery, money laundering, 
fraud, prohibited imports) and is punishable by at least three years’ 
imprisonment.64 
3.55 The Bill proposes a new definition of ‘serious Commonwealth offence’ as 
any Commonwealth offence which is punishable by at least one year’s 
imprisonment. Evidence to the inquiry focused on how this expanded 
definition may inappropriately go beyond the objectives of the Bill to 
strengthen counter-terrorism measures. 
 
61  Mr Roman Quaedvlieg, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
3 October 2014, p. 46. 
62  Senator the Hon George Brandis QC, Attorney-General, Senate Hansard, 24 September 2014, 
p. 65. 
63  Section 219ZJB of the Customs Act. 
64  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 23; Law Council of Australia, Submission 
12, p. 39. See also section 219ZJA, Customs Act 1901; section 15GE, Crimes Act 1914. 
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3.56 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law queried the rationale for the 
definitional change relating to offences from three years down to one year, 
noting that all of the terrorism offences are punishable by much higher 
penalties.65 Their submission stated that: 
It is not clear why this definition needs to be relaxed to cover 
offences of between 1 and 3 years’ imprisonment when all of the 
terrorism offences are punishable by much higher penalties 
(ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment). One possibility is 
that customs officers would be able to justify searches relating to 
the prevention of terrorism by demonstrating reasonable suspicion 
as to some more minor offence.66 
3.57 Refuting the suggestion that this expanded definition may be required for 
‘the prevention of terrorism by demonstrating reasonable suspicion as to 
some more minor offence’, Gilbert + Tobin argued that such a situation 
would be covered by the power for detention on national security grounds 
which is proposed in the Bill. They concluded that evidence has not been 
provided to justify the broadened definition of a serious Commonwealth 
offence.67 
3.58 Similarly Mr John Howell, lawyer for the Australian Human Rights 
Commission, raised concerns regarding the justification provided for the 
change and its application beyond suspected terrorist activities: 
The principal concern really is the lack of justification in the 
explanatory memorandum for changing the definition of a ‘serious 
Commonwealth offence’ … The real concern there is that the 
explanatory memorandum, the statement of compatibility, are all 
ostensibly addressed at combating terrorist type offences. The 
current definition of ‘serious Commonwealth offence’ relates to a 
number of different offences a Customs official can detain a person 
who is in the course of committing or has committed—one of a list 
of offences. All of those offences at the moment have to have a 
minimum term of imprisonment of three years … I suppose the 
real question is: has a justification for this change being given? It 
certainly would capture many, many things that are not terrorism 
related. All the important terrorism related offences have very 
significantly higher terms of imprisonment attached to them than 
 
65  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 23. Gilbert + Tobin noted that the 
exception to this is the offence of associating with members of a terrorist association which is 
punishable by three years imprisonment. However, even this offence would qualify under the 
existing definition of a serious Commonwealth offence.  
66  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 23. 
67  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 23. 
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the current minimum term given in the legislation pre-
amendment.68 
3.59 Consequently the Australian Human Rights Commission considered, in 
respect of this proposed definitional change, that the infringement on the 
rights to freedom from arbitrary detention and the freedom of movement 
had not been demonstrated to be necessary and proportionate to achieve a 
legitimate objective.69 
3.60 Reiterating these concerns regarding the expanded powers of Customs 
officers to detain in relation to a wider range of offences, the councils for 
civil liberties across Australia stated that: 
It is not clear to us how this general increase in the powers of 
customs officers, who are not subject to the same discipline as 
police, to detain people is connected with the general terrorism 
purposes of this legislation.70  
3.61 The Law Council of Australia indicated that ‘it is not clear why the 
definition of a “serious Commonwealth offence” is being redefined in a 
manner which is inconsistent with the Crimes Act’ and this proposal 
would appear to extend beyond the Bill’s counter-terrorism purpose. The 
Law Council noted that ‘[t]he potential effect of the proposed provision 
will be that Customs officers will be able to detain people for 
comparatively minor offences’ and went on to note that this may extend to 
detention by a Customs officer on suspicion that a person ‘is intending to 
commit a minor offence’.71 
3.62 In this context, the Law Council raised concerns that: 
The definition of ‘national security’ is very broad and would rest 
on Customs officers making judgments about whether a matter 
was a threat to Australia’s international relations, defence, law 
enforcement and security interests.72 
3.63 The Law Council questioned whether this amendment is necessary, and 
argued that a threat to national security or security of a foreign nation is 
likely to fall within the current definition of a ‘serious Commonwealth 
offence’. The Council summarised its position, stating that it 
is not persuaded that a different definition of a ‘serious 
Commonwealth offence’ for the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) applying 
other than that advanced by the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) is needed or 
 
68  Mr John Howell, Lawyer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 14.  
69  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 13. 
70  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 19. 
71  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, pp. 40-41. 
72  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 41. 
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justified and is concerned that lowering the threshold to offences 
punishable by only 1 year imprisonment may not be an effective 
counter-terrorism measure as terrorism offences are punishable by 
far higher penalties.73  
3.64 The submission from the Attorney-General’s Department described 
Schedule 3 as ‘addressing the shortcomings in the current powers of 
Customs’ officers under the Customs Act 1901 to detain persons of 
interest’.74 However no rationale is advanced for the expanded definition 
proposed and how this may address the suggested shortcomings in the 
current definition. 
Grounds for detention 
3.65 The Bill proposes amending the detention powers of Customs officers, in 
particular the threshold for the grounds for detention, the period of 
detention and the place of detention. 
3.66 Currently a Customs officer may detain a person where the officer ‘has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has committed, or is 
committing, a serious Commonwealth offence or a prescribed State or 
Territory offence’.75 Schedule 3 proposes extending the operation of these 
powers to ‘is committing or intends to commit’. 
3.67 The councils for civil liberties across Australia disagreed with the 
expanded grounds for detention by Customs, and argued that a person 
‘should not be detained on the basis of the amorphous opinion of an 
official of the state that they are a threat to the national security of 
somebody’.76 
3.68 Professor Triggs, President of the Australian Human Rights Commission, 
cautioned that the word ‘intends’ would allow a Customs officer to detain 
a person when 
no steps have been taken toward the commission of the offence. 
This is a very, very extreme basis on which detention can take 
place. … We have very low level threshold of merely suspecting, 
and you are suspecting something which is in the mind of 
somebody but without outside objective acts and steps taken 
towards the commission of it. All I am saying is that by going that 
far, lowering the threshold to the extent that you have, means that 
 
73  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 10.  
74  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 8, p. 6. 
75  Section 219ZJB(1)(b) of the Customs Act  
76  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 25, p. 19. 
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one has to be more cautious than ever about the level of 
safeguards.77 
3.69 While acknowledging that preventative detention may be justified in the 
situation of an intention to commit an act of terrorism, the Australian 
Human Rights Commission expressed concern at the scope of the powers, 
especially given the proposed change in the ‘serious Commonwealth 
offence definition’:   
However the amendment as proposed by the Bill would allow 
detention where a customs official reasonably suspects that a 
person intends to commit any of a large number of comparatively 
minor non-terrorism-related offences. 
The Commission considers that this goes considerably beyond 
what is justified to protect national security or other human 
rights.78 
3.70 Similarly, the Australian Lawyers Alliance suggested that the shift to 
‘intend to commit’ and ‘reasonable suspicion’ as the basis on which 
Customs officers may detain a person ‘significantly widens the powers of 
an officer to detain a person’.79 
3.71 The Law Council of Australia described the shift in threshold grounds for 
detention as ‘extraordinary’ and argued they must be ‘properly justified’.80 
3.72 In the supplementary submission provided by the Attorney-General’s 
Department, it was argued that: 
In exercising these powers, the current thresholds whereby an 
officer of Customs can detain a person if the officer has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the person has committed or is committing 
a serious Commonwealth offence may result in situations where 
despite information received from partner agencies or the 
behaviour or documentation presented by the passenger, 
detention may not be possible. This is why the operation of section 
219ZJB is proposed to be amended to include where an officer has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is intending to 
commit a serious Commonwealth offence.81 
 
77  Professor Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 14.  
78  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 13.  
79  Australian Lawyers Alliance, Submission 13, p. 7. 
80  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 41. 
81  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 8.1, p. 18.  
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Period of detention 
3.73 Currently the Customs Act provides that if a person is detained for a 
period greater than 45 minutes, then the person has the right to have a 
family member or another person notified. The period before notification 
was referred to as ‘detention incommunicado’ by some submitters. The 
Bill proposes extending this allowable timeframe of detention 
incommunicado from 45 minutes to four hours. 
3.74 Under the current Act a Customs officer has the discretion to 
refuse to notify a family member or other person if the officer 
believes on reasonable grounds that the notification should not be 
made to safeguard law enforcement or to protect the life and 
safety of another person.82 
3.75 The Bill proposes expanding the scope of a Customs officer’s discretion to 
include ‘safeguarding national security or the security of a foreign 
country’ as additional circumstances that an officer may take into account 
when determining if notification of detention is made to a family member 
or other person. 
3.76 In explanation of the change in time limit from 45 minutes to four hours, 
the Explanatory Memorandum states that 
it is considered that there may also be vulnerabilities with regard 
to the time and opportunity for the officer of Customs to 
undertake sufficient enquiries once a person has been detained, 
especially in order to determine whether notification to a family 
member or other person should or should not be made.83 
3.77 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law recommended against extending 
the current time limit of 45 minutes, noting that an officer has 
discretionary powers to deny contact and that the Bill proposes expanding 
these grounds to include national security.84 
3.78 Similarly, given the seriousness of detention incommunicado, the 
Australian Human Rights Commission did not consider that the 
amendment had ‘been shown to be necessary and proportionate to a 
legitimate purpose’.85 The Australian Lawyers Alliance also voiced 
concern at the extended timeframe proposed.86 The Australian National 
 
82  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p.183. 
83  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 183. 
84  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, pp. 23-24. 
85  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 13. 
86  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 13. 
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Imams Council noted that this proposal ‘considerably widens current 
provisions’ where Customs can detain a person.87 
3.79 A submission from the Islamic Council of Queensland, Council of Imams 
Queensland, Queensland Association of Independent Legal Services, and 
818 individual signatories questioned the need for such a substantial 
increase in the allowable period of detention. Their submission stated: 
We recommend a reduction in the detention powers offered to 
Customs from 4 hours to 90 minutes. This is double the current 
allowance and is far more reasonable than the sixfold increase 
proposed.88 
3.80 The Law Council of Australia acknowledged the requirement for an 
appropriate period for Customs officers to undertake inquiries once a 
person is detained, especially where the matter relates to security issues 
and may trigger a visa suspension or other action. However the Law 
Council questioned whether four hours of detention incommunicado is ‘a 
reasonable restriction as claimed in the Explanatory Memorandum’.89 
Detainee made available to a police officer 
3.81 The Law Council of Australia raises concerns regarding the consequences 
of wording changes requiring Customs to ensure that a person is 
‘delivered, as soon as practicable, into the custody of a police officer’ to the 
proposed wording that a person is ‘made available, as soon as practicable 
to a police officer’. 
3.82 The Explanatory Memorandum states that ‘this amendment reflects 
current practice whereby the person is made available to a police officer 
from Customs detention’.90 
3.83 Given the strictly temporary nature of the Customs detention power, the 
Law Council noted concern if this change was interpreted as ‘simply 
letting a police officer know that a person is being detained and asking if 
the police intend to respond’.91 The Law Council questioned the purpose 
of the amendment and suggested that if the intention 
is to allow a situation in which the police collect the individual, 
rather than Customs taking him or her to the nearest police 
station, then a different amendment could be included which 
 
87  Australian National Imams Council, Submission 35, p. 3. 
88  Islamic Council of Queensland, Council of Imams Queensland, Queensland Association of 
Independent Legal Services, and 818 individual signatories, Submission 30, p. 3. 
89  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 41. 
90  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 182. 
91  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 42. 
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clarifies that as well as delivery, the police may collect the 
individual from Customs.92 
Oversight 
3.84 Alongside the proposed expansion in Customs detention powers, new 
administrative arrangements are intended to reflect the changed roles of 
officers controlling Australia’s borders. From 1 July 2015 the Department 
of Immigration and Border Protection and the Australian Customs and 
Border Protection Service will be consolidated into a single Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection. At this time the Australian Border 
Force, a single frontline operational border agency, will be established 
within the department. In relation to these changes, Mr Chris Dawson, 
Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Crime Commission, commented 
that 
we know that the border force, for instance, is a new entity that is 
going to come up out of the ground and emerge in immigration 
and the traditional Customs type of inspection. That of itself 
requires not only the legislative change but also both cultural and 
departmental change and that operational engagement to make 
sure that there are no cultural impediments.93 
3.85 The use and operation of detention powers by Customs officers falls 
within the oversight of the Ombudsman who may investigate following a 
complaint or initiate an own motion investigation. However there is no 
current requirement for Customs to report to the Ombudsman on the 
frequency of use of the Customs’ detention powers. 
3.86 With the proposed expanded grounds for detention, the lowering of the 
threshold of suspicion, and the increase in the allowable period of 
detention without contact, additional oversight was raised by some 
witnesses as an issue. The Law Council of Australia recommended 
a positive obligation being placed on Customs to report to the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman on when a person has been detained 
under section 219 ZJB of the Customs Act, whether, and at what 
period during the detention, the officer informed the person that 
he or she is allowed to notify a family member that they are being 
detained, and the result of the detention, including whether the 
matter was referred to a law enforcement officer.94  
 
92  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 42. 
93  Mr Chris Dawson, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Crime Commission, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 8 October 2014, pp. 23–24. 
94  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 42. 
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Committee comment 
3.87 The Committee acknowledges that the threat of Australians leaving to 
fight overseas, and returning to Australia with potentially violent 
intentions brings a change to the role of Customs officers and those 
controlling our borders. Customs officers may be called on to make rapid 
decisions relating to national security threats and to act on reasonable 
suspicions they may have as to a person’s intent. It is appropriate that the 
changing role of Customs officers at our borders be supported by 
amendments to their enabling legislation, as provided for in this Bill. 
3.88 The Committee notes concerns relating to the expanded definition of 
‘serious Commonwealth offence’. The proposed definition substantially 
extends the powers of Customs officers to detain a person for more minor 
offences which may not be related to suspicion of a terrorism activity. 
3.89 The expanded power to detain is intended to allow Customs officers to 
better assist law enforcement agencies in relation to the detection and 
investigation of serious Commonwealth offences.  However, the 
Committee is not satisfied that expanding the definition as proposed is 
justified on these grounds.  The amendment would capture a range of a 
suspected criminal activity which would seemingly have little connection 
to terrorism activity.   
3.90 Every other proposal contained in this Bill is designed to counter threats 
to national security or terrorist activity.  There has been no evidence before 
the Committee which demonstrates how the proposal fits within these 
purposes.  There has also been no evidence which demonstrates why 
offences which carry a minimum 12-month imprisonment penalty are an 
appropriate trigger for the existing detention powers. 
3.91 Accordingly, the Committee is not convinced that the new definition is 
necessary in a counter-terrorism legislative framework.  Consequently, the 
Committee does not support the measure, unless the Attorney-General is 
able to provide to the Parliament further explanation on its necessity and 
how it would enable a greater role for Customs in dealing with threats to 
national security or terrorist activity.   
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Recommendation 31 
 Unless the Attorney-General is able to provide to the Parliament further 
explanation on the necessity of the proposed definition of ‘serious 
Commonwealth offence’ for the purposes of the Customs Act 1901 and 
how it would enable a greater role for Customs in dealing with national 
security threats or terrorist activity, the Committee recommends that the 
definition be removed from the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014.  
3.92 Further, neither the Explanatory Memorandum nor other evidence to this 
inquiry has provided a clear explanation as to why the extended period of 
four hours detention is required without contacting a detainee’s family 
member or another person. The Committee accepts the need for Customs 
officers to have the powers to detain persons in certain circumstances. The 
Committee supports the inclusion of national security as additional 
grounds for refusing contact during a period of detention. The Committee 
accepts that the current 45 minute allowable detention period without 
notification to family or friends may not be sufficient for adequate checks 
to be conducted. 
3.93 However, the Committee has seen no explanation as to why the current 45 
minute period should be so substantially increased, and why an 
intermediate time is not sufficient. Detention incommunicado is a serious 
infringement of a person’s fundamental rights, and would be exercisable 
by an officer in circumstances where there is only a suspicion of intent. 
3.94 Accordingly the Committee considers that the scope of this power must be 
balanced by a shorter permissible period of detention incommunicado 
than that proposed in the Bill. The Committee suggests a two hour period 
is more appropriate in balancing the seriousness of a national security 
threat with an individual's rights. Beyond this time a Customs officer may 
still exercise the power to refuse contact if it is considered that notification 
should not be made to safeguard law enforcement processes, the life and 
safety of another person, or the new circumstances to safeguard national 
security or the security of a foreign country. 
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Recommendation 32 
 The Committee recommends that the allowable period of detention by a 
Customs officer without notification to a family member or other person 
be extended from 45 minutes to two hours, rather than four hours as 
proposed in the Bill. 
The Committee notes that this does not deny a Customs officer’s power 
to refuse contact beyond this period on grounds of national security, 
security of a foreign country, safeguarding law enforcement processes or 
to protect the life and safety of another person. 
3.95 Alongside the increased responsibilities and the expanded powers 
proposed in this Bill must come greater training, oversight and 
accountability for Customs officers working in frontline positions at 
Australia’s borders. 
3.96 In particular, the Ombudsman will assume greater oversight and the 
Committee encourages the Ombudsman to oversee training procedures 
for Customs officers that equip them in the reasoned exercise of these 
powers as required. Regarding the use of Customs detention powers, the 
Committee recommends that instances of detention and the length of 
detention form part of regular reporting to the Ombudsman, including 
information as to whether a person is then made available to a police 
officer. 
3.97 Moreover, where a Customs officer exercises their power to refuse a 
person contact with a family member or other person, the Committee 
believes that notice of this action should be provided to the Ombudsman 
within seven days. 
3.98 In regards to the change in wording requiring a Customs officer to ‘make 
available to a police officer’ a detainee, rather than ‘deliver to police 
officer’, the Committee considers it worthwhile to clarify in the 
Explanatory Memorandum the intent of the wording change. 
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Recommendation 33 
 The Committee recommends that information on the frequency of the 
use of Customs detention powers is included in the Department’s 
annual report. Further where a Customs officer exercises the power to 
refuse contact with a family member or other person on the grounds of 
national security, security of a foreign country, safeguarding law 
enforcement processes or to protect the life and safety of another person, 
then notice of this should be provided to the Ombudsman within seven 
days. 
Schedule 4 – Cancelling visas on security grounds 
3.99 Schedule 4 of the Bill will amend the Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act) to 
enable a visa to be cancelled on security grounds.   
3.100 The amendment in the Bill is designed to address a gap in the existing 
regime whereby temporary action may need to be taken to mitigate a 
security risk.  Specifically, the Explanatory Memorandum outlines that: 
it will be both desirable and necessary that a visa be cancelled on 
the basis of the nature and extent of the security risk that a person 
might pose, as temporary mitigating action to permit further 
investigation and evaluation of the individual.95 
3.101 This provision adds to the range of tools currently available to manage the 
risks a non-citizen may pose, including: 
where ASIO makes an assessment that a permanent visa holder is 
a direct or indirect risk to national security, existing section 501 of 
the Migration Act provides the capacity for a permanent visa 
holder in Australia to be considered for visa cancellation. Further, 
section 116 of the Migration Act provides for the cancellation of a 
temporary visa onshore, and a temporary or permanent visa offshore 
on the grounds that the visa holder has been assessed as posing a 
direct or indirect risk to the Australian community (within the 
meaning of the ASIO Act).96 
3.102 Justifying the nature of the amendment, ASIO outlined in its submission 
that it considered: 
 
95  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 61. 
96  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 60–61. 
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This amendment provides an appropriate and proportionate 
mechanism to respond to potential security threats posed by non-
citizens intending to travel to Australia where there is insufficient 
time for ASIO to assess new information that the person is directly 
or indirectly a risk to security.97 
3.103 The Law Council of Australia, while accepting the need for the 
amendments, expressed concern with aspects of the amendments, 
including: 
Cancellation under the proposed provision will be mandatory, 
will be without notice or notification, not required to adhere to the 
principles of natural justice5 and will not be merits reviewable. 
These features of the proposal challenge rule of law principles, 
which require the use of Executive power to be subject to 
independent oversight and used in a way that respects procedural 
fairness, including the right of a person to be notified of a decision 
that impacts directly on his or her most basic individual rights.98  
Criteria and process for cancelling visa 
3.104 The Bill will require the Minister for Immigration to cancel a visa held by a 
person if an assessment provided by ASIO contains: 
 advice that ASIO suspects that the person might be, directly or 
indirectly, a risk to security (within the meaning of section 4 of the 
ASIO Act), and 
 a recommendation that all visas held by the person be cancelled.99 
Mandatory requirement 
3.105 In relation to the Minister being required to cancel the visa on the advice of 
ASIO, the Australian Human Rights Commission, on the basis of the effect 
of such a cancellation, called for the decision to cancel the visa to be 
discretionary rather than mandatory. The Commission noted that this 
would allow the Minister to consider the potential consequences of such a 
cancellation, including human rights ramifications.100 
3.106 The Law Council of Australia similarly advocated that the Bill 
 
97  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission 11, p. 10  
98  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 30 
99  Proposed section 134B of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
100  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 15 
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ensure that the emergency cancellation power is discretionary not 
mandatory, permitting the decision maker to have regard to the 
circumstances of the case.101 
3.107 In response to concerns about the mandatory nature of the cancellation 
power, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection stated 
mandatory cancellation is appropriate in this context, given that 
the purpose of the emergency cancellation proposal is to enable a 
response to the perceived imminent security threat.102 
3.108 Additionally, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill outlines that the 
Minister is already required to cancel a visa as a consequence of an ASIO 
assessment that a person is a risk to security. 
Under the existing provisions, the consequence of an ASIO 
assessment of ‘is a risk to security‘, for a visa holder who is outside 
Australia, is that the Minister must cancel the visa. Cancellation is 
mandatory for both temporary and permanent visas. For example, 
a permanent visa holder may have resided in Australia for several 
years. If that person departs Australia and, as a consequence of the 
person‘s activities overseas, is assessed by ASIO to be a risk to 
security, the visa must be cancelled. The visa can be cancelled with 
notice (under section 116) or without notice (under section 128).103  
 
Threshold test 
3.109 The threshold for the emergency cancellation of a visa is lower than that 
for a permanent cancellation (might be a direct or indirect risk to security 
compared with is a direct or indirect risk to security). 
3.110 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law expressed concern in relation to 
the threshold level that ASIO only needs to suspect the person might be a 
direct or indirect risk to security. Gilbert + Tobin went on to argue that: 
This sets a very low threshold, and could be said of large numbers 
of people returning from foreign countries. Given that the power 
would cause significant disruption and inconvenience to 
individuals who are later shown not to pose any risk to security, 
we believe that a higher standard for imposing the initial 
cancellation would be appropriate to sensibly confine the power. 
 
101  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 31 
102  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 19. 
103   CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 187.  This requirement is contained in sections 116 
and 128 of the Migration Act 1958 and paragraphs 2.43(1)(b) and 2.43(2) of the Migration 
Regulations 1994. 
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The legislation should require that ASIO suspects on reasonable 
grounds that a person might be a direct or indirect risk to security. 
This threshold would be consistent with the proposed power to 
temporarily suspend passports and travel documents.104 
3.111 This position was supported by the Australian Human Rights 
Commission.105 
3.112 In response, ASIO advised that 
it is their view that it is implicit that this assessment must be based 
on reasonable grounds, and ASIO will apply this standard when 
preparing a security assessment for the purposes of the emergency 
visa cancellation provisions.106 
Timeframes for initial and permanent cancellation 
3.113 The emergency cancellation will only apply for 28 days.  This is designed 
to ‘enable ASIO additional time to further consider the security risk posed 
by that individual.’107  In the Attorney-General’s Department 
supplementary submission, ASIO provided an example to further justify 
the need for this amendment: 
There may be circumstances where ASIO obtains intelligence in 
respect of a person who is planning to travel to Australia 
imminently, that indicates the person presents as a security risk. In 
such circumstances ASIO may be unable to meaningfully assess 
the extent and nature of the security risk and conduct a security 
assessment investigation prior to the person’s travel.108 
3.114 The amendment also defines the process that is to occur during and at the 
end of the 28 days to ensure due regard is given to whether the 
cancellation will be made permanent or not.  Specifically, the cancellation 
will: 
 be revoked if: 
 ASIO recommends the cancellation of the visa be revoked, and 
 a security assessment is not furnished by ASIO within the 28 days 
that recommends against revocation having assessed that the person 
is, directly or indirectly, a risk to security  
 
104  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 22. 
105  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 15. 
106  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 19. 
107  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 61. 
108  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, pp. 18-19. 
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 not be revoked (made permanent) if within the 28 days ASIO provide 
an assessment recommending the cancellation not be revoked on the 
basis that person is, directly or indirectly, a risk to security.109 
3.115 The amendments require the person to be notified where a decision is 
made to not revoke the cancellation (the point at which the cancellation is 
permanent).  However, this notification is not required in circumstances 
where ASIO have advised that a notice not be given due to the security of 
the nation. 
3.116 The IGIS observed in her submission that the provisions are silent on 
whether multiple, consecutive cancellations are possible. 110  On this point, 
the Explanatory Memorandum noted: 
There is no provision for ASIO to seek an extension of the 28 day 
period in circumstances where additional time is required to 
conclude an assessment. ASIO can, however, issue a further 
assessment under section 134B, which would require the 
reinstated visa to again be cancelled. This would restart the 28 day 
period. While it is not intended to unreasonably fetter ASIO in the 
task of assessing security risks, it is also not intended that this 
mechanism would be used in serial fashion to continue extending 
the period within which ASIO must form an opinion about 
whether a person is a risk to security. The operation of the 
emergency cancellation power will be monitored and reviewed 
within the established framework of accountability measures 
applying to ASIO. 
3.117 The IGIS also noted: 
Temporary cancellation requests are not subject to AAT review 
and such requests, particularly any cases of multiple requests, will 
be subject to IGIS scrutiny.111 
Consequential cancellation of visas 
3.118 The amendments will, in circumstances where a person’s visa has been 
permanently cancelled, provide the Minister with the discretion to cancel 
visas held by any other person solely because the first person held a visa. 
3.119 The Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law expressed concern with this 
element of the amendments, specifically drawing the Committee’s 
attention to the effect it could have: 
 
109  Proposed section 134C of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
110  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 1, pp. 8-9. 
111  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 1, p. 9. 
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Where those family members are in Australia, they would be 
exposed to immediate detention and/or deportation. If this power 
is to be included in the legislation, it should at least require that 
notice be given for these consequential cancellations.112 
3.120 On this point, the Australian Human Rights Commission welcomed that 
the Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights states that [a 
number of human rights] will be taken into account by the 
government’s policies and administrative decision making 
processes.113 
3.121 The Law Council of Australia however sought to 
enshrine in legislation the policy principles outlined in the 
Explanatory Memorandum that are intended to apply to 
consequential visa cancellations, such as those that seek to 
implement some of Australia's relevant obligations under the 
CROC.114  
3.122 While the amendments outline that this cancellation may be without 
notice, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) 
provided advice that: 
In response to concerns raised regarding the notification of 
consequential cancellations, DIBP has advised that for visas 
cancelled consequentially it is intended that former visa holders 
will be notified of the cancellation of their visa, the grounds on 
which their visa was cancelled and the effect of that visa 
cancellation on their status, including review rights, if available.115 
Committee comment 
3.123 As is the case for the temporary suspension of Australian and foreign 
travel documents (as provided for in Schedule 1 to the Bill), the 
Committee supports measures directly aimed at preventing persons who 
constitute a security risk from traveling to Australia. The Committee sees 
the reforms in this schedule as necessary and appropriate to the stated 
aims of the Bill.  
3.124 The Committee notes comments about the mandatory nature of the 
requirement to cancel a visa on advice from ASIO which does not provide 
the Minister with any discretion. While there were differing views in the 
 
112  Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Submission 3, p. 22. 
113  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 7, p. 16. 
114  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 31. 
115  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 19. 
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Committee on the appropriateness of the Bill directing a Minister in such a 
way, the Committee notes the policy rationale behind this approach.  
Firstly, the approach is consistent with the existing mandatory 
requirement for the Minister to cancel a visa where the holder of the visa 
has been assessed by the ASIO to be directly or indirectly a risk to 
security.116 Secondly, given the nature of the advice, the Committee 
considers it appropriate that security is the only consideration and that 
other factors should not be relevant to the Minister’s decision.  
3.125 The Committee also notes the thresholds provided for in the legislation, 
noting that the lower threshold only applies for what operates as a 
temporary cancellation. Cancellation can then only be made permanent if 
the higher threshold is met. 
3.126 In response to concerns that the provisions may enable rolling 
cancellations of a person’s visa (on a lower threshold) without requiring a 
permanent cancellation (on the higher threshold), the Committee notes 
that ASIO does not intend to use the provisions in a serial fashion.  It is 
also satisfied that the existing oversight mechanisms ensure there is 
sufficient oversight of ASIO’s use of these provisions. 
3.127 Finally, the Committee considers that the powers enabling the Minister to 
cancel other visas that were issued on the basis of the visa that has been 
cancelled are appropriate. This approach is also consistent with existing 
provisions in the Migration Act. The Committee considers that the 
discretionary nature of this power will enable the Minister in these 
circumstances to have due regard to all the appropriate factors as outlined 
in the Explanatory Memorandum. 
Schedule 5 – Identifying persons in immigration 
clearance 
3.128 The amendments contained in Schedule 5 will amend the Migration Act to 
enable an ‘authorised system’117 such as SmartGate or eGates, to perform 
‘accurate biometric identification of all persons entering and departing 
Australia’.118 The Explanatory Memorandum argues that: 
 
116   See sections 116 and 128 of the Migration Act 1958 and paragraphs 2.43(1)(b) and 2.43(2) of the 
Migration Regulations 1994. 
117  Automated Border Clearance systems (SmartGate and eGates) are ‘authorised systems’ to 
perform the immigration clearance function for arriving passengers, and border processing for 
departing passengers. The authorised system confirms the identity of a traveller by 
biometrically comparing the photograph contained in the passport to a live image of the 
traveller’s face and conducts visa and alert checks. 
118  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 66. 
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The ability to accurately collect, store and disclose biometric 
identification of all persons increases the integrity of identity, 
security and immigration checks of people entering and departing 
Australia.119 
3.129 Currently, for both arrivals and departures, the Migration Act only allows 
an ‘authorised officer’ (not an ‘authorised system’) to obtain personal 
identifiers from non-citizens by way of an identification test under section 
166, 170 and 175 of the Migration Act.120 Amendments to sections 166, 170 
and 175 of the Migration Act will authorise a ‘clearance authority’ (defined 
as an officer or a system) to collect and retain personal identifiers 
(specifically a photograph of the person’s face and shoulders) of citizens 
and non-citizens who enter or depart Australia. 
3.130 The proposed amendments would mean that when the traveller presents 
their travel document to the authorised system, the system will be able to 
determine whether the traveller is the same person to whom the travel 
document (such as a passport) was issued and whether the document 
satisfies the test as being a genuinely issued document.121 
3.131 The Attorney-General’s Department advised the Committee that while the 
numbers of travellers departing Australia will vary each year, in the 2013-
14 financial year there were a total of 8.08 million departures by travellers 
on Australian travel documents.122 
3.132 At a public hearing, Mr Stephen Allen, First Assistant Secretary, Border, 
Refugee and Onshore Services Division, DIBP, stated: 
This is an extension of what is already happening for inwards 
processing, where we are gradually phasing out the manual face-
to-passport check and replacing it with the automated or biometric 
check. That is being done on the basis that it is both more efficient 
in terms of processing time and also more effective, in that the 
biometric check is very much more accurate than a manual face-to-
passport check by an officer.123 
3.133 The amendments would allow these systems of ‘verifying an image which 
is already stored by the Australian government’.124 The image capture at 
 
119  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 65. 
120  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 65. 
121  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 66. 
122  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 8.1, pp. 20-21. 
123  Mr Stephen Allen, First Assistant Secretary, Border, Refugee, Onshore and Services Division, 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 44. 
124  Mr Allen, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 44. 
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the immigration clearance point will be stored on a secure DIBP 
database.125 
Disclosure for specified purposes 
3.134 The amendments will also permit the disclosure of that information for 
specified purposes.126 The Attorney-General’s Department submitted that 
the Migration Act already contains a number of specified purposes for 
which this information will be collected and used by the DIBP and 
Customs.127 The Department further submitted: 
Amendments will be made to these sections to ensure that it is 
permissible to disclose identifying information in order to identify, 
or authenticate the identity of persons (including Australian 
citizens) who may be a security concern to Australia or a foreign 
country.128   
3.135 Commenting on the safeguards surrounding disclosure, Mr Stephen Allen 
of DIBP argued that the ‘protections lie in the reasons for the exchange [of 
sensitive personal information]. It is not so much in the organisations it 
can be shared with; it is the reasons for the exchange—not for any general 
purpose’.129 Mr Allen further explained: 
The safeguards exist in the requirement for any sharing to be done 
for specified purposes, but there are also those safeguards around 
the protection of the database itself, so that it can only be accessed 
by authorised users of the database and it is protected from 
external intrusion… I can understand that in general people are 
concerned when the government stores personal information of 
any kind. The safeguards behind this are designed to ensure that 
people are first of all informed up front of why this information is 
being collected and secondly assured of the circumstances under 
which it will be shared, and those circumstances are required 
circumstances rather than general circumstances. So, it is intended 
to be shared only for purposes of national security or serious 
similar concerns. And, as I said, the actual safeguards around the 
security of the information itself are designed to provide further 
assurances.130 
 
125  Mr Allen, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 44. 
126  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 65-66. 
127  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 19. See also section 5A(3), 
Migration Act 1958. 
128  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 20.  
129  Mr Allen, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 45. 
130  Mr Allen, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 45. 
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3.136 The Attorney-General’s Department outlined the safeguards that are in 
place: 
 An offence will be committed for non-permitted disclosure of the 
personal information covered by the amendments, which carries a two 
year imprisonment term, as well as a financial penalty in certain 
circumstances. 
 Customs officers are currently required to comply with the Privacy Act 
1988 and the Australian Privacy Principles contained within. 
 All personal information collected via SmartGate or eGates (including 
photographs) will be treated in the same way as information that is 
collected manually. 
 SmartGate or eGates will also comply with the Privacy Act 1988, 
specifically Australian Privacy Principle 5 which requires persons to be 
notified of a number of matters before personal information is collected. 
Travellers will be notified through signs, information sheets and 
information on DIBP and Customs websites. 
 Captured images will be stored on a DIBP server under the controls and 
certification processes of the Australian Signals Directorate. 
 Images will only be available to authorised officers with regular audits 
undertaken to ensure that only authorised officers maintain access. 
 All images will be kept in accordance with the Archives Act 1983 and 
‘utilised for the purposes of biometric algorithm improvements and 
improved passenger facilitation’.131  
Additional biometric data to be prescribed in regulations at a later date 
3.137 The amendments will also allow additional biometric data (such as 
fingerprints and iris scans) to be prescribed in the Migration Regulations 
1994 at a later date.132 The Explanatory Memorandum explains that the 
DIBP 
does not intend to make new regulations in relation to this 
provision at this time as automated border clearance systems only 
need to collect a person’s photograph of their face and shoulders 
to confirm their identity. Should the need arise, and technology 
improve, other personal identifiers such as a persons’ fingerprints 
or iris scan may be prescribed in the Migration Regulations.133  
 
131  Attorney-General’s Department, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 21.  
132  See Clause 166(1)(d)(ii) and 170(1)(d)(ii) of the Bill; CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 
66; Mr Allen, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 44. 
133  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 66. 
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Schedule 6 – Advance passenger processing 
3.138 Schedule 6 of the Bill amends the Migration Act to extend Advance 
Passenger Processing (APP) arrangements to departing air and maritime 
travellers.134 These amendments extend current APP arrangements which 
require airlines to provide passenger data for all travellers arriving in 
Australia.135 
3.139 The Explanatory Memorandum explains the intention of the APP system 
is to ‘prevent entry to Australia of any identified high-risk travellers’.136 
Further, the intention is to overcome the 
current situation of the DIBP and Customs being only aware that a 
person is intending to depart Australia when the traveller arrives 
at the outward immigration processing point. This is particularly 
problematic when a traveller only presents for check-in or 
boarding at the airport or seaport a short time before their flight or 
maritime vessel departs, and DIBP and Customs do not have 
sufficient time to respond or address any potential alerts or threats 
in relation to that traveller.137 
3.140 The APP system will provide DIBP and Customs forewarning of a 
person’s intention to travel at the point that they check in for their flight.  
The Explanatory Memorandum notes that in the context of the foreign 
fighter threat and persons intending to depart Australia to engage in 
foreign conflicts, ‘this advance notice allows appropriate security response 
to persons of interest’.138 
3.141 The amendments also would impose an infringement regime for airlines 
and maritime vessels that fail to comply with the reporting requirement. 
The proposed infringement regime will mirror the existing regime for 
inbound travellers: either prosecution or a financial penalty in lieu of 
prosecution. The financial penalty rate will be the same as for arrivals, 
currently $1 700 for each breach.139 
 
134  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 9. 
135  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 69. 
136  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 69. 
137  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 69. 
138  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 69. 
139  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 69. 
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Schedule 7 – Seizing bogus documents 
3.142 Schedule 7 of the Bill amends the Migration Act to introduce the power to 
retain ‘bogus’ documents presented or provided to DIBP. Schedule 7 also 
amends the Citizenship Act 2007 by introducing a definition of ‘bogus 
documents’ and related documents.140 
3.143 All persons who seek to enter Australia must provide a passport or valid 
travel document that details the person’s personal information and has a 
facial image. Currently, inspection of documents takes place in public, 
which may include DIBP officers conducting a visual inspection of 
document/s and asking persons questions about the documents 
presented. The Explanatory Memorandum states that while the 
overwhelming majority of documents are legitimate, ‘a small number are 
bogus’.141 The Explanatory Memorandum continues: 
Where a bogus document is detected currently, the DIBP officer 
has no option but to return the bogus document to the person who 
provided it.  While DIBP does take action so that the person does 
not obtain a benefit as a result of using a bogus document at the 
time (for example, DIBP may refuse a visa application based on a 
bogus birth date), the document remains available to the person to 
continue to use it for potentially fraudulent purposes.142 
3.144 Under the proposed amendments, the seizure of bogus documents would 
take place during routine inspection of documents, which may be in a 
public place, and the retention of documents may occur in view of other 
members of the public.143 
3.145 The amendment provides that where a DIBP officer ‘reasonably suspects’ 
that a document presented is bogus, the officer may seize the document.144 
A ‘bogus document’ is currently defined in section 97 of the Migration 
Act: 
in relation to a person, means a document that the Minister 
reasonably suspects is a document that: 
 purports to have been, but was not, issued in respect of the 
person; or 
 is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not 
have the authority to do so; or 
 
140  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 9. 
141  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 71. 
142  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 71. 
143  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 72. 
144  Proposed section 487ZJ(1) of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
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 was obtained because of a false or misleading statement, 
whether or not made knowingly.145 
3.146 The proposed amendments will add new sections to the Migration Act to 
provide a prohibition on a person providing a bogus document/s within 
the meaning of section 97 for any purpose relating to DIBP’s functions or 
activities under the Migration Act. A document presented or provided to 
DIBP which meets the definition in section 97, will then be subject to 
forfeiture to the Commonwealth.146 A person presenting such documents 
may seek to recover the document or a seek a declaration that the 
document is not ‘bogus’. If proceedings are not instituted, the document 
will be deemed to be forfeited to the Commonwealth at the end of the 90 
day period, and it will then be disposed of, or retained for court 
proceedings.147   
3.147 The amendments require that the officer seizing documents will be 
required to give written notice as soon as practicable.148 A person 
suspected of presenting bogus documents may institute proceedings 
against the Commonwealth within 90 days of the written notice being 
issued.149 
3.148 Similarly, Schedule 7 of the Bill will add new sections to the Citizenship Act 
2007. The Explanatory Memorandum explains: 
As under the Migration Act, applicants for citizenship also provide 
a wide range of documents to DIBP, and the amendments to the 
Citizenship Act are for the same purposes as amendments to the 
Migration Act.150 
Interaction with the Privacy Act 1988 
3.149 As the proposed amendments in Schedules 5, 6 and 7 relate primarily to 
privacy rights under domestic and international law, the Privacy 
Commissioner submitted an overview of the Bill’s interactions with the 
Privacy Act 1988 and that Act’s overview mechanisms of personal 
information held by government authorities. The Privacy Commissioner 
submitted: 
The starting position is that generally Australian government 
agencies affected by the amendments proposed in the Bill are 
 
145  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 72. 
146  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 72. 
147  Proposed sections 487ZK and 487ZL of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
148  Proposed section 487ZJ(2) of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
149  Proposed section 487ZJ(2)(3) and (4) of the CTLA(FF) Bill. 
150  CTLA(FF) Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 72. 
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required to comply with the Australian Privacy Principles 
contained in the Privacy Act when handling personal information, 
including personal information collected for the purpose of 
upholding Australia’s national security.151  
3.150 The Privacy Commissioner stated that Australian Privacy Principles are 
‘legally binding’ and set out the standards, rights and obligations in 
relation to the collection, use, disclosure, holding and access to ‘personal 
information’.152 Further, the Principles require that a government agency 
only collects information that is ‘reasonably necessary for, or directly 
related to, the agency’s functions and activities’.153 Under the Privacy Act 
1988, government agencies are only permitted to 
use and disclose that personal information for the purpose for 
which the information was collected unless an exception applies to 
permit the information to be used or disclosed for a secondary 
purpose. Importantly, those exceptions include where the use or 
disclosure is authorised or required by an Australian law.  
3.151 The Privacy Commissioner explained: 
Where the proposed measures in the Bill authorise the collection, 
use or disclosure of personal information, this brings the activity 
within the ‘authorised or required by law’ exceptions… to permit 
the collection, use or disclosure without contravening the Privacy 
Act. However, even where a particular collection, use or disclosure 
is authorised by law, the relevant agency must still comply with 
other obligations contained [in the Privacy Act] when handling the 
information (including those relating to providing notice and 
ensuring the quality and security of the information).154 
3.152 The Australian Federal Police, the Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection, the Attorney-General’s Department and the Australian 
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre are required to comply with the 
Privacy Act 1988.155 The personal information handling practices of 
Australia’s intelligence agencies are not within the jurisdiction of the Act. 
Rather, these agencies – including how they collect, store and use personal 
information – are overseen by the Inspector General of Intelligence and 
Security.156 
 
151  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 28, p. 2.  
152  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 28, p. 2. 
153  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 28, p. 2. 
154  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 28, p. 2. 
155  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 28, p. 2; Mr Timothy Pilgrim, 
Privacy Commissioner, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 1. 
156  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 28, p. 2. 
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Stakeholder feedback 
3.153 Few organisations provided feedback on the proposed amendments in 
Schedules 5, 6 and 7. The Law Council of Australia submitted: 
The Law Council has not had time to consider the amendments 
proposed in Schedules 5 and 6 in any detail but notes that the 
measures proposed in Schedule 5 (use of automated border 
processing control systems to identify persons in immigration 
clearance) and Schedule 6 (extending Advance Passenger 
Processing (APP) have the potential to impact on the privacy of a 
vast array of individuals, including those that pose no risk to 
Australia’s national security.157 
3.154 In a supplementary submission, the Law Council further commented: 
The amendments [in Schedule 5] proposed in the Bill appear to 
broaden the purposes for which certain biometric material can be 
shared between agencies. At the same time, these Schedules make 
changes to the existing legislative safeguards governing the 
collection, use and sharing of biometric material under the 
Migration Act. This has the potential to have significant privacy 
implications, including implications for how sensitive personal 
information (that may in the future include material such as 
fingerprints) is stored and destroyed.158 
3.155 The Law Council recommended that Schedules 5 and 6 be reviewed by the 
Privacy Commissioner and that a Privacy Impact Assessment be prepared 
to ‘enable the public to have a clear sense as to what impact these changes 
will have on their privacy rights’.159 
3.156 Australian Lawyers for Human Rights and the Australian Privacy 
Foundation also raised concerns about the impact of the proposed 
amendments in Schedules 5, 6 and 7 on privacy rights in Australia.160  
More specifically, Australian Lawyers for Human Rights submitted its 
concern that ‘thresholds are … lowered’, commenting that the 
amendments to the Migration Act ‘enable Department of Immigration 
officers to retain personal identity documents where they only ‘suspect’ 
that the documents are bogus’.161 
 
157  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 31. 
158  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12.1, p. 4. 
159  Law Council of Australia, Submission 12, p. 31; see also Ms Leonie Campbell, Co-Director, 
Criminal Law and Human Rights Division, Law Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 59. 
160  Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission 15, p. 8; Australian Privacy Foundation, 
Submission 20, pp. 1–4. 
161  Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission 15, p. 5. 
182  
 
3.157 The Privacy Commissioner, Mr Timothy Pilgrim, observed that: 
There is always a risk when you are aggregating and collecting 
vast amounts of personal information, and when you add to those 
you increase the risk. The responsibility lies with the agency—the 
department in this case—to make sure they are making the right 
steps to make sure they are adding additional protections to their 
systems to protect that information... We need to make sure that, 
where it is being authorised by law, there is due consideration 
given in terms of making sure that it is commensurate with the 
need to collect that information—why is it being collected? And 
then we also need to make sure that we have appropriate levels of 
protection in place for it. That is where our responsibility comes 
into play in oversighting what sort of security measures those 
types of organisations such as the department have in place to 
protect that information.162 
3.158 However, the Privacy Commissioner also submitted that he did not have 
any significant concerns with Schedules 5, 6 and 7. The Commissioner 
noted his authority under the Privacy Act 1988 to be able to conduct 
Privacy Assessments when it is deemed by the Commissioner as 
‘appropriate to undertake one of those assessments’.163 The Commissioner 
elaborated: 
In doing that, we would be looking at the data holding security 
measures that the department would have in place to ensure that it 
is meeting the requirements of Data Security Principle APP 11 in 
the act, which requires agencies to take reasonable steps to protect 
that personal information. One of the things we would be looking 
at is the ability of the agency—the department in this case—to 
work with other appropriate agencies in the security area to make 
sure that they are working to keep those systems to as high a level 
as possible to meet any particular risk or threat that there may be 
to that information being inappropriately accessed. If that 
information were to be inappropriately accessed, the department 
itself would be possibly in breach of the Privacy Act and, 
therefore, we would be able to take some remedial steps.164 
3.159 More specifically, in respect of Schedule 5, the Commissioner submitted: 
I am mindful that the proposed amendment does allow for the 
making of regulations prescribing additional categories of 
 
162  Mr Pilgrim, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 2. 
163  Mr Pilgrim, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 2.  
164  Mr Pilgrim, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 2. 
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biometric information (referred to in the Migration Act as personal 
identifiers), such as fingerprints and iris scans. I appreciate the 
need to ensure that the law is able to accommodate changes in 
technology and, therefore, do not raise any concerns about this 
amendment. In saying this, I would, however, expect that any 
proposal to extend the types of biometric information prescribed 
in the regulations would be subject to appropriate public 
consultation. In addition, I would welcome any invitation to 
provide feedback on the likely privacy impacts of such a 
proposal.165 
3.160 Similarly, the Privacy Commissioner submitted that the amendments 
contained in Schedule 6 concerning advance passenger processing 
do not purport to expand the types of personal information 
collected, only to extend the reporting obligation to include 
travellers and crew that are departing Australia. Further, that the 
information collected is information that is already collected by the 
border authorities when the passenger or crew member presents at 
the border.166 
3.161 The Privacy Commissioner did not make comment on the amendments 
contained in Schedule 7 enabling the seizure of ‘bogus documents’.   
Committee comment 
3.162 The Committee is generally supportive of the amendments contained in 
Schedules 5, 6 and 7 of the Bill. 
3.163 However, given the quantity of sensitive personal information proposed 
to be collected, stored, shared and used by government agencies under 
Schedules 5 and 6, the Committee believes that the efficacy of measures 
taken to protect the privacy of this information should be reviewed. The 
Committee therefore recommends that the Privacy Commissioner review 
and report on the operation of these clauses by 30 June 2015. 
 
Recommendation 34 
 The Committee recommends that the Privacy Commissioner undertake 
a Privacy Assessment of the data collected and stored by the Department 
of Immigration and Border Protections and Customs, and report to the 
Attorney-General by 30 June 2015, with specific regard to the collection, 
 
165  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 28, pp. 5–6.  
166  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 28, p. 6. 
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storage, sharing and use of that data by the government agencies within 
the remit of the Commissioner’s jurisdiction.   
3.161 The Committee has significant concerns about the amendments contained 
in Schedule 5 that will permit additional categories of biometric data (such 
as fingerprints and iris scans) to be added to the Migration Regulations 
without those proposals being subject to sufficient parliamentary approval 
or public comment. 
3.162 The Committee appreciates the need for laws to accommodate changes in 
technology. However, given the sensitive nature of this data, the 
Committee considers that listing the collection of more personal 
information (such as fingerprints and iris scans) in regulations is an 
inappropriate mechanism for such an important policy. A formal 
legislative amendment would be a more appropriate avenue to scrutinise 
these proposals. The Committee recommends the provisions in the Bill 
that would allow the collection of this additional information be 
prescribed in regulations at some later point in time be removed from the 
Bill.   
3.163 Any future amendments to Australian law to enable the collection of this 
additional information should also be referred to this Committee for 
public inquiry.  
 
Recommendation 35 
 The Committee recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be amended to remove the 
ability to prescribe the collection of additional categories of biometric 
information within the Migration Regulations.   
Should this information be required by relevant agencies to ensure 
Australia’s border security, further legislative amendments should be 
proposed by the Government and referred to this Committee with 
appropriate time for inquiry and report.  
3.164 The Committee also considers that the Privacy Commissioner should be 
consulted in the policy-development stage of any proposal to amend 
Australian laws to allow for the collection of additional personal 
information. The Privacy Commissioner advised the Committee of the 
benefits that can be gained through government agencies developing a 
privacy impact statement in collaboration with the Commissioner’s 
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office.167 Among other benefits, a privacy impact statement could be done 
in a way to help better inform the Parliament as well as the public, and 
could also consider whether any additional safeguards need to be built 
into the legislative proposal to add additional protections to that 
information.  
3.165 The Committee is of the view that the Privacy Commissioner’s 
involvement at this early stage would better inform the Parliament’s 
consideration of the collection, storage and use of this sensitive personal 
information.  
 
Recommendation 36 
 The Committee recommends the Government consult with the Privacy 
Commissioner and conduct a privacy impact statement prior to 
proposing any future legislative amendments which would authorise 
the collection of additional biometric data such as fingerprints and iris 
scans.  
Concluding comments 
3.166 The Committee notes that in evidence to the inquiry, the IGIS indicated 
that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 provides her 
with sufficient authority to oversight the new ASIO powers contained in 
this Bill.168 
3.167 Further, while noting some resource implications, the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman expressed confidence that his office had the relevant 
expertise and experience to perform the inspection roles and other 
oversight activities that would result from the proposed legislation.169 
3.168 Throughout its inquiry, the Committee was very mindful that its review of 
the proposed legislation has coincided with a heightened level of security 
threat to Australians and our interests overseas. As ASIO and the AFP 
highlighted to the Committee in their evidence, a major reason for this 
 
167  Mr Pilgrim, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 October 2014, p. 3. See also 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-guides/guide-to-undertaking-
privacy-impact-assessments>. 
168  IGIS, Submission 1, p. 3; Ms Vivienne Thom, IGIS, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 2 October 
2014, pp. 6–7. 
169  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 10, p. [2]; Mr Richard Glenn, Acting Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2014, p. 66. 
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increased threat level is Australians travelling overseas to train with, fight 
for or otherwise support extremist groups, and the risks posed by those 
persons on their return to Australia. The Committee heard that such 
persons are likely to be further ‘radicalised’, with the result that they are 
both more able and more willing to commit terrorism offences.170 
3.169 The Committee restates that the legislative amendments proposed in this 
Bill were requested by security and law enforcement agencies to enhance 
their ability to respond to an increased threat from terrorism. In this 
context, the Committee fully supports the intent of the Bill. 
3.170 The Committee notes its previous recommendations in relation to the 
resourcing of the IGIS and the appointment of the INSLM. The Committee 
reiterates its recommendation that the Monitor is appointed urgently.  
3.171 The Committee notes that the Commonwealth Ombudsman made 
representations to the Committee regarding a lack of resources and 
further, that these issues are being pursued in ongoing discussions with 
the Attorney-General’s Department. 
3.172 The recommendations the Committee has made in its report are intended 
to further strengthen the provisions of the Bill including the safeguards, 
transparency and oversight mechanisms. The Committee commends its 
recommendations to the Parliament and recommends the Bill be passed.  
 
Recommendation 37 
 The Committee commends its recommendations to the Parliament and 
recommends that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 be passed.  
 
 
 
 
 
Dan Tehan MP 
Chair 
October 2014 
 
 
170  AFP, Submission 36, pp. 2–3; ASIO, Submission 11, pp. 2–4. 
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